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It was during the April 2007 UN forum on Online Dispute Resolution
(ODR) hosted by Graham Ross in Liverpool that I met Pablo Cortés for the
first time. He was telling with great enthusiasm about the research he was
conducting on norms for ODR. He clearly believed in the benefits of ODR,
and his aim was to stimulate the use of ODR by designing an appropriate,
coherent legal framework for the European Union. As you can find out when
reading this book, he successfully accomplished his mission.
One and a half years later we encountered again in Cork, in a very different
setting, namely during his Viva (the confidential oral examination for Ph.D
candidates) in University College Cork, Ireland. His defence of Developing
Online Dispute Resolution for Consumers in the European Union1 started October 3,
2008, at 13:30. Fully in line with the topic of the thesis I logged into Skype
that morning in the hotel, and when I did an alert popped up. It appeared to
be the birthday of our mutual friend and colleague, Colin Rule. So during the
Viva I started with asking him whether he had congratulated Colin. This was
obviously not the type of question he expected, but I explained the question
was not referring to benefiting from Colin’s groundbreaking work in ODR
(as we all do), but because it was Colin’s birthday. This first ‘question’
remained the only one he did not answer accurately, I quote from the Viva
rapport:2
The candidate started with a clear presentation of the topic of the thesis.
He dealt with the questions in a very accurate way, addressing the neces-
sary issues fluently and demonstrated a very good understanding of the
domain.
October 2008 was in fact a fruitful month for norms on Online Dispute
Resolution. Co-incidentally the same month Susan Schiavetta defended
her remarkable doctoral dissertation entitled Electronic Alternative Dispute
Resolution – Increasing Access To Justice Via Procedural Protections at the Uni-
versity of Oslo (Norway) on October 23 and 24, 2008.3 But back to Pablo; he
did not only write on ODR, but has been an active participant of the stand-
ardisation of ODR project by the EU/CEN as well:4 he has provided feedback
and attended the first meeting in Brussels in 2008. Furthermore even
before this book was published, his work has been read by a large group of
students. I used excerpts from his thesis in an ODR module of an inter-
national LL.M in business law course on E-commerce Law in spring 2009.
The students did highly appreciate this part of the course, and considered the
writing by Pablo Cortés really valuable. Also a group of Dutch students in my
Master course on Internet Law, both in 2008 and 2009, learned many things
from an early version of a chapter of this book which was part of mandatory
reading.
In September 2009, in Barcelona, on his home ground, Pablo Cortés pre-
sented during an ODR event and he then asked me if I would be willing to
write this foreword. I immediately accepted, and am very glad to be in the
position of recommending this work.
As said, this book is well suited for students, but also for both academics
and practitioners interested in norms on ODR. Before the Viva I had read the
manuscript of the Ph.D-thesis that the present book is based upon with great
pleasure. I quote once more from the rapport:
The candidate has written a solid work with thorough considerations
of the issues, and good use of the literature. He supplemented his litera-
ture review with several interviews with stakeholders in the field of
ODR. He developed along the lines of existing recommendations the
idea of drafting a Directive5 to harmonise necessary elements of building
trust in ODR. His proposal is nuanced, sophisticated, and mature. The
candidate writes in a pleasant style, synthesises and analyses the material
very well.
This is indeed a great book, by a talented scholar of whom I expect we will
hear much more. As the foreword reveals I met Pablo in Liverpool, Cork,
Brussels, and Barcelona, so maybe it would be a good idea if he presents me
the print of the book in person, in Amsterdam. On the other hand, we live in
the information society, so an e-book or a hard copy via normal post is fine
too. Maybe most fitted to the topic of the book is if he informs me online,
using Skype, an ODR platform, or with our avatars in a virtual world. One




Computer/Law Institute, VU University Amsterdam
Centre for Electronic Dispute Resolution
1 In the initial invitation entitled Developing Online Dispute Resolution in Europe for
Electronic Contracts.
xx Foreword
2 By Professor Steven Hedley (supervisor), Dr. Darius Whelan, and I.
3 Supervisors were Professors Ola Mestad and Lee Bygrave. The adjudication com-
mittee consisted of Professors Hans Jacob Bull, Elizabeth Thornburg, and I.
4 Final CEN Workshop Agreement (CWA) was published in September 2009, the
members of the project team were Andrea Borri (Firenze Tecnologia, Italy),
Jacques Gouimenou (TIGA technologies, France), Brian Hutchinson (University
College of Dublin, Ireland), Arno R. Lodder and Vincent Tilman (Eurochambres)
5 It must be noted that the thesis recommended the drafting of a Directive; con-
versely this book recommends the drafting of a Regulation as a more appropriate




The notion that most people want black-robed judges, well-dressed lawyers,
and fine panelled courtrooms as the setting to resolve their dispute is not
correct. People with problems, like people with pains, want relief, and they
want it as quickly and inexpensively as possible.1
Background
Electronic commerce in the European Union
Electronic commerce (e-commerce) is the largest and fastest growing market
in the world. It offers online consumers a vast selection of products and
businesses with an enormous potential customer base. The increasing number
of internet users in the European Union (EU), with more than half of its
citizens using the internet regularly, has impacted on the growth of business
to consumer (B2C) e-commerce. As a result, e-commerce is the most common
form of cross-border shopping in the EU, where one-third of EU citizens
used the internet in 2008 to buy something online.2 According to the
European Commissioner for Consumer Protection, consumer spending repre-
sents 58 per cent of the EU gross domestic product (GDP).3 However, only
29 per cent of EU small and medium sized enterprises are currently involved
in cross-border transactions, even when 48 per cent stated that they would be
prepared to sell to online consumers in other Member States.
Amidst the difficulties facing the expansion of e-commerce within the EU,
a significant barrier is created by the potential problems in resolving com-
plaints.4 Indeed, cross-border trade is being slowed down not because there is
a lack of regulation but because there is no means to enforce the existing law;
in other words, there is no effective method of resolving disputes. This is
very apparent for small value claims which cannot usually be resolved in
courts since the cost of obtaining a remedy in court will frequently be greater
than the amount claimed. Consequently, consumers often do not even try
to assert their rights and statistics continue to record ad nauseam how EU
consumers often distrust e-commerce.5
If the EU is to benefit fully from the economic potential of its internal
market, a proactive policy approach is needed to stimulate favourable market
developments in online consumer protection.6 It will also be necessary to
develop tailored mechanisms to ensure the enforcement of consumers’ rights,
which adequately reflect the requirements of cyberspace. If this is done effect-
ively, by providing consumers and businesses with trust and consistency in
the resolution of disputes, it will facilitate the growth of e-commerce.7
The need for online dispute resolution (ODR)
In relation to the resolution of online consumer disputes, our legal system
faces a crucial choice: either to adopt traditional dispute resolution methods
that have served our legal systems well for hundreds of years or to find a new
method which is better suited to a world not anchored in jurisdiction and
identity. In the borderless online marketplace, parties located in different
parts of the world make contracts with each other at the click of a mouse. In
this virtual environment, where activities take place amongst strangers, the
potential for misunderstanding, mistake and fraud is augmented. However,
litigation for these disputes arising out of e-commerce is often inconvenient,
time-consuming and expensive owing to the low value of the transactions and
the physical distance between the parties.8 Furthermore, courts may lack
the resources and the expertise to keep up with the growth in cross-border
disputes arising out of an ever emerging e-commerce.9
The resolution of disputes is enhanced when assisted by Information and
Communications Technology (ICT), because when distance communications
are utilised there is no need to travel, which in turn reduces costs and
increases access to justice. Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) mainly involves
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) processes, largely assisted by the
speed and convenience of ICT and the internet, which are eminently suited
to the needs of e-commerce. ODR creates the opportunity for the resolu-
tion of lesser-value and cross-border disputes which could not simply be
resolved otherwise. In addition, ODR in the B2C context has the role
of increasing consumer trust, essential in the development of sustainable
e-commerce; if that is not provided, consumers will certainly prefer to shop at
the local store.10
There are some misconceptions about ODR, such as the idea that ODR is
only valid for small claims, or that ODR exclusively relies on automated
technology, or that ODR can only deal with online disputes. As a matter of
fact, ODR has proven successful in resolving offline and large value disputes,
eg CyberSettle,11 and it generally incorporates neutral third parties, eg
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP). Today, ADR is mainly
used in relation to employment disputes, family disputes and commercial
disputes, including those with cross-border elements. ADR is, however,
largely untested with B2C disputes. Moreover, there is no clear evidence that
ADR mechanisms correlate to a feeling of consumer safety, any more than
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evidence demonstrating that ADR contributes to consumer satisfaction in
dispute resolution.12 However, when ADR is complemented with distance
communications it is unquestionable that it increases access to justice for
many e-commerce players. ODR services, such as PayPal online mediation (as
well as the service that was provided to eBay users by SquareTrade until May
2008) are frequently the only processes available for addressing e-commerce
disputes.
In order to achieve valuable legal protection for online consumers, it is
necessary to develop dispute resolution mechanisms that respond to the needs
of the parties, as disputes arising online have different needs to those arising
offline. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development observed
that ‘[i]n the online environment, loss of time often causes loss of opportun-
ities, and people involved in e-commerce will want to resolve problems in the
fastest possible way’.13 The closer our legal system is to meet this goal, the
more it will boost consumers’ confidence in e-commerce.
Setting the tone
Aim of this book
This book examines how ADR when complemented with ICT can assist in
resolving consumer disputes that arise from e-commerce. ADR laws and
principles as well as flexible judicial processes, such as the small claims pro-
cess, will be evaluated as most of these principles also apply to ODR
processes. Most of the discussion in this book is limited to only a few ODR
methods, namely online mediation, online arbitration and online small
claims processes, since these methods are the most common and have the
greatest potential for resolving consumer disputes. Furthermore, these are the
methods proposed in the last chapter of this book in a model for designing
an EU legal framework in the field of ODR. However, the types of
ODR methods are much wider and some references to them will be made
throughout the book.
The aim of this book is to give an overview of the current use and potential
of ODR in the B2C context and to identify obstacles to a more widespread
use of ODR for consumer transactions. In this context, the role of the law
would be to respond to the need of directing disputants to use cost-effective
ODR services, while also ensuring compliance with due process principles.
Online disputes are often of a global nature; hence, national and regional laws
may constrain rather than aid the resolution of cross-border disputes. The
final objective will be to identify the legal responses required in the EU to
accelerate the expansion of ODR in the resolution of B2C disputes.
This book will focus first and foremost on ODR but it will also examine,
where necessary, broader areas such as consumer protection, ADR, civil pro-
cedure and conflicts of law. The types of disputes considered in this book will
be national as well as cross-border consumer contractual disputes arising out
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of the online marketplace, where parties do not have equal bargaining power
(ie B2C). In so doing, this book will primarily be focusing on those disputes
which appear to be most suitable for ODR, namely those concerned with
the entitlement to material benefits rather than those concerned with funda-
mental rights. This includes civil and economic disputes, for instance dis-
putes related to violation of trademarks, sales, exclusion clauses, unfair terms,
deliveries, payments, and so forth.
This book seeks to examine the policy making and regulatory challenges of
ODR with the aim of identifying a new approach to the resolution of online
consumer disputes, which may assist in redressing grievances, strengthening
consumer trust and making e-commerce more secure. Legal provisions for
ODR seem to be the best option for resolving these challenges. The ultimate
objective of this book is to assess the need for designing a new EU regula-
tory model in order to improve the enforcement of online consumers’ rights.
This book will therefore evaluate the proposition that ODR, if it is to
realise its full potential in the resolution of e-commerce disputes and to
facilitate the enforcement of ODR decisions, must be grounded firmly on an
EU regulatory basis.
Summary of contents
Chapter 1 considers consumer protection and access to justice from an EU
perspective. This chapter intends first to examine the consumer protection
law in the EU and the means to enforce consumers’ legitimate rights. When
litigation for the resolution of disputes arising out of online transactions
becomes necessary, parties must answer questions related to the establish-
ment of the legal forum, the determination of the applicable law and the
enforcement of judgments. The general objective of Chapter 1 is to evaluate
whether the judicial system offers a helpful tool to enforce consumers’
rights adequately and whether alternative methods of dispute resolution are
necessary.
Chapter 2 introduces ODR as a consumer redress option. This chapter
discusses the current development of ODR and evaluates the challenges posed
by ODR, such as how it can be impartially funded, how to direct parties to
take advantage of ODR, how to ensure enforcement and due process stand-
ards and, finally, to define the role played by technology in the dispute
resolution process.
Chapter 3 deals with consumer adjudicative processes supported with ICT,
ie cybercourts and online arbitration. With regard to cybercourts, this chap-
ter examines first how national judicial authorities are incorporating ICT into
their processes but its focus lays mainly on the Regulation for a European
Small Claims Procedure,14 which in order to be cost-effective will need to rely
heavily on ICT. This chapter also addresses online arbitration and the princi-
pal legal obstacles that face its implementation. Particular attention is given
to an international adjudicative process akin to arbitration, the Uniform
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Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), examining in detail how
it works, identifying its main advantages and pitfalls, and to what extent this
ODR model could be applied to resolve mainstream B2C disputes through
online arbitration.
Chapter 4 examines online mediation for e-consumers. The main challenge
for online mediation is to attract the parties in dispute to a consensual ODR
process. To achieve this, it is necessary to educate the parties and for the
legislature and the judiciary to promote mediation as a matter of public
policy. The Directive on Mediation, which is due to be implemented in
all EU Member States by May 2011, encourages mediation and assures the
direct recognition and enforcement of cross-border settlements.15 In addition,
English courts offer litigants an incentive to consider ADR, advising that an
unreasonable refusal to mediate will result in an order to pay all the legal
costs.16 This chapter tests the application of the above regulation and case law
to consumer online mediation. It also considers whether mandatory online
mediation may be implemented successfully.
Chapter 5 evaluates the critical question of whether a legal framework is
needed in the EU to develop consumer ODR. This chapter explores the
efficiency and sufficiency of the existing regulatory mechanisms and the need
for designing a European legal framework in the field of ODR. It puts for-
ward a proposal for taking co-ordinated action within the EU to ensure that
those ODR services that meet the required legal standards could be rewarded
with a higher level of legal recognition.
Methodology
A comparative analysis between the United States (US) and the EU jurisdic-
tions seems appropriate since both jurisdictions are committed to working
closely together on ADR and ODR.17 However, the focus of this research is on
the EU jurisdiction, with specific reference to Ireland, Spain and the UK. The
choice of jurisdictions takes into account both my language skills and the
benefit of using and contrasting common law and civil law approaches to
dispute resolution. This book intends to evaluate the introduction of ICT
mechanisms in the above jurisdictions to resolve consumer disputes through
the use of litigation and ADR methods. Thus, this book evaluates national
initiatives, such as the Irish online small claims procedure, the Spanish online
consumer arbitration and the decisions from the English courts persuading
litigants to use ADR mechanisms.
The methodology of this book reaches beyond an analysis of primary legal
material and extends into a consideration of experts and political discourse on
the measures introduced to deal with ADR, ICT and ODR. For instance, this
book discusses reports from the European Commission, the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and European Consumer
Centres (ECC). Furthermore, the previous work of ODR experts (such
as Ethan Katsh, Colin Rule, Lucille Ponte, Thomas Schultz, Julia Hörnle,
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Arno Lodder and Orna Rabinovich-Einy) has contributed to the design and
theoretical underpinnings of this book.
Finally, it must be mentioned that there are some limitations to this
research because it is difficult accurately to assess ODR development when
statistical analysis is scarce. In order to measure properly the effectiveness
of ODR more information on outcomes, processes and users’ comments is
needed. The most important statistical analysis to date has been carried
out by Melissa Conley Tyler in 2004.18 Previously, in 2001, Consumers
International carried out another survey study specifically on B2C ODR.19
At the EU level the only study on ODR is the Workshop Agreement
on Standardisation of Online Dispute Resolution Tools.20 This study has
had as its objective the improvement of the interoperability of ODR
services in the EU and beyond; in so doing it has focused on delivering a
taxonomy through the classification of existing ODR methods as a basis for
building an ontology. Yet, this agreement does not include any statistical
data. Along the same lines, it has been decided to restrict this book to a
theoretical and normative approach rather than to carry out empirical
research given the time constraints for this book. Further, given the con-
fidential nature of most ODR processes, save with some exceptions, eg
UDRP, it has proven to be very difficult to obtain statistical data from most
ODR providers.
Location and contribution of the book in the existing
academic debate
Although the study on the application of ODR to B2C disputes is not new,
most of the legal writing emanates from the US.21 To date, there has been
comparatively little published on this issue in the EU. There is evidence that
ODR is still emerging in the EU where it is facing additional hurdles, such as
different languages and legal cultures. With the advance of new technologies,
there is an increasing interest from the European Commission in the promo-
tion of ODR to boost and accelerate the growth of e-commerce within the
European single market.22 This book evaluates ODR methods by examining
the progress of ODR in the European legal context. It considers what can be
taken from the ODR legal academic writing in various jurisdictions and to
apply this information in an EU context, which aims to create a secure online
internal market that will promote adequate consumer redress and encourage
corporate competition.
The focus on the EU market is owed to a number of reasons. Most of the
literature comes from the US, leaving a current gap in the EU legal literature.
It is obvious that there are vast differences between both jurisdictions: both
in current legal structures and in the online environment, as well as the
behaviour and expectations of EU and US consumers. The EU has a different
legal culture from the US, putting far more emphasis on the protection
of consumers and regulation of the marketplace. In the EU there is an
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increasingly harmonised regime of consumer protection law, which includes
distance selling, unfair terms and consumer credit regulations. EU consumers
have arguably greater expectations of protection in the marketplace than US
consumers. A common plan, therefore, to enforce those rights could be
developed in the EU.
The European Commission has shown interest in creating a regulatory
model, which has been indicated by preparatory acts, such as the two Green
Papers on access to consumer justice and ADR.23 The second of the papers is
of particular importance because it opened the debate on cross-border ADR
and promoted ‘ADR and ODR [as] a political priority’.24 Nonetheless, very
few concrete initiatives have emerged from the EU to date. The most likely
reason for this is that the EU is awaiting the development of ODR within the
industry. In this book, I have considered how the EU could intervene to
further the development of ODR.
EU interest has also been evident through the financial support granted
for ODR initiatives and projects. Among these initiatives is the Electronic
Consumer Dispute Resolution scheme (ECODIR) and the Euro-Label
trustmark, projects which aimed to set up systems devoted to the electronic
resolution of internet disputes arising between consumers and merchants in
Member States. These projects, however, did not achieve a successful market
implementation; consequently, their study will help us to examine the dif-
ficulties currently faced by ODR initiatives. This book will therefore analyze
the main hurdles for ODR projects in obtaining successful market implemen-
tation and will propose solutions to overcome current obstacles. It will also
examine the role of other European initiatives such as the ECC-Net, which
informs consumers of their rights when they find themselves in a dispute
in another Member State. As far as possible, I have tried to state the law as
I see it at Easter 2010.
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1 Consumer protection and
access to justice in the era of
electronic commerce
A European perspective
Access to the courts may be open in principle. In practice, however, most
people find their legal rights severely compromised by the cost of legal ser-
vices, the baffling complications of existing rules and procedures, and the
long, frustrating delays involved in bringing proceedings to a conclusion.
There is far too much law for those who can afford it and far too little for
those who cannot.1
1.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to evaluate whether European consumers are pro-
vided with adequate protection when they participate in e-commerce. To that
end, this chapter considers not only the substantive law provided to encour-
age consumer participation in e-commerce but also the adequacy of existing
judicial tools to enforce these rights effectively.
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section (1.2) sets out
the current European consumer protection regulation affecting e-commerce.
The European Union (EU) is developing and harmonising consumer protec-
tion law with the aim of achieving a truly integrated internal market. This
has been manifested in the area of e-commerce through many legal initiatives
discussed in this chapter, such as the E-Commerce Directive and the Distance
Selling Directive, soon to be part of the Directive on Consumers Rights. The
European regulation is examined in the global context by contrasting its
tendency towards codification against the more hands off regulatory approach
of the US. This section considers whether there is a need to pursue greater
legal harmonisation at regional and international levels in order to encourage
the development of e-commerce.
The second section (1.3) considers consumer access to judicial redress in a
European context within the EU by examining the small claims procedures of
Ireland, Spain and the UK. It assesses these national judicial procedures and
tests their accessibility for consumers by considering such critical questions as
whether the existing small claim procedures are effective to deal with (i) low
cost disputes or (ii) those with cross-border elements, such as those disputes
arising out of e-commerce transactions.
The third section (1.4) addresses the conflict of laws. The development of
e-commerce has led to an increase in the number of cross-border disputes.
The Brussels Regulation and the Rome Regulation are contrasted with US
case law on choice of law and forum selection in order to compare the legal
treatment in both jurisdictions for business to consumer (B2C) disputes. At
the international level it is apparent that the question of conflict of laws is
still quite unsettled, but at a regional level there is greater legal uniformity.
In addition to the above, this section also examines the efforts at an inter-
national level to reach legal harmonisation of the principles of conflict of laws
through the Hague Conference.
Finally, section 1.5 discusses the enforcement of consumers’ rights under
the EU legislation. First, it considers judicial enforcement and the procedural
requirements for applications to enforce judgments and other judicial deci-
sions. It examines how consumers may seek redress independently or as a
group of affected individuals, either by collective actions, or from the repre-
sentations of consumer organisations and government consumer agencies.
It also discusses enforcement when this is carried out by governmental
organisations that monitor and enforce consumer rights.
1.2 Consumer protection policy in the online market
1.2.1 The legal definition of consumer
A consumer is considered to be anyone acting for personal purposes and in
a non-commercial capacity. From a legal perspective a consumer is an indi-
vidual that needs legal protection when dealing with a business owing to his
perceived lack of knowledge and weak position in the course of entering into
a transaction. According to the Proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights
a ‘consumer means any natural person who [. . .] is acting for purposes which
are outside his trade, business, craft or profession’.2 As opposed to this, the
trader is considered to be a natural or legal person who, for the transaction in
question, is acting in a commercial or professional capacity.
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) deliberated over the definition of
consumer a number of times in order to clarify its scope. In France v Di Pinto
the defendant (Di Pinto) offered professionals who wanted to sell their busi-
nesses an opportunity to advertise their offers in his magazine.3 The question
referred to the ECJ was whether professionals in the process of selling their
businesses could be treated as consumers owing to their lack of experience in
these transactions. The ECJ did not accept this subjective notion of con-
sumers and rejected the above argument. This definition of consumer was
reinforced in the case of Francesco Benincasa v Dentalkit.4 In this case the parties
had entered into a franchising agreement for the defendant to open a business,
which was never completed. The question raised in this case was whether the
defendant could be considered as a consumer under Article 13(1) of the
Brussels Convention of 27 September 1968. This Article defined consumer as
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a party acting for a purpose which may be considered as outside his profes-
sional activities. The resulting question was formulated: is this qualification
then applicable to parties who have not yet entered into a commercial activ-
ity? The ECJ stated that a consumer, in the light of the Convention, should
be interpreted as a private end-consumer, and in no way engaged in com-
mercial or professional activity. Hence, following this interpretation of the
ECJ, consumers should be understood in a strict sense, that is, individuals
whose activities are exclusively guided by private and household purposes
without any connections to professional or commercial activities.5
Despite this unmistakable interpretation of the law there will always be
border-line cases, eg a solicitor who buys a car for personal and business
purposes. It seems that in this type of border-line cases consumer protection
law will normally apply as long as the professional interest is not higher than
the personal one.6
1.2.2 Consumer protection
The notion of consumer protection first appeared to challenge the doctrine of
freedom of contract in the 1970s. This new concept questioned whether it
was fair to allow a business to decide freely on the terms and conditions of a
contract when dealing with consumers who are not technical experts and have
neither the bargaining power nor the knowledge to negotiate fairly the terms
of the contract. Under these circumstances the notion of freedom is truly
applicable to one of the parties. At this point, the doctrine of freedom
of contract stopped being absolute and began to be seen as a doctrine with
some limitations. In order to balance the inequality of contractual power
between businesses and consumers, the legislature decided to intervene by
enacting laws to protect consumers when entering in contractual relations
with businesses.
To achieve adequate consumer protection, the law of contract must balance
two of its functions. The first one is the ‘facilitative function’ that states that
parties must have the freedom to do what they want to do (if both really want
the same once they are ad idem), which is the idea underlying the doctrine of
freedom of contract. The second one is the ‘protective function’, which aims
to prevent abuse from the stronger party over the weaker party when negoti-
ating the terms and conditions of consumer contracts. To obtain this double
objective Girot suggests that the consumer law should ‘be enlightened by
“the notion of the parties’ reasonable expectations” ’.7 This notion contributes
to find a balance between, in words of Adams and Brownsword, market-
individualism and consumer welfarism.8
The idea that ‘weak businesses’ must have legal protection when dealing
with stronger parties is based on the same legal principle supporting con-
sumer protection, ie the imbalance of power may allow abuses from the
stronger party. In this context, the European Commission consulted in the
Revision of the Consumer Acquis whether weak businesses or businesses
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that have a double capacity (eg buying something for personal as well as for
professional use) should receive the same level of protection as consumers.
The case law of the ECJ and the Revision of the Consumer Acquis implies that
the inclusion of non-consumers under the protection of the consumer regula-
tion is undesirable.9 The reason behind this restriction is that the best method
for recognising consumers is distinguishing them from those acting in a pro-
fessional capacity. Furthermore, accepting commercial parties within the
meaning of consumer protection might increase the risk of legal disharmony
when national courts construe this new category.
Nevertheless, removing professionals from consumer protection regulation
should not exclude them from legal protection because small businesses are
often in similar circumstances to those experienced by consumers. Businesses
can still be protected by general rules of contract law, such as those related to
the valid formation of contracts, which are applied to both businesses and
consumers.10
1.2.3 Consumer protection in the field of e-commerce
1.2.3.1 EU regulation
At the time of writing, in the context of information and communications
technology (ICT) there are two main directives which aim to protect con-
sumers when buying online. These are the Distance Selling Directive and the
E-Commerce Directive,11 which aim not just to grant minimum rights for
consumers but also to harmonise the Member States’ legislation in order to
facilitate and boost the internal market.
Under the Electronic Commerce Directive, EU Member States must
ensure that their legal systems allow the formation, completion and enforce-
ment of electronic contracts.12 The requirements to create a valid electronic
contract are similar to those relating to traditional paper contracts. On the
one hand, common law legal systems require the concurrence of at least three
elements: (i) an agreement ad idem (offer and acceptance); (ii) consideration
(the acquisition of something of value in return for what one gives or prom-
ises, usually an agreed sum of money); and (iii) the intention to create legal
relations. On the other hand, civil law countries do not see consideration as a
compulsory element. In addition to the requisites to enter into traditional
contracts, consumer electronic contracts must fulfil extra legal requirements.
First, consumers must be informed about the technical steps required to
conclude the e-contract. Secondly, the terms and conditions must be avail-
able in a manner that allows their storage and reproduction.13 Finally, the
directive introduces a new element required for the formation of an e-contract,
namely the confirmation, which requires the service provider to acknowledge
the receipt of a consumer’s order.14
One of the challenges of e-contracts is the difficulty in verifying the
identity of the parties. This obstacle is partly overcome through the use of
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electronic signatures. In this regard, the European Commission has adopted a
directive guaranteeing EU-wide legal recognition of electronic signatures.15
However, this directive provides for some exceptions such as contracts relat-
ing to land transactions, where, even though the preparatory acts were carried
out online, the final signature must be of the established accepted paper based
type. Although the directive intends to be technological neutral, it estab-
lishes two types of e-signatures, simple and advanced signatures. The latter
type of signature has cryptographic assurance of the sender’s identity, and the
integrity of the text to which is attached. This differentiation has attracted
many criticisms for being biased in favour of advanced technologies, ie smart
cards.16 The directive has been criticised for being over-regulatory to the
point that it has restricted the development of ICT in this area. However,
it can be argued that the market needs to know when an e-signature is
legally binding; yet the need for legal certainty must be balanced with the
risk of creating technological restrictions and barriers to the development of
e-signatures.
Consumer protection in the EU is still developing. The Directive on
Unfair Commercial Practice outlines ‘sharp practices’ such as pressure selling,
pyramid schemes, misleading marketing and unfair advertising.17 It is
important to point out that this directive, unlike the Directive on Consumer
Rights (but in the same way as most EU directives in the field of con-
sumer protection), only provides minimum harmonisation. In order words,
the Directive on Unfair Consumer Practice has set minimum standards
to contribute to the harmonisation of consumer protection law between the
Member States, but allowing Member States to expand consumers’ rights
further. Additionally, this directive obliges businesses not to mislead con-
sumers with misinformation through acts or omissions.18 Through this direc-
tive consumers are given the same protection against aggressive or misleading
marketing whether they buy locally or from other Member States. It also
provides additional protections for vulnerable consumers who are often the
target of unscrupulous traders, such as rules regulating advertising that
targets children.
The most significant European regulation in relation to e-commerce is the
Directive on the Protection of Consumers in Respect of Distance Contracts,
commonly referred to as the Distance Selling Directive.19 This directive,
along with three others – Unfair Contract Terms, Sales and Guarantees and
Distance Selling – are presently being merged into the Directive on Con-
sumer Rights, which harmonises and updates the law of the EU Member
States for consumer contracts for goods and services.20 The new text is more in
line with the e-commerce environment and introduces full harmonisation in
its provisions, restricting EU Member States from introducing more or less
stringent provisions when implementing it into their domestic legislations.21
The proposed Directive on Consumer Rights recognises a number of
rights to consumers which cannot be waived in the terms of a B2C contract.
These are:
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(i) Right to information: Consumers must be provided with certain infor-
mation, such as the name and address of the supplier; main characteristics
of goods and services; price inclusive of taxes; arrangements for payment;
existence of right of withdrawal, where applicable; information on
after-sales; and guarantees etc.22
(ii) Consumer protection against the fraudulent use of credit cards.
(iii) Cooling off period for distance and off-premises contracts, eg online
contracts. Consumers can withdraw from transactions if they are not
satisfied, without any justification. To invocate this right, a consumer
must communicate his or her decision in writing to the business within
14 calendar days.23 This period increases to a maximum of an extra three
months where the supplier had not provided the relevant information.24
The supplier must return any money received from the consumer (less the
cost of returning the goods, except when the goods are defective) within
30 days, counting from the day the supplier had received the returned
goods.25 The right to cancel does not require any particular form, but
consumers may use a standard form included in the Annex I of the
directive. This right has some exceptions under which the consumer
will not be entitled to cancel the contract: in case of goods made
to the consumer’s specifications; audio, video recording or computer
software where the consumer has broken the seal; newspapers, periodicals
or magazines; contracts for gaming, betting or lottery services etc.26
Surprisingly, the directive omits the exclusion of goods which cannot be
returned for health, safety and/or hygiene reasons, such as lipsticks and
underwear.
(iv) Prohibiting certain activities by the supplier such as inertia selling,
which is the practice of sending products to people who have not asked
for them, and then demanding payment.27 It also restricts the use of
automated calling systems without human intervention.
The directive imposes an obligation on all Member States to observe this
common set of rules for consumer protection and to implement them
with the assistance of an efficient means of enforcement. In addition, it
imposes the obligation of actively informing consumers and businesses about
these rules.28
1.2.3.2 Electronic commerce in the global context: EU and US comparison
In order to consider consumer law in an international context it is first neces-
sary to make a comparison between the two largest world economies where, on
the one hand, the United States has a greater economic and legal integration
owing to the fact that it has been operating a single market economy since
its constitutional foundation and, on the other hand, the more recent forma-
tion of the EU results in a more fragmented market, despite its increasing
integration. However, in terms of consumer regulation, the EU has achieved a
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higher level of legal integration and legal codification than that obtained in
the US. In the US, consumer protection focuses on false advertising, particu-
larly when directed at minors and deceptive business practices, such as
coercing consumers into unfair contracts. In contrast to the EU, the US has
not enacted new legislation to protect consumers who contract online29 and
it has taken an approach of ‘favoring business efficiency, flexibility, and prac-
ticalities’.30 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) strategy for protecting
consumers is basically enforcing the existing regulations applicable to con-
tract law, as well as educating consumers and businesses on how to participate
in e-commerce.31
The effectiveness of these diverse policies in protecting consumers is argu-
able; in fact, both policies have contributed to the growth of e-commerce.
The EU approach supports heavy consumer protection, taking a ‘precaution-
ary’ approach with the aim of promoting a sustainable growth of competitive
e-commerce within the internal market. The US view, in contrast, suggests
that excessive consumer protection, such as that of the pro-consumer European
regulation, may be detrimental to the evolution of e-commerce by restrict-
ing innovation.32 The US ‘hands off’ regulatory approach is based on liberal
ideas which support the premise that small and medium sized firms will
not be economically viable if they have to comply with high consumer
protection policies.
Notwithstanding the different approaches, many requirements in online
contract formation are common in both jurisdictions. For instance, one pecu-
liarity of electronic agreements is that these e-contracts are usually dealt with
faster than some paper-based contracts. As a result, when contracting online,
it is more likely that errors will be made, particularly at the time of the
consumer’s acceptance.33 In these cases, service providers in both jurisdictions
must make technical means available allowing customers to identify and
correct input errors prior to the placing of the order.34 Additionally, the US
FTC has statutorily prohibited unfair acts and advertising that are likely
to cause substantial consumer injury. With the same purpose in mind, the
EU has created the Directive on Misleading Advertising.35 Also the Unfair
Terms Directive (soon to be the Directive on Consumer Rights) has some
similarities with the US Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws, whereby any
term included in the contract will be invalid if one party believes that the
other party would not consent if that party was aware of the inclusion of
such a term.36
There are still many European provisions in relation to consumer protec-
tion that differ widely from the US ‘hands off’ approach. Among them, the
most significant are the absence of the ‘cooling off period’ in the US regula-
tion; the US provisions that allow an easier enforcement of standard form
contract terms; and the validation of post-payment disclosure of material
terms in consumer transactions.37 This approach is in direct conflict with that
taken in the EU, where generally the law limits the enforcement of standard
form contract terms; it recognises a consumer’s right to withdraw and it
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requires the full disclosure of terms prior to the formation of the contract and
payment by the consumer.38
Overall, it is difficult to say which of these policies is more effective for
encouraging market development. Ramsay notes that there is very little
empirical data on whether central policies such as the cooling-off period
actually have any impact on the market.39 It seems clearer, however, that
legal harmonisation will benefit the cross-border market since consumers’
expectations will be more easily fulfilled.
1.2.3.3 The need for harmonisation
The base for harmonisation of national legislation in the EU is grounded in
Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, which stresses
the need for a high level of protection for consumers.40 From a consumer’s
point of view there still appears to be a lack of confidence in e-commerce;
consumers do not yet feel well protected when engaging in cross-border
transactions. The main reason given by consumers’ surveys is the difficulty of
resolving after-sales problems (88 per cent) and the problems of initiating
legal action in the courts (83 per cent).41 However, as Vogenauer and
Weatherill pointed out, these difficulties are not only caused by the lack
of uniformity in the legislation but also stem from problems arising from
the different languages and cultures involved in cross-border transactions.
According to them, it is not surprising that nearly eight in ten consumers
would propose, as a solution to the cross-border barriers, the unification
of the law and the introduction of the possibility of suing in their own
countries.42
From the business owners’ point of view, the difficulties of cross-border
transactions derive from the need to comply with disparate domestic regula-
tions, in particular with consumer protection laws and fiscal regulations. In
the same survey businesses also propose, as a solution to these cross-border
difficulties, the harmonisation of laws as well as the establishment of ADR
services to resolve disputes.43 In many cases small and medium enterprises
(SMEs) and consumers do not know the law and procedure of the other
Members States, which accordingly makes them uncomfortable in engaging
in cross-border transactions, even between Member States where the law is
quite similar. A European harmonisation in contract law may encourage
cross-border trade by giving the perception to SMEs and consumers that their
expectations will be fulfilled at the national and also at the regional level.
In addition, the harmonisation of international private law rules at an
international level would contribute to facilitating a greater access to justice.44
However, European legal harmonisation in respect of consumer protection
differs from the US policy. This is because the EU is drafting a new con-
sumer regulation from scratch, whereas the US is taking a different legal
strategy by trusting market self-balance more and thus avoiding the
introduction of consumer laws that could hinder the growth of the market.45
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Taking these divergent policy approaches into account, a higher degree of
harmonisation in substantive law cannot be reached in the short term; it
will be more practical to seek a higher degree of harmonisation in the
enforcement of national and cross-border remedies.46 The continued evolu-
tion of e-commerce depends to a large extent on the trust and confidence of
the stakeholders and that can only be obtained by fulfilling their legitimate
legal expectations.
1.3 Consumer access to justice: Small claims procedures
1.3.1 Introduction
This section explores the access of individual consumers to the courts within
the EU with a focus on the small claims procedure in Ireland, Spain and
the UK.47 In so doing, it considers whether national courts can presently offer
an effective mechanism to resolve small value disputes. This section also
addresses whether national procedures can be used effectively by online con-
sumers to resolve cross-border disputes arising out of e-commerce. Hence,
this section examines exclusively national judicial processes for resolving
small value disputes as they are intended to be a suitable mechanism to deal
with B2C disputes. The European Small Claims Procedure, however, will be
later discussed in Chapter 3.
When a consumer is dissatisfied with a transaction, the first logical step is
an attempt to resolve the dispute by negotiating directly with the business. If
a solution cannot be reached, consumers will generally become disappointed
and frustrated with the transaction, although they will be unlikely to seek
redress. Exceptionally, when the amount of money involved is significant,
consumers may consider the option of going to court. In these cases, it is
expected that the consumer will send a letter threatening proceedings, if the
grievance is not settled.48
Several legal systems offer an expeditious judicial process, often called a
Small Claims Procedure (SCP) or Small Claims Court, to resolve small value
claims without the need for legal representation. The SCP is generally avail-
able as an additional judicial procedure to the ordinary civil procedure. The
aim of the SCP is to provide a means of dispute resolution where the expense
and the time involved are proportionate to the value of the claim. As a result,
judges in the SCPs take a more interventionist role, particularly by assisting
unrepresented parties with procedural issues. With the publication of a
European Green Paper, the Commission distributed a questionnaire to the
Member States with the intention of promoting public awareness about the
creation of a European Small Claims Procedure and to obtain a better under-
standing of the existing SCPs.49 The result of this questionnaire showed that
at the time of its publication only a few Member States had a SCP, namely
Ireland, the UK, Spain and Sweden. Furthermore, other legal systems offered
summary ordinary procedures applicable to small claims. Arguably, these
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procedural simplifications can also be considered a SCP, as in practice very
similar results may be achieved.
Baldwin identifies five main features of the SCP that distinguish it from
the ordinary civil procedure.50 First, the SCP is a more informal and simpli-
fied procedure. Secondly, legal representation of litigants is generally discour-
aged. Accordingly, claimants do not have the obligation to make any legal
arguments to support their claims. Thirdly, judges play a more intervention-
ist role at oral hearings by assisting the unrepresented litigants in relation to
procedural matters. Fourthly, procedural rules are more relaxed for litigants
and judges, giving litigants more flexibility in presenting their evidence and
judges greater discretion in reaching their decisions. Finally, litigants often
pay for their own legal costs; therefore, the claimant does not run the risk
of having to pay the defendant’s costs (including the fees for legal
representation) if the claimant is unsuccessful.
1.3.2 Small claims procedure in Ireland
Under Irish law, the district court is competent to hear small claims on the
basis of the District Court (Small Claims Procedure) Rules 1997 and 1999.51
Only consumers are eligible for this procedure where they have bought goods
or contracted services for private use from someone selling them in the course
of their business.52 Claims related to minor damage to property (eg torts)
and non-return of rent deposits in relation to holiday premises may also be
addressed under the SCP.53 However, personal injuries,54 hire-purchase agree-
ments, breach of leasing agreements and debts are excluded from the SCP.
The maximum amount of a claim is 2000; claims over this limit fall under
the ordinary civil procedure of the district court. The Irish SCP is designed to
allow consumers with small value disputes to obtain redress in court at a low
cost without the need for legal representation. This is reinforced by a prohib-
ition on the district court awarding legal costs to any of the litigants. The
SCP commences when the claimant submits a claim with the corresponding
fee of 15 in the small claims office at the district court. Since December
2006 the online version allows lodgment of a claim and the fee online. The
new online service has proven to be very popular because not only does it
allow a claim to be lodged, but also it allows the claimant to monitor the
progress of his claim.55
To lodge a claim online, a consumer-claimant must click the Small Claims
Procedure box on the website http://www.courts.ie. Once there, the site
explains the competence of the SCP and the option of filing an online stand-
ard claim application. Consumers are expected to read simple, brief guidelines
and a checklist before they fill in the application in the secure website. A
district court clerk, called the registrar, will receive the claim and will con-
sider whether the claim is appropriate for the SCP and if so, the claim would
be admitted and processed. If the registrar rejects the claim, an e-mail will be
sent to the claimant informing him of the reasons for the rejection. If the
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court registrar admits the claim, a notification will be sent to the claimant
with the corresponding case number and a pin number which allows the
claimant to follow the case online. A copy of the claim coupled with all the
documentary evidence and a ‘notice of dispute’ will be sent to the respondent
(the business) by registered post.56
The main advantage of the online initiative is that it makes the SCP
accessible to consumers who can now file and monitor their cases from a
computer, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. If the respondent accepts the claim,
or if he does not reply to it within 15 days, the district court will make an
order in the claimant’s favour for the amount claimed.57 This must be paid
in a short period of time by a cheque which will be sent by post to the
claimant without the need for attending court. In time, these payments may
be effected online through bank transfers, instead of using the current trad-
itional mail systems. This online project has shown that the SCP is easily
adaptable to the use of ICT.58
The respondent may ignore or contest the claim. First, if the respondent
does not reply to the claim within 15 days, the claim will be automatically
treated as undisputed. The registrar at this stage will ask the claimant to
swear an affidavit, and then the district court will make an order in favour
of the claimant. The district court will order the respondent to pay the
liquidated amount requested in the claim, which in any case must be limited
to the claimant’s financial loss, excluding any additional compensation.59
Secondly, in the event that the respondent contests the claim, the registrar
may interview and negotiate with both litigants separately with the intention
of reaching a pre-trial settlement.60 The registrar may propose solutions when
requested by the litigants.61 Over half of the cases are settled with the aid of
the registrar, without the need for an oral hearing in court. In this context,
some of the competences of registrars are very similar to those of a mediator.
For instance, they explain the procedure to the parties and encourage them to
reach a settlement.
The role of the registrar helps to reduce the number of disputes that go
before the judge, facilitating a quicker procedure for those cases which are
more complicated and that are not ripe for an early negotiable agreement.
When the matter cannot be settled, the claim will be brought before the
district court judge for a public oral hearing. On the day of the hearing,
litigants are expected to explain the facts and give evidence under oath.
They are also allowed to bring their own solicitors, experts and witnesses,
but each party must bear his own costs.62 The ‘no costs’ rule is a powerful
disincentive to the use of solicitors and encourages the development of a
cost-effective SCP.63
Overall, the main limitation of the Irish SCP is the stringent criteria to be
met to become a claimant. This has promoted the development of new alter-
natives to resolve small claims disputes where litigants do not fall within the
criteria set by the Irish SCP. As a result, the Irish Bar Council has developed
a small claims arbitration procedure which deals with claims of up to 7500
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where fees are limited to 750.64 Unlike a SCP, this is a voluntary procedure
whereby parties must enter into a contract that subjects all disputes to the
arbitration. It is a fast track, which uses standard forms in plain English.
Arbitral awards are delivered within 14 days after the oral hearing. The
awards are final and legally binding.65
1.3.3 Small claims in England and Wales
The present SCP in England and Wales was introduced following the
review on access to justice by Lord Woolf.66 The Civil Procedure Rules (CPR)
2001 distinguish three tracks: the small claims track (SCP) for low valued
claims; fast track for moderate value claims (over £5000 but not exceeding
£25,000); and the multi-track for high value (over £25,000), complex or
important issues. The SCP dominates the civil procedure, reaching over
70 per cent of the claims brought before the county court.67 Under this
procedure the current monetary limit is £5000 but it maintains a number
of exceptions, such as personal injuries and housing repairs where the limit
is £1000.
The majority of claims are related to debts, compensation for faulty ser-
vices or goods and disputes between landlords and tenants. The SCP is not
only limited to consumers, but also allows businesses to initiate legal actions.
The procedure starts when the claimant submits a claim with the fee in the
county court.68 Additionally, in England and Wales, certain claims for a fixed
amount of money (less than £100,000) can also be submitted online through
the Money Claim Online service.69 The English SCP is designed in a user-
friendly manner in order to enable litigants to participate without legal
representation. Nevertheless, this has not been fully achieved; the National
Audit Office has stated that since judges make decisions based on legal provi-
sions, legally unrepresented parties against represented litigants tend to do
less well.70 This imbalance probably happens in many other jurisdictions
where legal representation is also discouraged for SCPs. In fact, the National
Consumer Council advised against allowing parties to use lawyers since this
makes the SCP longer and more legalistic. Litigants without legal representa-
tion can however be accompanied at the oral hearing by a lay representative
who will be able to speak on his or her behalf.
In making an overall analysis of the small claims system in England and
Wales, Baldwin and Lord Woolf recommended the need for giving prelimin-
ary legal advice to lay litigants in order to assess the probability of bringing
successful claims to a court of law.71 This advice is currently restricted by
procedural rules whereby court staff are not allowed to provide information
about the possible difficulties of enforcement or to indicate the likelihood of
the litigants’ success. The district judge may act as a mediator or conciliator
at the start of the hearing, but normally time restrictions prevent this from
being meaningful and either there is a settlement on the court doorstep or the
judge hears and tries the case.72
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This situation, however, may change in the near future. In December 2006
the Department of Constitutional Affairs (DCA) published four reports with
the results of three pilot schemes offering mediation for small claims disputes
in Exeter, Manchester and Reading county courts.73 In brief, the Exeter pilot
project consisted of a number of qualified solicitors who acted as mediators;
in Manchester, a full-time mediator officer was available in court to give
information about the SCP and free voluntary mediation services; similarly,
the Reading pilot project facilitated settlement negotiations and it provided
information to unrepresented litigants explaining the SCP. From all the above
schemes, the one in Manchester with the in-house mediator was considered
the most satisfactory and cost-effective. This model is currently being
extended to other courts across England and Wales.
The overall experience was regarded as very positive for both the litigants
and the judiciary, but it raised a number of concerns derived from the lack
of experience in using these new services. For instance, some participants
expressed disappointment at what they perceived as low settlements or high
settlements given that they felt under pressure to settle.74 The main reason for
this was the lack of understanding of the process of mediation where some of
the parties expected it to be an adversarial procedure; and the lack of training
and experience of the mediators. Although the use of mediation as a comple-
ment to the SCP has proven to be positive, in order to offer a fair mediation
service, more resources should be put in place to inform parties about the
procedure as well as in training staff. Indeed, this may increase the cost of the
mediation to the extent that it may end up being a more valuable but expen-
sive alternative to the small claims procedure.75 Further research on this area
is needed in order to assess the appropriateness of high quality mediation for
small claims.
The three pilot projects have also shown that distance communication,
in particular mediation taking place by phone calls, is very effective. In
this regard, Wood raises interesting questions in relation to telephone
mediations:76
When parties are telephoned by ‘the court’ and asked to discuss resolving
the case, are they fully aware that they do not have to settle? Are they
fully aware of the mediator’s role and the nature of the process? Are
they truly aware that the Judge is not involved in the discussion and will
know nothing about the negotiations? [. . .] ‘does this new approach
work?’ The Manchester success rates seem to speak for themselves. They
may ask, ‘would you rather these cases went to trial?’
Parties are likely to receive some pressure from the registrar or mediator to
settle their disputes; yet this should not justify reaching a settlement through
coercion, or allowing the misrepresentation of mediators by making parties
believe that the judge wants a settlement, to the extent that if one party
refuses to reach a settlement, the judge will be inclined to rule against that
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party.77 This could be avoided by warning the parties that they cannot be
coerced to settle and that if this occurs they may report such coercion to the
relevant authority.78
1.3.4 Small claims court in Spain
The Spanish Civil Procedure Act regulates two different civil procedures: the
Ordinary Procedure (Juicio Ordinario) and the Oral Procedure (Juicio Verbal).79
The Court of First Instance (Tribunal de Primera Instancia) must use the oral
procedure for claims up to 3005. This procedure, however, cannot be con-
sidered as a genuine SCP because it is mandatory for litigants to be legally
represented.80 When claims fall under the threshold of 900 litigants can
use standardised claim forms and are allowed to attend courts without the
assistance of legal practitioners.81 It is only the latter claims which might
accurately be referred as SCP because the possibility of participating in the
court unrepresented is one of the core features of the SCP.
The Spanish SCP commences when a claimant submits a claim, which is
done by filing standard forms that can be downloaded from the website of the
General Council for the Judiciary.82 The filing of the claim is generally done
physically in the competent court.83 The law allows for the use of distance
filing when technical means are available, although it is not widespread yet.84
Similarly to the English SCP, at the oral hearing the judge may attempt
to conciliate the parties, but this is a rather formalistic attempt that does
not have a persuasive nature.85 During the hearing, the judge may aid
unrepresented litigants in presenting their cases, and 10 days after the hear-
ing the judge must deliver a judgment. In spite of this deadline there can be
delays from the court in producing their judgments, which may vary from
one court to another depending on their caseload. The decisions of the Court
of First Instance can be appealed within five days to the Provincial Court
(Audiencia Provincial).86
When litigants, without being compelled by the law, decide to seek the
assistance of lawyers in the SCP they will have to bear their own costs.87 There
are two exceptions to this rule. The first is when the judge considers that
the claimant commenced the legal action on frivolous grounds; and,
secondly, when the court is located in a different town to the defendant’s
home town. In the above situations the judge has discretion when deciding
whether the claimant must pay the defendant’s legal costs or not, but in any
event the legal expenses cannot be more than one-third of the total amount
claimed.
1.3.5 Assessment
The resolution of small value disputes faces a number of obstacles. First of all,
when there is little money involved litigants will usually not seek redress
because the cost of such redress is generally more than that of a positive
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outcome, particularly when taking into account not only legal and court costs
but also loss of earnings in attending the court and the stress of litigation.88
Lord Woolf’s reports analysing the civil process in the UK found that high
costs were the main obstacle, and argued that in order to obtain effective
civil litigation ‘we must seek to achieve a more proportionate but workable
system, not one which is theoretically impeccable but unaffordable’.89 Lord
Woolf’s reports effected deep reforms within the UK, which in turn inspired
reforms across the EU, particularly in the Irish civil justice, with the aim
of achieving legal procedures that are proportionate and accessible for small
value disputes. Online procedures, such as the Online Money Claim in
England and the Online Small Claims Procedure in Ireland contribute to
lower cost barriers to litigants. Despite this, significant barriers still remain
in national procedures.
The main limitation of the Irish SCP, as mentioned above, is the stringent
criteria required to become a claimant. The rationale behind this policy seems
to be the preservation of the SCP from the monopolisation of scarce resources.
Businesses, unlike consumers, can often become repeat-players in the SCP,
which give them the advantage of achieving economies of scale.90 This has
promoted the development of new alternatives to resolve small claims dis-
putes for small businesses that do not fall within the scheme of the SCP, such
as the Bar Council arbitral small claims scheme.
The Consumer Strategy Group recommended in 2005 that the limit of the
maximum award in the small claims procedure in the district court should be
increased to 3000.91 A positive aspect of the Irish procedure is the assistance
of the registrar who plays a key role as a conciliator during the first stages of
the proceedings. Hence, this figure could be replicated in the other national
SCPs. In fact, the English courts are currently implementing a similar system,
providing a full time mediator, following the pilot project carried out in
Manchester.
The main constraint in the Spanish SCP is the low monetary limit of the
procedure (900) and the need of legal representation of all the claims that go
over this limit.92 According to Duggan the civil procedure must balance the
risks and advantages of expeditious procedures by proportionality measures.
He observes:
The absence of lawyers combined with the exclusion of rules of evidence
and procedure and the prohibition of appeals increases the risk of wrong
decisions. This is a cost of the systems. However, the cost of not having
the system must also be taken into account [. . .] Imperfect justice [. . .] is
better than no justice [. . .] at all.93
Another main obstacle affecting all national SCP is the difficulty in dealing
with cross-border disputes, which increasingly appear amongst internet
users.94 In July 2007 the OECD Committee on Consumer Policy produced a
recommendation in which it stressed that today’s procedures for small claims
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were designed to deal with low costs disputes at a national level; con-
sequently, resolving cross-border disputes has proven, thus far, to be quite
inefficient.95 This is noted in the current Irish and English SCPs, which are
not completely accessible for non-residents. Despite the fact that the law
allows claimants who are non-residents to initiate legal actions, significant
burdens are imposed. For instance, litigants have to be physically present
during the court oral hearing, and if one of the parties decides not to attend
the hearing, it would cause an obvious imbalance. As a result, litigants living
abroad would have to pay travel and accommodation expenses which, in most
cases, cannot be recovered.
Furthermore, the current mediation programmes are not feasible for cross-
border disputes since they rely mainly on face-to-face discussions. Although
some of these obstacles have started to be addressed with the new regulation
on the European Small Claims Procedure, it is regrettable that the new
pan-European procedure does not provide enough tools for encouraging
settlements.96
The European Commission has stressed three difficulties that individual
consumers have in accessing justice.97 Those are the high cost of litigation,
the length of time taken in resolving the disputes and the complexity of
the existing legal procedures. It highlighted that the lack of redress is
particularly acute in the cross-border arena. To overcome these difficulties the
Commission suggested three formulas. First, it proposed the simplification
and improvement of the judicial procedures. Secondly, the Commission
remarked on the importance of improving the methods of communication
between consumers and businesses in order to avoid unnecessary disputes.
Lastly, the Commission encouraged the use of consumer ADR and ODR
methods.
1.4 Conflict of laws
1.4.1 Introduction
Conflict of law rules determine which countries’ laws and jurisdiction are
applied in a particular case. Courts first decide on their own competence to try
a case and subsequently the applicable law for the particular case. To know
this in advance is essential in electronic commerce because often more than
one jurisdiction is involved in one transaction, where traders and consumers
may have different obligations. In order to obtain legal certainty online busi-
nesses will generally include choice of law and jurisdiction clauses in their
contracts. However, the rules deciding the applicable law, the competent
jurisdiction and the validity of contractual clauses are not the same in every
country. Furthermore, there is no international convention that resolves all
conflict of laws between different jurisdictions in B2C transactions. For
the purpose of this section I will focus on the law of the two largest world
economies, the EU and the US.
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1.4.2 Choice of law
1.4.2.1 Choice of law for private sales
When two consumers (C2C or private sales) become involved in a dispute, for
instance through the e-Bay auction house, the applicable rules are those used
in business transactions (B2B). In practice, consumers in these cases are
unlikely to look for redress in the courts, unless there is a large amount of
money involved, eg someone who sells his own car through an online auction,
and the buyer purchases the car with some mechanical problems unknown to
the seller.
The law of every country gives parties bargaining on an equal footing (C2C
and B2B) complete freedom to determine the choice of law as long as the legal
system chosen by the parties has some connection with the parties or the sub-
ject matter of the contract. However, when consumers deal with other con-
sumers they would probably not write a contract, so they will be exposed to the
default legal rules. Under these circumstances, in the (unlikely) event that the
parties start a legal action, it will be the courts themselves which will decide
about their competence. In making this decision courts will probably look at
where the contract was made and where the execution of the contract occurred;
in the former example it would be upon the delivery of the car. If the delivery
was done in the seller’s country, then the forum and the law of the seller’s
country will probably be applicable. By contrast, if the delivery was done in the
buyer’s country, then country and national law of the buyer will be applicable.
1.4.2.2 Choice of law under the EU Regulation
The main instrument governing the choice of law within the European Union
since 17 December 2009 is the Regulation on the Applicable Law to Con-
tractual Obligations (Rome I), which provides for uniform choice of law rules
in contract for all Member States (except Denmark).98 The new regulation has
the aim of adapting the text to the growth of cross-border shopping, particu-
larly on the internet.
1.4.2.2.1 ROME I REGULATION
The Rome Regulation makes a distinction between those contracts with a
choice of law clause and those where there is no such clause.
Choice of law clause Most electronic contracts will contain a choice of law
clause. Article 6 of the Rome Regulation provides that consumer contracts
may have a valid choice of law clause but this clause may not deprive the
consumer of the protection afforded by the mandatory rules of the country
of his habitual residence if the business pursues or directs its commercial
activity in the consumer’s Member State.
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This provision distinguishes between active and passive consumers. The
former would be those consumers who look for the business actively, and
the latter would be those consumers who are approached by the business. The
regulation gives special protection to passive consumers. This begs the ques-
tion of whether an internet website constitutes advertising in the Member
State of the consumer’s domicile. It seems that businesses advertising with
a website directly in a Member State (eg by e-mail or through a website
directed to the consumer’s country, ie using the consumer’s language, cur-
rency etc) may not override the mandatory consumer protection laws of the
consumer’s country.99 Therefore, if a choice of law clause limits the rights
recognised to consumers in their countries under the above circumstances,
such clauses shall be voided and the mandatory rules of the consumer’s habit-
ual residence will be applied instead.100
No choice of law clause The lack of a choice of law clause is rare but it may
happen in relation to e-mail transactions without standard terms or it can be
used for some businesses as a marketing option having a short terms and
conditions contract. The Rome Regulation states that in those cases the
applicable law will be the law of the country where the consumer is habitually
resident, when the contract is entered into according to the form listed
above in Article 6, that is, with a specific invitation to buy. Furthermore, in
some cases national laws have given consumers the presumption that the
contract, unless proved otherwise, was formed in their habitual country of
residence.101
When the conditions of Article 6 are not fulfilled, the law of the country in
which the seller is located will be applied.102 In this regard, the E-Commerce
Directive and the European Court of Justice consider that the seller’s location
on the internet is the service provider’s nation of establishment, ie the
Member State where the business is physically located, regardless of the
location of the technology that hosts the website.103
The regulation has been received with disappointment amongst businesses’
representatives, who fear that the new regulation may curb the growth of
online sales. They argue that businesses (mainly SMEs) that sell products
across borders will have to deal with consumer complaints under the legal
systems of each Member State. Although consumer protection laws are gov-
erned by EU law, in most cases it only establishes minimum standards,
leaving it to the Member States to develop further consumer protection laws.
Conversely, consumer organisations welcome the new regulation, noting that
increasing consumer protection will favour consumer trust in e-commerce,
boosting consumer participation in the online market.
1.4.2.3 Choice of law in the US
The policy behind US law is the doctrine of freedom of contracts where the
parties, including B2C transactions, have the autonomy of choosing their
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applicable law. Hence, the US legal approach is not as sensitive and inter-
ventionist as the EU towards the inequality of bargaining powers between
consumers and businesses.
Choice of law clause The main difficulty with the US law is the large number
of state laws that are potentially applicable.104 The most relevant regulations
in the US are the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, the Uniform
Electronic Transaction Act (UETA), the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
and the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA).
The US Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws is a compilation of legal
rules, which, in spite of being quite influential, are not binding, unless parties
contract them in expressly. It essentially provides that the law chosen by the
parties will be applied in all cases, except under two circumstances: first,
when the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the
transaction; and, secondly, when the application of the chosen law would be
contrary to a fundamental policy of a state, which has a greater interest in the
issue, but only when that state would be the chosen one if there was not a
contractual clause.
UETA is the first comprehensive effort to prepare state law for the
e-commerce era. It is a proposed law of procedural rules which recognises the
validity of electronic contracts and e-signatures. It also covers only those
aspects of the electronic transactions that the parties did not agree in their
contract. This Act has been implemented in the majority of the US, strength-
ening the enforceability of online transactions.105 Nonetheless, UETA will
only be applied to electronic transactions when the contracts are not governed
by the UCITA and UCC statutes.
The latest revision of the UCC was made in 2001 by the American Law
Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. In this revision the proposed law gives even more autonomy to the
parties in deciding the applicable law, eliminating the former condition that
the chosen law had to have a reasonable relationship with the contract.106 It
must be noted that this new proposal is not applicable to B2C contracts.
The UCITA, originally intended to be part of the UCC, is a controversial
regulation that has been created to deal with electronic information transac-
tions. It was promulgated in 1999 but has only been implemented in two
states, namely Virginia and Maryland. Currently, there is substantial doubt
about the UCITA gaining more acceptances among other states’ parlia-
ments.107 The UCITA has been criticised for disadvantaging consumers,
despite still providing a certain level of consumer protection. The Act states
that ‘parties in their agreement may choose the applicable law. However, the
choice is not enforceable in a consumer contract to the extent it would vary a
rule that may not be varied’ under that law of the jurisdiction applicable
in the absence of that agreement.108 This policy has driven the UCITA to
move away from the current version of the UCC, where a court is permitted
to invalidate a choice of law provision if the chosen law does not bear a
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‘reasonable relationship’ to the transaction.109 The drafters of the UCITA
considered that this court control of the choice of law imposed undue costs
and uncertainty on e-commerce. Under the UCC, as well as under the
UCITA, parties may opt out of it, save with some exceptions, such as those
related to consumer protection.
No choice of law clause The Second Restatement provides that in the event
that the parties have not chosen the applicable law, the law governing the
electronic contract will usually be that of where the consumer is domiciled,
that is, the location from where the acceptance was transmitted and to where
the goods were delivered. The UCITA automatically selects the law of the
licensor’s principal place of business if product delivery is accomplished
online or by electronic delivery, ie downloads of software.110 The location of
the licensor does not depend on the location of the computer that contains
the information, but on the place of establishment. This rule mirrors the
E-Commerce Directive’s place of establishment provision. By contrast, when
the delivery is carried out through a tangible medium, most states rely on the
UCC, which, akin to the Rome Regulation, states that the governing law will
be that of the consumer’s location.111
Overall, in fact US courts and legislators tend to recognise choice of law
clauses even when those favour businesses, but only as long as there is a
reasonable relationship between the parties, the transaction and the chosen
law. The reasoning behind this is that respecting choice of law clauses and
favouring businesses is believed to result in lower prices for consumers.
Although there is consumer protection in the US, it must be taken into
account that a significant proportion of legal protection for consumers stems
from the state law, where the governments of the states appear reluctant to
relinquish domestic control over the consumer protection to the federation.
By contrast, in the EU it is European law which directs the consumer protec-
tion policy, imposing greater limitations on the choice of law clauses. Finally,
it must be noted that since the competent law is chosen after deciding on the
competent forum, the latter will have significant influence over the applicable
law; not surprisingly, judges are often unwilling to apply foreign laws.
1.4.3 Forum selection
The forum selection determines which courts of law can try a particular case.
The basic rule is that defendants may be sued in their own jurisdiction, yet
consumer contracts constitute a significant exception.
1.4.3.1 European law
The Brussels Regulation (also known as Brussels I) establishes the forum
selection in all of the EU Member States with the exception of Denmark,
which continues to apply the Brussels Convention.112 In the context of
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electronic consumer contracts, the most important provision is Article 15.1(c),
which limits businesses to bring actions only in the consumers’ domicile,
while giving consumers the choice of suing businesses in their own domicile
or at the businesses’ domicile.113 This rule, similarly to Rome I, will only be
applied whenever a business pursues commercial activities in the consumer’s
state; for instance, when the online businesses are giving information to
consumers in their languages, currencies and deliver the goods in the con-
sumers’ country.114 In other words, those websites with one language and a
single currency (eg in English and accepting only pounds sterling) will be
considered as not pursuing commercial activities in other Member States.115
Consumers, however, are no longer required to complete contracts in their
Member States of domicile for their forum to apply.116
There are a number of exceptions to these rules. The first exception is when
an individual buys property: the applicable law and the competent forum in
these cases will be that where the property is located. Secondly, another
exception is those cases related to intellectual property rights (IPRs): the
country where the IPRs are registered will decide on the applicable law
and the forum. Thirdly, insurance companies may be sued in the forum of
the claimant or where the damage had occurred. Finally, if the defendant
(consumer or not) appears in a particular court, such court may become
automatically competent because it is understood that the defendant impli-
citly recognised such jurisdiction.
1.4.3.1.1 APPLICATION OF FORUM SELECTION RULES BY THE EU MEMBER STATES
As mentioned above, under the Brussels Regulation, the use of the language
or the currency of the consumer’s Member State is prima facie evidence of the
business’s interest in directing his activities to the particular country; hence
consumers will have the option of claiming in their domicile. The British
courts, however, seem to interpret this rule cautiously.117 In Crate & Barrel the
consumer’s jurisdiction was not recognised because the judge held that the
design of the website was exclusively directed to the Irish market despite
the fact that the site was accessible to UK consumers.118 The judge followed
an early decision in which it was held that ‘the mere fact that Web sites can be
accessed anywhere in the world does not mean . . . that the law should regard
them as being used everywhere in the world’.119
This decision nevertheless contrasts with that of the French courts in the
Yahoo! Case, whereby the French courts had made orders against a US based
website on the basis that it infringed French anti-incitement laws for selling
Nazi memorabilia, despite the fact that the website was in English and
Yahoo! had filters in place to block users with French IP addresses.120 In this
case Yahoo! France had to comply with the decision of the French court, while
Yahoo! Inc (the US corporation) did not comply with the decision of the
French court because its activity was held lawful by the US court (under the
protection of the First Amendment of the US Constitution).121 According to
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Colón-Fung: ‘this case illustrates the difficulty of enforcing laws designed
to protect consumer’s domicile where the law [of the consumer’s domicile
and the law] of the seller’s domicile conflict.’122 Also in UFC v AOL the
Tribunal de Grande Instance of Nanterre (Paris) found in 2004 that 31 of
the 36 terms used in the AOL e-contracts were unfair and void.123 It appears
that French law, although complying with the Brussels Regulation, gives
French courts jurisdiction over almost any case in which a French national is
a party.124
1.4.3.2 Jurisdiction rules in the US
Albeit that the highest number of websites offering to supply goods and
services are based in the US, the jurisdiction rules here are different. In the US
the choice of forum is based on several legal precedents that evaluate the
defendant’s contact with the plaintiff’s state to determine if jurisdiction is
appropriate. The choice of forum is generally referred to by US courts as
‘personal jurisdiction’. This concept includes ‘general’ and ‘specific jurisdic-
tion’. The former occurs when disputes do not arise from the defendant’s
contacts with the forum.125 By contrast, the specific jurisdiction is the
exercise of jurisdiction when disputes arise out of the defendant’s contacts
with the forum. The Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment limits the
power of a state court to try only those cases that have sufficient connections
with that state.126 In order to determine the reasonability of the forum, US
courts will use the so-called ‘minimum contacts’ test. Minimum contacts
must exist between the parties, the transaction and the forum. This test
was first designed by the US Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v
Washington.127
Contractual clause As a general rule US courts respect contractual clauses in
consumer contracts, unless of course such clauses contain an unreasonable and
unfair choice of jurisdiction. The leading case is Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v
Shute.128 This case involved a Washington State couple who purchased two
tickets from Carnival, a Florida based cruise line. In the contract there was a
clause whereby any dispute arising must be resolved in the courts of Florida.
During the cruise trip on Mexican waters Ms Shute slipped on a deck mat and
suffered a number of injuries. The case commenced with a dispute on the
competent jurisdiction. The US Supreme Court (SC) held that a forum selec-
tion clause in a consumer contract was reasonable because it was (i) freely
bargained for; (ii) it was entered into in exchange for reduced fares; and (iii) it
did not unduly burden the plaintiffs.
More recent cases have extended the reasoning of Carnival to consumer
online contracts. The New Jersey SC applied this reasoning in Caspi v
Microsoft Network, LLC, holding a forum selection clause placed online by
Microsoft to be valid.129 In that case the court ruled in favour of the clause
because the plaintiff failed to prove any of the following three circumstances:
30 Online Dispute Resolution for Consumers in the European Union
(i) that the clause is the result of fraud or excessive bargaining power; (ii) that
the enforcement would violate public policy; or (iii) that it would create a
seriously inconvenient trial. The same rule was applied to arbitration clauses.
In Hill v Gateway 2000, Inc., the US Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit held
valid an online arbitration clause.130
Overall, US courts will generally uphold these agreements unless it can be
shown that they are unfairly oppressive, unconscionable or outside the reason-
able expectations of the consumer. It must be noted that the expectations
of consumers in the US, where clauses are generally enforced, would differ
significantly from those of consumers in the EU.
Non-contractual clause In those situations where there are no contractual
clauses or the extant ones are deemed unreasonable, the seminal case for
internet transactions is Zippo Manufacturing Company v Zippo Dot Com, Inc.,
which delivered an approach that aimed to determine personal jurisdiction in
all cases related to e-commerce.131 The case involved trademark claims by
Zippo Manufacturing (the maker of Zippo lighters based in Pennsylvania)
against Zippo Dot Com (a news-website based in California). Zippo Manu-
facturing filed a suit in the Western District of Pennsylvania and Zippo Dot
Com argued lack of personal jurisdiction because it did not have its premises
or staff in that jurisdiction but only a website which was accessible from
there. Since the dispute was about the domain name, the plaintiff alleged
specific (as opposed to general) jurisdiction. The court found that Zippo Dot
Com was an ‘active website’ with a significant number of users subscribed in
Pennsylvania and therefore upheld its jurisdiction.
The Zippo court also set a sliding scale test which classifies the likelihood
that personal jurisdiction could be exercised on businesses, based in another
jurisdiction, in proportion to the nature of the commercial activity conducted
by their website on the plaintiff’s jurisdiction. This classification was done on
three different levels:
(i) Active websites: Those that clearly look for contractual parties in other
jurisdictions. Under this test personal jurisdiction is always considered
proper.
(ii) Passive websites: When somebody posts information online that is not
interactive but merely informative. In these cases online users, consumers
or not, cannot exercise their personal jurisdiction.
(iii) Mixed websites: They are a combination of the former two, where the user
can exchange information with the host computer, even though the web-
site is not particularly targeting those users. In these cases, courts will
analyse the level of interactivity and the commercial nature of the
exchange of the particular information. In consumer contracts the general
tendency of the US courts has been to favour consumers’ jurisdiction, but
when the interactivity of the parties is low, courts might find it difficult
to recognise their jurisdiction.
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This test focuses its attention on whether the defendant conducts his activity
intentionally and directly to the consumer’s forum. The analysis is never-
theless quite awkward when using the sliding scale approach and it is
being considered increasingly vague and inappropriate by both scholars and
courts.132 Awoyemi argues that the 1997 Zippo doctrine is outdated because
many websites are increasingly falling into the mixed websites category, thus
emptying the predictive value of the Zippo test and opening the floodgates to
different judicial interpretations.133 The Zippo sliding scale test is still often
mentioned by the US courts, but as this test aims to fit all cases into this
approach to internet jurisdiction, it is now becoming too simplistic and
even inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction case law.
Consequently, courts are now increasingly dropping the sliding scale test in
their reasoning when deciding the competent jurisdiction. Unfortunately, as
a result, US courts are producing a confusing and incoherent body of case law
where some courts still rely on the sliding scale Zippo case, others apply it
exclusively to specific jurisdiction cases (and not to general jurisdiction cases)
and still others use it as a combination with the conventional minimum
contacts test.134
Overall, under the US ad hoc analysis, the act of regularly sending goods
into the consumer’s forum will likely fulfil the requisite of minimum con-
tacts; true also when a consumer buys goods or services as a result of a direct
marketing scheme. These transactions cannot be sporadic but must be
continuous, systematic and substantial to recognise a general jurisdiction for
consumers’ disputes. In the event of a specific jurisdiction in connection to
the consumer’s forum, unless there is clause stating otherwise, the competent
court will be the one sitting in the consumer’s domicile.135
1.4.3.3 The US and the EU compared
The determination of forum differs substantially between the EU and the
US. The EU follows the civil law approach, looking at the connection
between the dispute and the forum based on legislation, while the US follows
the common law approach, looking at a number of judicial precedents mak-
ing an ad hoc analysis and evaluating the connection between the defendant
and the plaintiff’s forum, that is without considering the connection between
the dispute and the forum.136 In those cases where there are forum selection
clauses, as noted above, the Brussels Regulation is quite restrictive in regard
to consumer contracts while the US is not. Nonetheless, it would be easier to
argue on a case by case basis at a US court unreasonableness of a forum selection
clause in a B2C contract than in a B2B contract. When a US court applies the
country of origin approach using the minimum contact test, it checks if a
website is purposely availing itself to the plaintiff’s forum. Conversely, the
EU follows the country of destination approach, which is generally easier to
determine.
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1.4.3.4 Jurisdiction under the Hague Conference
Outside the EU there are no multilateral agreements to ensure the mutual
recognition and enforcement of judgments. The most important attempt to
reach a global agreement was the Hague Conference on Private International
Law, where the conflicting views of the EU and US in relation to con-
sumer disputes have been one of the main issues of discussion. The prin-
cipal disagreement is that the EU was supporting the adoption of the
country of destination rule while the US was backing the seller’s country of
origin rule. An area where an agreement could be more easily reached is in
relation to those disputes where the seller does not have notice about the
location of the buyer; in those cases the country of origin rule should be
applied.137
The Conference adopted a Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction
and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters.138 In this draft,
the most debated provision is Article 7, which provides that consumers can
initiate an action in their habitual residence, when contracts had been con-
cluded or directed to the consumers’ state. However, this Article has three
alternatives:139
(i) The above rule would be used as a default rule when the parties have not
entered a contractual clause selecting a forum.
(ii) The states may enter a reservation that would allow them to respect a
jurisdiction agreement only when it has been agreed after the dispute
arises.
(iii) The second alternative will be implemented in all states, in other words,
Article 7 applies unless a jurisdiction agreement was entered into after
the dispute arose.
The EU supports options (iii) and (ii), which are reflected in the Brussels
Regulation and the US supports option (i).140 In order to make this proposal
workable it has been suggested to narrow the scope of the Convention by
excluding its applicability to consumers and e-commerce; however, this sug-
gestion raises another difficulty, ie the definition of new boundaries to limit
the scope.141 The Hague Conference was partly abandoned by scaling back to
cover only enforcement of judgments resulting from choice of court agree-
ments in B2B contracts.142 Therefore, with the breakdown of the negotiations
on consumer cases, conflicts of laws are likely to continue in the current
climate of legal uncertainty.
1.4.4 Assessment
It is ironic and unfortunate that parties are forced to spend time and money
in litigating on where to litigate.143 There are two obvious methods to
limit conflicts of laws. First, it is the use of forum selection and choice
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of law clauses but, as pointed out above, these contractual clauses have
different weights in the US and the EU. Secondly, it is the improvement
of legal harmonisation. This option seems unlikely to occur in the near
future where the alternatives cannot satisfy either businesses or consu-
mers, nor the US and the EU.144 The main attempt to create uniform rules
was during the Hague Conference, which has been largely regarded as
unsuccessful.145
In practice, however, only large corporations are concerned about the con-
flict of laws because they are the likely ones to be involved in these disputes.
B2C transactions on the internet are usually low cost transactions. Realistic-
ally, no-one is going to pursue a lawsuit for a small amount of money, even
when the competent forum is his own jurisdiction.146 If a lawsuit is initiated
in one country for a small amount of money, a default judgment is likely to
result since it is doubtful that a defendant would spend money to defend
himself in the plaintiff’s forum. Hence, conflict of laws rules would be applic-
able only to consumer disputes where a large amount of money is involved, eg
in some personal injuries cases. For the remaining disputes a more suitable
method to resolve conflicts should be sought.
Presently, the current regulation in the global market raises too many legal
questions on the applicable law and jurisdiction. Furthermore, rule-based
adjudication systems are often difficult to sustain in environments where
jurisdictions overlap and enforcement can be extremely difficult. Within the
EU, businesses can restrict the geographical scope of their offers by using
technology or using disclaimers or by setting a website in a manner that
is clearly directed exclusively to specific jurisdictions. On the other hand,
this approach limits competition and consumer choice, one of the main
advantages of online commerce.
The Global Business Dialogue on Electronic Commerce states that ‘extra-
judicial procedures for settling disputes can be an effective alternative to
the cumbersome and expensive resort to courts’.147 Consensual ADR does
not follow jurisdictional rules or national laws, eliminating the uncertainty
of the law applicable in different jurisdictions. Litigation for online disputes
is typically disproportionate to what are often low value transactions.
ADR systems when complemented by ICT, ie ODR, are systems best suited
for transnational disputes because these methods are generally less lengthy
and do not require the physical presence of the parties. Consequently,
ODR has the potential to be less costly than litigation and thus more
suitable for consumer disputes. These systems will be evaluated in the
next chapter.
Nonetheless, court proceedings are the only way of resolving disputes
when parties do not agree to the use of ADR, or when the decisions of ADR
bodies are contested by one of the parties. Therefore, questions of jurisdiction
and applicable law must be dealt with urgently if the law aims to encourage
both business investment and consumer trust in e-commerce.148
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1.5 Enforcement
1.5.1 Introduction
The success of courts as a means of providing effective consumer redress is
contingent on the ability of the winning party to enforce the court’s decision.
In the legal context, enforcement refers to the execution of the law carried out
by the competent authority. Public enforcement can be performed by a gov-
ernmental body or by the judiciary. This section is divided into two parts.
The first part considers judicial enforcement, and the second part considers
how governmental organisations monitor and enforce consumer rights.
1.5.2 Judicial enforcement in the EU
Consumer protection in e-commerce is meaningless unless effective enforce-
ment mechanisms are provided. Thomson suggested that the ‘[l]aw will not
be generally observed unless there is enforcement machinery to use against
the occasional violator’.149 Judicial enforcement is carried out by a court
sanctioning an action that compels one party to comply with a former court
order (the judgment). This part has been divided into two sections. First, it
commences by considering the procedural requirements of enforcement when
it is initiated by consumers. It continues, discussing when such an applica-
tion is carried out by groups or entities that act on the consumer’s behalf.
1.5.2.1 Procedural requirements
The procedural law to enforce judicial decisions has different requirements
depending on whether the judgments are foreign or domestic.
1.5.2.1.1 FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
In order to enforce a judgment in another country it would be necessary to
check first if there is a bilateral agreement between the country whose court
has delivered the judgment and the country where that judgment is sought to
be enforced. Where there is no agreement, judgments will be enforced on the
basis of the enforcing country’s private international rules, which generally
follow the principle of reciprocity, ie both states recognise their judicial deci-
sions as mutually binding and enforceable. In addition, common requirements
for enforcing foreign judgments include the judgment to be final and binding
and the rendering court to have proper jurisdiction over the matter and the
parties. This last requirement often raises difficulties since many countries
(outside the EU) have different rules for jurisdiction and applicable law.150
Within the EU, enforcement rules have been unified through the Brussels
Regulation, which provides that anyone with a sufficient interest in a
judgment may apply for its enforcement (ie locus standi).151 The application
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is made to the court that has territorial jurisdiction on the basis of the
domicile of the party against whom enforcement is sought or of the place of
enforcement.152 The declaration of enforceability (ie exequatur) must be issued
after certain formalities have been completed and must be served on the other
party, who may challenge it. It is possible to refuse the recognition of a
foreign judgment under specific circumstances, such as public policy, being
irreconcilable with an earlier judgment etc.
The European Council observed that the intermediate measures for the
enforcement of judgments were still too restrictive.153 Consequently, the EU
decided gradually to remove all existing intermediate measures for the
enforcement of judicial decisions. Two major initiatives were taken. The first
step towards this aim was the removal of the exequatur procedure for
uncontested monetary claims with the creation of the European Enforcement
Order (EEO).154 The EEO dispenses uncontested pecuniary claims from all
intermediary measures under certain conditions, mainly related to the service
of documents in the case of judgments by default. A second major initiative
was the Regulation of the European Small Claims Procedure (ESCP) which
removes the exequatur procedure when enforcing ESCP judgments in another
Member State.155
1.5.2.1.2 DOMESTIC JUDGMENTS
The application procedure of enforcement is similar in all EU Member States
since they follow the Brussels Regulation. This section briefly considers how
consumers may use this procedure in three Member States, namely Ireland,
England and Spain.
Ireland Although it is not necessary for an applicant to be legally repre-
sented, a legal practitioner will generally write the application of enforce-
ment. Applications must be made in person, together with the fee, in the
competent court (district, circuit or High Court depending on the amount
claimed), which will be later passed to the other party. There are a number of
ways for enforcing a judgment: execution, registration, affidavit, instalment
orders, attachment of earnings etc. The other party may oppose the enforce-
ment with an appeal, which is allowed not against the enforcement measure
itself, but only against the substantive judgment (or against the order upon
which the enforcement is grounded).
England and Wales Similar to Ireland, in England and Wales there is a choice
of enforcement methods which may be used. Applications must also be made
in person in the competent court, except for the Money Claim Online, where a
request can also be made online. For the application it is not necessary to have
the assistance of a legal professional, but professional advice on the procedure
by a solicitor or the Citizens’ Advice Bureau is recommended because the
procedure may be very complicated for a lay person to understand. Consumer
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claims are mainly enforced by the county court but when the amount is more
than £50,000 the application must be transferred to the High Court.
Spain Enforcement applications need to be made with the assistance of a
lawyer except when the application is submitted to the First Instance Court
for amounts of less than 900.156 Spanish courts proceed, as most courts, by
accepting first a judicial decision as in rem which precludes the re-litigation of
a claim on the same facts on the ground of res judicata. Unlike Ireland, appeals
in England and Wales are not possible for decisions granting enforcement,
but the debtor may oppose the adoption of specific measures. However, the
initiation of an appeal proceeding does not suspend the enforcement of the
measures granted by the court.
1.5.2.2 Legal enforcement on behalf of consumers
There are instances where a breach of consumer protection legislation affects
a number of consumers in a similar way. Sometimes these consumers are
unlikely to pursue damages individually owing to the high legal fees and
complexities of the legal system compared to the relatively low value of their
individual losses. In some countries consumers, besides being able to enforce
their rights individually, may also find redress by bringing cases as a group of
affected parties. According to the OECD this type of enforcement plays a key
‘role in regulating the marketplace, depriving defendants of ill-gotten gains
and deterring future wrongful or irresponsible commercial behaviour’.157
There are three different categories in which consumers may be represented in
court: by class actions, by consumer organisations and by governmental con-
sumer agencies.
1.5.2.2.1 BY CLASS OR COLLECTIVE ACTIONS
Class action procedures commence when the claimants file a case on behalf of
themselves or of a group who have suffered the same loss in similar circum-
stances. It can be against a company or a public entity, although they are
frequently against large corporations that provide services to a large number of
customers; for instance, an electricity supplier that overcharges its customers.
Generally speaking, there are broadly two types of class action procedures:
the opt-out model and the opt-in model. The opt-out model automatically
includes all consumers in similar circumstances, who will be bound by the
final decision, unless they expressly exclude themselves.158 By contrast, the
opt-in model only includes those consumers who have expressly joined
the claimant and agreed to be bound by the final decision.159
Class actions were originally created in the US in order to compensate for
the lack of governmental support in enforcing consumer laws. In the EU, 13
Member States currently allow them under their domestic laws, although
with certain restrictions.160 The European Commission has highlighted the
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need for creating a communitarian instrument to address collective redress
mechanisms at EU level with cross-border disputes.161 As mentioned above,
the consumer protection policy in the EU is based on the intervention of
the public authorities to stop market abuses, while in the US the public
policy encourages attorneys to take more initiative in upholding consumer
rights and correcting market abuses. One reason for this is that US attorneys
may charge contingent fees, with the approval of the court. Contingent
fees consist of a fee charged on certain amounts over the final judgment
(normally from one-third to 50 per cent). These fees allow consumers to
access courts without paying lawyers in advance. Critics of consumer class
actions contend that such fees benefit plaintiffs’ lawyers more than consumers
themselves.162
According to Emmons and Garoupa, in the EU contingent fees are strictly
prohibited by the ethical code of the European Association of Lawyers; how-
ever, recent legislative changes in some Member States (eg the UK) tend to
change the approach towards the US model by permitting the charging of
conditional fees which allow lawyers not to charge when they lose a case and
to obtain an upscale premium (up to 100 per cent of the original fee) if
the case is won.163 Further, the UK is currently considering the introduction
of contingency fees.164
An additional difference between the US and EU fee model is that in
the US the rule is that litigants bear their own costs, while within the EU the
costs follow the event; thus a party using a conditional fee will usually take
out an insurance policy in the event that such party had to cover the winner’s
legal fees. In some Member States such as in the UK, the winner may also
require the losing party to pay all the legal fees, including the conditional fee
agreement and the insurance premium.165 According to Duggan, conditional
fees give the claimants’ lawyer an incentive either to settle the case quickly
and cheaply or to drag the case out so that the lawyer’s costs are increased.166
In reality, lawyers will not generally act on a conditional fee basis unless the
prospects of success are abnormally high, eg above 80 per cent, so significant
limitations remain.167 Notwithstanding this, the conditional fee has an
important advantage, since it removes the need for the state to provide plain-
tiffs with legal aid in these cases.
A significant difficulty in these procedures is the resources needed to reach
and communicate with all the claimants. These types of disputes are good
options to be managed through the use of ICT tools, particularly with the
increase of e-commerce, where the number of disputes augments across
borders.168 Hence, the use of technology to negotiate and resolve these dis-
putes may help to overcome difficulties related to the use of litigation in
various jurisdictions and it will ease communications among the many con-
sumer claimants.
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1.5.2.2.2 BY CONSUMER ORGANISATIONS
Many European directives allow Member States to provide consumer organ-
isations with the right to take legal action to ensure compliance with
consumer protection laws.169 As a result, most Member States have given this
right to certain consumer organisations in different manners.170 There are
several types of legal action, but the main three are the following:171
(i) Actions in the collective interest of consumers: where a consumer organisation
takes a legal action in its own name on behalf of the collective interest of
consumers. These legal actions are particularly useful when the consumer
harm is widespread. In order to initiate this action, it is not necessary to
show an actual harm to individual consumers. In most cases the only
remedies available to consumer organisations are conduct remedies, eg
injunctions. In the EU, the Injunction Directive has set a uniform pro-
cedure which can be used by some qualified bodies (such as certain con-
sumer organisations approved by their Member States) to take injunctive
actions against traders in another Member State in order to protect
collective interests of consumers in case of infringements of national
provisions transposing the EU directives, eg infringements concerning
misleading advertisements, consumer credit, package travel, unfair con-
tract terms, distance selling contracts, sale of consumer goods and guar-
antees.172 Its application, however, has been very limited, with only two
cases in the last decade.173
(ii) Joint representative actions: where a consumer organisation represents a
particular group of consumers. There are some concerns about this prac-
tice. Although it is important to increase consumer access to justice it
is necessary to avoid ‘exposing business to spurious or vexatious claims
or unwittingly creating a compensation culture’.174 With the aim of
avoiding the above damage or abuse a number of safeguards can be intro-
duced, such as allowing legal actions only from bodies approved by the
government, exclusively on behalf of named consumers and subject to
pre-trial approval from the court.175
(iii) Partie civile: in the majority of the Member States that come from the
civil law tradition, consumers and consumer organisations may join
as a civil party to a criminal prosecution of a defendant, requesting
exclusively a civil remedy. In these cases it is possible not only to obtain
conduct remedies for consumers as with the Injunctions Directive, but
also compensation.
1.5.2.2.3 BY GOVERNMENTAL CONSUMER AGENCIES
In some cases, neither consumers nor consumer agencies have the resources to
seek judicial redress, in particular when such redress is sought overseas.
Domestic laws in many countries allow government officials to bring legal
actions to protect consumers, eg in Ireland the National Consumer Agency and
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in the UK the Office of Fair Trading. Furthermore, other bodies are created
to address more specific problems, such as the Spanish National Centre for
the Response to Information Technology Attacks, which specialises in fraud
issues related to IT. These are public entities that monitor market infractions
and stop them, either directly or via the courts. In most countries government
agencies have the authority to seek redress on behalf of their consumers,
including sometimes on behalf of foreign consumers.176
1.5.3 Administrative enforcement
Administrative authorities also ensure compliance with consumer regulation
using their own enforcement mechanisms. This is particularly cost-effective
in stopping market abuses when it affects a large group of consumers who do
not have the initiative in seeking redress in courts. This may happen for a
number of reasons: consumers are not aware of their rights, or they do not
detect abuses, or they do not have economic resources.177
1.5.3.1 EU dimension
The European Commission considers that one of the main problems of
e-commerce is the lack of consumer confidence in internet transactions, which
may come from genuine disputes with businesses that act in good faith or
from rogue traders that take advantage of consumers.178 It appears that the
latter is the main reason that hampers consumer confidence in e-commerce.
Common examples of these activities that often simultaneously affect consu-
mers in different countries are deceptive prize draws, e-mail scams, premium
rate phone calls, misleading advertising, online banking cons (ie phishing),
timeshare and holiday club rogue traders, and so on.179
Within the EU rogue online businesses often move to different Member
States in order to avoid being stopped by the national authorities. This is
encouraged by the legal restrictions of national authorities in sharing informa-
tion with the national authorities of other countries. Currently, this practice
is hoped to be mitigated by the recent Regulation on Consumer Protection
Cooperation, which removes existing barriers to information exchange and
cooperation between national enforcement agencies.180 The objective of this
regulation is to link up national enforcement authorities to stop rogue traders
from taking advantage of the internal market by deceiving consumers.
The regulation requires that each Member State designates a single public
enforcement authority to be part of the mutual assistance network.181 Each of
these authorities can call on other members of the network for assistance in
investigating a possible cross-border breach of consumer EU laws and ultim-
ately to stop rogue traders. The regulation is also complemented by the
Injunctions Directive, which allows these bodies to apply for an injunction
in any court of the EU against a rogue online business.182
The regulation imposes an obligation on the assigned national authorities
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of exchanging relevant information, even without request from the interested
authority.183 However, in some circumstances limited by the regulation, an
enforcement authority may deny the requested information, eg if there is a
final judgment on the matter.184 In case of disagreement between two of the
national authorities, the European Commission will issue an opinion resolv-
ing the disagreement. All the designated enforcement authorities will have
common investigating and enforcement powers, such as access to any relevant
document related to an infringement of intra-communitarian law, competence
to carry out website inspections, to request the ceasing of an infraction etc.185
It also sets a number of competences that can be developed by the Member
States, such as the authority to impose fines or to seek consumer monetary
redress. In order to protect honest traders all the information collected by the
competent authorities is gathered in a confidential database controlled by the
European Commission.186 All communications are carried out online using
the national language agreed by the parties and, in case of disagreement, each
country would use its own official language.187
This type of cooperation will not be completed until it is extended at
international level, given the lack of barriers to e-commerce and its global
nature. In this regard, the regulation allows Member States to cooperate
through their link agencies with third countries in accordance with their
bilateral agreements, but any information obtained from another Member
State needs first the approval from such Member State.188 Clearly, the cooper-
ation and centralisation of the enforcement at the EU level is a further step
towards consumer confidence and success in the fight against rogue traders
and scams. An additional positive side effect of this regulation is that it is
expected to contribute to improving the quality and the consistency in
enforcing EU law.189 This regulation also shows clear intentions from the EU
to cooperate and negotiate on these issues with third countries at the same
time that they reassure respect for personal data.190
1.5.3.2 International dimension
At an international level there have been some efforts to increase cooperation
in this area. As has already been discussed, the Hague Conference on Private
International Law negotiated issues on competent jurisdiction.191 In addition,
the International Consumer Protection and Enforcement Network is an
organisation that compiles bodies involved with trade practices and law
enforcement. Its function is to share information about cross-border com-
mercial activities that may affect consumer interests and to encourage
international cooperation among law enforcement agencies.192
The OECD set Cross-Border Fraud Guidelines with principles for inter-
national cooperation among enforcement agencies that protect consumers
against cross-border fraudulent and deceptive practices.193 The main purpose
of these guidelines is to promote international cooperation to stop harmful
practices which originated abroad, as this is the only way fully to protect their
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consumers at home. In doing so, it calls for the sharing of non-confidential
information between relevant bodies to tackle harmful consumer practices.
The guidelines do not call as yet for government enforcement agencies to seek
consumer redress in another country, but they encourage joint research on
this possibility.194 This is quite a challenge because in those cases where a
national authority may have the power to find redress for foreign consumers,
it may not be able to prioritise the expenditure of limited resources to protect
them. In addition, from a logistic perspective, a case involving a large number
of consumers living abroad will be difficult to deal with.195 In this regard,
ICT development and cooperation between national agencies are essential.
The Global Business Dialogue on Electronic Commerce (GBDe) recom-
mended governments to ‘encourage enforcement agencies to adopt a more
aggressive interpretation, application and enforcement of existing criminal
and consumer protection laws’.196 To foster optimum efficiency the GBDe
suggested that sharing information among private and public entities as well
as agreement on an international procedure for cross-border fraud are of key
importance in order to stop illegal activities on the internet.197
1.5.4 Assessment
It has been shown that there are several methods to enforce consumers’ rights
and that many of them complement each other. In the EU all these methods
are combined to deliver the enforcement of consumer law. Recapitulating,
first, individual legal action by consumers can be sufficient to resolve disputes
in courts when the amount at stake is significant and the parties are in the
same jurisdiction and located near each other. Secondly, actions on behalf of
consumers are more suited when a significant number of consumers suffered
similar losses caused by the same defendant. Lastly, in the EU, governments
and consumer protection agencies will be the best approach for seeking
redress in cases of fraudulent practices where private action is slow and inef-
fective.198 By contrast, in the US, regulatory agencies play a lesser role than
the courts. Individual litigation and class actions are used more frequently for
correcting market abuses.199
The major hindrance is that most of the existing procedures were
developed to address domestic cases and they are generally not adequate to
provide consumers with remedies across borders, where costs and practical
difficulties are beyond the reach of most consumers with low value disputes.
It is widely believed that ICT has an important role to play in assisting the
resolution of many cross-border disputes. Thus, other options (that will be
discussed in the next chapter) such as the use of Online Dispute Resolution
methods (ODR) may prove to be more suited to certain disputes, such as
a one-off dispute of low value with a legitimate business arising out of an
e-commerce transaction.
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1.6 Conclusion
European consumer regulation is evolving with the aim of obtaining a higher
level of uniformity across the Member States. By contrast, the US has adopted
a hands-off-approach towards consumer protection, ie trusting the market to
self-correct. In order to gain more integrated e-commerce what is needed is
greater legal harmonisation at regional and international levels. Nonetheless,
international harmonisation in substantive and procedural law, in spite of
being theoretically ideal, is quite challenging and impractical given the sig-
nificant legal disparities still present among different countries, as has been
shown by the Hague Conference.
From a substantive law perspective it appears that consumers within the EU
are more protected when buying online than in the physical world, but this
protection may be to a large extent fictitious because consumers find it dif-
ficult to enforce their rights when these are not respected, particularly across
borders. If a consumer dispute arises in a bricks and mortar shop, the consumer
may return to the shop and discuss it with the owner and, if that is not suf-
ficient, the consumer may go to the small claims court. Presently, small claim
procedures are designed to deal (with greater or lesser efficiency) with low
cost disputes at a national level. Thus, cross-border litigation does not seem
to be effective for consumer disputes, even when favouring consumers’ forums
and laws, particularly when the enforcement has to be carried out in a differ-
ent forum. The costs of cross-border litigation are likely to deter all but the
highest value consumer claims from pursuing this option. Clearly, traditional
consumer enforcement mechanisms are unsuitable for the internet age.
It is necessary to question the need of having consumer protection laws
in the EU if there are no effective ways of enforcing these laws. At present the
resolutions of small value disputes with cross-border elements, such as those
arising from e-commerce, are untouched under the domestic judicial proce-
dures. A potentially more suitable judicial process for resolving e-commerce
disputes, the European Small Claims Procedure, was implemented in January
2009. This cross-border procedure is discussed in Chapter 3.
There is an urgent need to provide an easy-to-utilise venue for consumers
to resolve their disputes. In other words, it is necessary to develop an efficient
system to enforce consumers’ rights. It is not suggested that courts are not
necessary; in fact, courts cannot be substituted by private dispute resolution
bodies when dealing with certain cases, such as those that involve criminal
wrongdoing. But for a large number of cases that arise online, where the value
under dispute is less than likely legal bills and where both parties truly
participated in the transaction in good faith, different alternatives are needed.
An efficient mechanism for the resolution of online consumer disputes might
assist in redressing grievances and strengthening consumer trust, thereby
making e-commerce more reliable. The best options are those of ICT, ADR
and the synergy of these two elements (ODR), which is discussed in the
following chapter.
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In this chapter the existence of European legislation on consumer protec-
tion has been analysed. That analysis indicates that the European approach
acknowledges that the internal market of itself does not and will not result in
effective consumer protection and, for this reason, the EU is developing
consumer protection laws, both substantive and procedural provisions.
Accordingly, a consistent application of that European view of the market
seems to require an analysis of the need to regulate ODR. The remainder of
this book will evaluate whether that view of the market is applied consist-
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2 Online dispute resolution
An emerging option for
consumer redress
[T]he shortcomings of the online market became clear. The second wave of
e-commerce will build the services buyers and sellers need to sustain their
involvement in online marketplaces, dispute resolution first of all. Only
after users of online marketplaces can obtain redress will the real potential of
e-commerce be achieved.1
2.1 Introduction
The internet’s relatively low economic entry barrier invites global participa-
tion in e-commerce even for those who cannot afford direct participation in
the offline market arena.2 Consumers and businesses from different countries
can now easily enter into international transactions. This new global com-
merce is producing a knock-on effect on the volume of international disputes.
However, the resolution in court of these disputes is often impractical because
it is necessary to participate in complicated, expensive and lengthy offline
procedures. This constraint contributes to the lack of trust that deters
many potential consumers from purchasing online, as the judicial forum for
enforcing their legal entitlements is unreachable. Consequently, the ability of
the internet to support and expand international commerce may be curtailed
to some extent by the lack of effective methods for resolving international
disputes in a simple manner, quickly and at low cost.
Accordingly, it is believed that efficient mechanisms to resolve online
disputes will impact on the development of e-commerce. The tools with
potential for achieving this are ADR and ICT. This book focuses specifically
on consumer ODR and considers its potential for resolving the disputes that
arise between businesses and consumers when engaging in e-commerce.
While the application of ODR is not limited to disputes arising out of
B2C online transactions, it seems to be particularly apt for these disputes,
since it is logical to use the same medium (the internet) for the resolution
of e-commerce disputes when parties are frequently located far from one
another.3 This chapter follows the previous analyses made by ODR experts
such as Katsh, Ponte, Schultz and Rule; special attention will be given to the
last author and arguments contained in his book, Online Dispute Resolution
for Business.4
The aim of this chapter is to examine the current state of consumer ODR
from a European perspective; on such account it evaluates the potential of
ODR in assisting online consumers and businesses to resolve e-commerce
disputes. This chapter will provide some suggestions about how ICT and
ADR can facilitate the resolution of disputes and which models are the most
appropriate for resolving B2C disputes arising out of e-commerce.
The chapter focuses in particular on the practical and technical difficulties
for the development of consumer ODR; the following chapters will focus on
the legal impediments. The chapter is divided into two main sections. The
first section (2.2) considers the state of the current development of ODR. It
begins by defining ODR and related concepts, such as ADR and online ADR.
Secondly, it looks to the brief history of ODR. Thirdly, it examines the main
advantages and difficulties of ODR for resolving consumer disputes. Fourthly,
it continues by discussing the various mechanisms used for avoiding disputes,
such as legal audits, internal complaint procedures, escrows, online payment
providers, reputation systems and trustmarks. Fifthly, it will consider the
major dispute resolution methods to deal with consumer disputes, ie auto-
mated negotiation, assisted negotiation, mediation, arbitration and small
claims court processes. Finally, it looks at the most significant European ini-
tiatives aiming to promote the use of consumer ODR, namely, the Consumer
Complaint Form, ECODIR and ECC-NET.
The second section (2.3) evaluates the challenges posed by ODR. It
addresses how current ODR projects are being funded and the possible risks
to impartiality that may arise. Another major challenge to consumer ODR is
directing parties to utilise it; several strategies to achieve this will be con-
sidered, such as promoting awareness, increasing confidence in e-commerce
by using trustmarks and by providing public ODR services etc. Due pro-
cess issues are at stake when a power imbalance exists; in this regard, key
aspects, such as the need for impartiality, the selection of neutral third
partiess, legal representations and exerting control over ODR providers will
be discussed. Judicial enforcement and self-enforcement mechanisms are
also considered as of paramount importance for the development of ODR.
Finally, the role of technology in ODR processes is analysed by looking at
the strengths and weaknesses of the different ICT techniques, the security
issues, and the potential of the fourth party in assisting individuals to resolve
their disputes.
2.2 Definition and growth of ODR
2.2.1 Defining ODR
Dispute resolution techniques range from methods where parties have full
control of the procedure to methods where a third party is in control of both
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the process and the outcome.5 The following diagram illustrates the main
dispute resolution methods and the parties’ control over the resolution of
the dispute.6
Initially, there was a resistance to using ICT and ADR, by both parties and
lawyers alike. In the last few years ADR has gained greater acceptance
amongst the general public and the legal profession. In fact, some courts now
require parties to resort to ADR, typically mediation, before allowing them
to engage in litigation.7 The rising popularity of ADR can be explained
by the ever-increasing caseload of the traditional courts, the potential cost
benefits of ADR over litigation and a preference for confidentiality.
Dispute resolution methods may be complemented with ICT. The process
is referred to as ODR when it is conducted mainly online. This may include
the initial filing, the neutral appointment, the evidentiary processes, oral
hearings, discussions, and even the rendering of binding decisions. ODR is
simply a different medium to resolve disputes, from beginning to end, while
still respecting due process principles.8
ODR emerged from the synergy between ADR and ICT as a method of
resolving disputes arising online and for which the traditional means of dis-
pute resolution were inefficient or unavailable.9 The introduction of ICT into
dispute resolution is currently growing to the extent that the difference
between offline dispute resolution and ODR is blurred. Hörnle has observed
Figure 2.1 Chart adapted from the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), E-Commerce and Development Report 2003,
Chapter 7, Online Dispute Resolution: E-Commerce and Beyond, 178.
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that it is only possible to distinguish between proceedings that rely heavily
on online technology and proceedings that do not.10
Some commentators have defined ODR exclusively as the use of ADR
assisted principally with ICT tools, although part of the doctrine incorporates
a broader approach including online litigation and other sui generis forms
of dispute resolution when they are assisted largely by ICT tools designed
ad hoc.11 The latter definition seems more appropriate as it incorporates all
methods used to resolve disputes that are conducted on the internet through a
tailored online platform. Moreover, this approach is more consistent with the
fact that ODR term was created out of the conceptual distinction with
offline dispute resolution processes.12
The concept of online ADR is used for referring to those methods involv-
ing primarily ADR methods assisted largely by ICT. Similar to ODR,
the boundaries of ADR are a debatable concept. In England and Wales ADR
is considered as covering all methods for resolving disputes other than
litigation. By contrast, in the United States ADR is generally referred to
as ‘non-adjudicative’ dispute resolution, excluding arbitration and other
adversarial proceedings.13 In this book it has been decided to use the former
approach while employing the term of consensual ODR when referring to
non-adjudicative ODR methods.
The nature of ODR, like ADR, may derive from public or private sectors
depending on the source of the provider. In Spain, for instance, the most
widespread consumer ADR method is the Consumer Arbitration Boards,
which are of a local origin as they are controlled and funded by the local
authorities.14 In England and Wales Her Majesty’s Court Service has imple-
mented an ODR service within the courts with the introduction of the
Online Money Claim. Other types of ADR and ODR methods may have a
corporative nature, such as the ombudsman for banks and insurance com-
panies. Finally, ADR and ODR can also be provided by private online start
up initiatives such as CyberSettle and Paypal. ODR is therefore not a fixed
concept, but one that is evolving, to include any procedure that relies mainly
on ICT to resolve disputes.15
2.2.2 A brief history of ODR
The first ODR scheme ever launched was the Virtual Magistrate (VM) located
in Villanova University (Philadelphia, USA) and founded by the National
Centre for Automated Information Research in 1995. The VM was a volun-
tary online arbitration procedure aimed to resolve disputes between Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) and users. At that time, it was not clear whether the
ISPs could be held responsible for the activities of their users, so there was a
concern that ISPs could be sued quite often on basis of these activities.16 The
VM had competence to deal with disputes arising from defamation, intel-
lectual property, fraud and illegal appropriation of commercial secrets etc.
This project rendered only one decision, Tierney v Email America,17 which,
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incidentally, was not a very popular one. The decision ordered America
Online (AOL) to remove a commercial notice posted on its website advertis-
ing the availability of millions of e-mail addresses that could be used for
bulk e-mailing.
Benyekhlef and Gélinas believe that this project was unsuccessful for three
reasons.18 The first was because of the exclusion of all commercial transac-
tions, including those where arbitration seemed to be an appropriate method.
Moreover, in their view, for some of the competencies given to the VM,
mediation might have been more appropriate. The second reason was on
account of the primitive software used, which relied mainly on non-secure
e-mail. Finally, they claimed that the contractual arbitration used by this
project could not effectively enforce arbitral awards. It appears that this
scheme was ahead of its time. In addition to the above reasons, Katsh and
Rifkin maintained that the main difficulty that the scheme encountered was
to persuade respondents to participate in arbitration.19 Initially AOL, the
largest ISP at the time, had informally agreed to refer disputes to the VM, but
as AOL had the authority to terminate their contract for almost any reason, it
decided not to risk its power and independence by outsourcing these
decisions. The VM did not succeed in persuading other ISPs to participate in
the scheme. Katsh and Rifkin observed that the lesson learnt was that ‘who-
ever has the economic power in a dispute is unlikely to be eager to surrender
that power to a third party decision-maker’.20 Indeed, this is a difficulty faced
in the resolution of B2C disputes.
Shortly afterwards the Online Ombudsman Office was launched in 1996.
It offered mediation services for all internet disputes.21 This project showed
that working within a particular marketplace is very useful for attracting
users.22 CyberTribunal also appeared in 1996. It was a ground-breaking ser-
vice in dispute resolution combining mediation and arbitration. The service
ended in 1999, when the founders set up a new project eResolution. All these
ODR schemes were experimental in nature and aimed at creating a viable
ODR system. Looking back at the short history of ODR, it is possible to
divide the emergence of ODR into four different phases:
(i) Hobbyist phase: It is understood that this phase was from the creation of
the internet until 1995, when ODR did not exist. During this time the
first disputes arose from the internet and informal ODR mechanisms
were used. Ideas started appearing in the different methods as to how
these disputes could be solved in an effective manner.
(ii) Experimental phase: from 1995 to 1998, when more disputes started
to appear and the first ODR initiatives were used by not-for-profit
organisations, eg VM.
(iii) Entrepreneurial phase: from 1998 to 2002, when the ODR industry started
to emerge and commercial enterprises had successful initiatives, eg
SquareTrade and CyberSettle.23
(iv) Institutional phase: This phase was initiated in 2002 and continues to the
Online dispute resolution 55
present. It refers to the adoption of ODR programmes by public bodies,
eg Online Money Claim in England and Wales and the Online Small
Claims in Ireland.
According to Conley Tyler, as of March 2006, at least 149 ODR services have
been launched worldwide,24 although many of them have since closed down
or appear to be dormant, without significant activity. The reasons contribut-
ing to hinder the development of ODR services are analysed throughout
this book.
2.2.3 Advantages and difficulties in using ODR
The use of ICT to resolve disputes changes the dynamics by which parties
interact. There are pros and cons when using ICT. According to Rule, the aim
is to design ODR platforms that maximise the pros and minimise the cons.25
2.2.3.1 Advantages
2.2.3.1.1 TIME SAVINGS
The use of the internet to resolve disputes can speed up the procedure since
parties have more flexibility when using ODR asynchronous communica-
tions. This is because ODR allows parties to work at any convenient time
24/7, ie not just during court hours or with scheduled meetings.26
2.2.3.1.2 CONVENIENCE OF THE PROCEDURE
The use of asynchronous communications allows the parties to be prepared to
produce their best response without being easily intimidated or bullied.27
Moreover, some scholars consider that asynchronous communications allow
parties to think more thoroughly than in verbal exchanges before actually
sending their messages.28 It also opens lines of communication that are not
used in the more formal offline legal procedures. Ponte and Cavenagh main-
tain that ODR often uses confidential procedures which encourage parties to
be more honest in a trusting environment that fosters settlement.29 ODR
facilitates the parties to start working on the resolution of their disputes
immediately. It also allows neutral third parties to continue assisting the
parties after key communications.30
2.2.3.1.3 COSTS SAVINGS
ODR offers a lower cost than offline procedures because there are no travel
and accommodation expenses, which in international consumer disputes are
frequently higher than the value of the dispute. The use of informal means of
ODR facilitates self-representation and fast settlements resulting in cost and
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time savings. Lower expenses expand the possibility of using ODR in low
value disputes, increasing consumer access to justice.
2.2.3.1.4 LITIGATION
ADR has significant advantages when compared with litigation, which can be
added to ODR services. The most significant advantage is that the parties
have greater control over the processes and the decision. For instance, in
consensual ODR the parties create their own agreement without having it
imposed on them by a third party. As a result, there may not always be strict
winners and losers.31 In addition, the parties may select the most convenient
neutral third party and process. Neutral third parties are experts on the
particular area of the dispute, which can remove the need for lawyers and
expert witnesses.32 By contrast, judges are compelled to follow existing pro-
cedures and precedents. When consensual ODR methods are used the rules of
evidence do not apply; hence procedures are more flexible and the parties need
not be represented by a legal practitioner.
2.2.3.1.5 CONTROL OVER OUTCOMES
Consensual ODR gives the parties more control over the outcomes, increasing
conflict resolution options and encouraging enforcement. Parties can reach
agreements without the limitations imposed by the law. Additionally, when
parties voluntarily agree upon a decision there is a better chance of voluntary
compliance than when the decision is imposed by a judge, since in the latter
case one party will often feel unsatisfied with the decision. Furthermore,
judicial enforcement is complicated, slow and expensive, particularly when
enforcing cross-border decisions.
2.2.3.1.6 APPROPRIATENESS
ODR seems to be the most appropriate tool to address online disputes. Ponte
and Cavenagh observe that ‘[t]he online community is looking for conflict
resolution options that mirror the speed and efficiency of the Web’.33 However,
it would be foolish to see ODR as a panacea for consumer disputes;34 in fact,
ODR is facing many difficulties in its implementation.
2.2.3.2 Difficulties
2.2.3.2.1 LACK OF FACE-TO-FACE CONTACT
Body language, tone of voice and facial expressions are important compo-
nents of communications. The absence of non-verbal cues may facilitate
misrepresentation of identity35 and lead to miscommunication. Video-
conferencing and other online technologies may help to compensate for the
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lack of face-to-face contact36 but they will not be able completely to substi-
tute it. Neutral third parties and technology have an important role in
delivering meaningful communications and building trust. This requires
different training for neutral third parties. The interpretation of written
communications, although different from physical communications, is also
possible. It has been argued that face-to-face communications tend to favour
those who are physically attractive and more articulate, and it can create
possible bias in terms of religion, sex, nationality or physical appearance.37 In
this context, the internet enables parties to self-represent, thus removing
prejudices.38
2.2.3.2.2 TECHNOLOGICAL PROBLEMS
The argument that ODR favours those who are familiar with computers is
losing ground as the number of people using computers on a regular basis is
increasing; however, parties may have different levels of knowledge and skills.
In addition, there are no equal technical standards, ie technology advances
differ in every country. Presently, within the EU many people still use dial-up
as well as broadband connections.
2.2.3.2.3 LANGUAGE BARRIERS
Currently most existing ODR services use only the English language, which
can be another difficulty in expressing accurate information and avoiding
miscommunications. This can be a barrier not just for those parties who
do not speak the language but also for those parties who use it as a second
or third language.
2.2.3.2.4 LEGAL DIFFICULTIES
The absence of clear legal standards for ODR creates many difficulties,
particularly if the need of public enforcement arises.
2.2.3.2.5 NEED FOR PARTY CONSENT
Litigation is an adversarial procedure familiar to those who use it regularly.
For those who refuse to participate in court proceedings, the latter may
summon them with subpoenas and fines. But how can online ADR procedures
summon the parties, especially when the EU prevents the application of ODR
(or ADR generally) if it impedes consumers’ access to court?39
2.2.3.2.6 LOSS OF PUBLIC ACCESS AND PRESSURE
ODR generally applies confidential procedures which may cover up important
information about defective products, poor customer service, discriminatory
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practices and other unethical business conduct that, if publicly known, would
impact on consumer purchasing choices. On the other hand, it can be argued
that the role of the public authorities is to police these abuses, while ODR
can be used as an effective mechanism to obtain fast and fair redress for
consumers.
The above issues have been listed as ODR difficulties instead of ODR
disadvantages, as most of them can be overcome or mitigated with appropri-
ate practice, technologies and law. It must be noted that some of the
advantages and difficulties perceived above are arguable since they are
based on certain assumptions that would need reliable empirical data to be
categorically confirmed.40
2.2.4 Dispute avoidance
ODR can be divided into dispute avoidance and dispute resolution.41 The
first refers to the use of ICT to impede the occurrence of disputes between
the parties and the resolution of disputes at an early stage without requiring
the disputants to become fully engaged in a dispute resolution process. The
second refers to ICT as applied in the settlement of disputes. This book
focuses on dispute resolution mechanisms, although it is necessary at least
briefly to refer to the several dispute avoidance mechanisms as they contribute
to a better understanding of the potential of ICT for resolving disputes. An
effective use of these mechanisms can help businesses and consumers to alle-
viate the need for external resolution procedures, saving the parties valuable
time and money. There are many types of dispute avoidance mechanisms, and
those referred to below are the main ones currently in use.
2.2.4.1 Internal complaint procedures
These are also called internal dispute settlements, in-house customer satisfac-
tion systems, call centres, complaint services etc. Internal complaint pro-
cedures are the most popular and preferred method to impede the appearance
of B2C disputes.42 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) issued the E-Commerce Guidelines for Consumer Protec-
tion, where it highlighted in 2007 the need to use these in-house processes
effectively,43 because it is a beneficial strategy for providing consumers and
businesses with quick and inexpensive solutions.44 In this regard it has
suggested that merchants should improve their complaint handling pro-
cedures before investing in external ODR procedures.45 The Global Business
Dialogue on E-Commerce (GBDe) also considers that in most cases the use of
these mechanisms is recommended prior the use of external ODR.46
Direct negotiations between businesses and consumers are of paramount
importance as most disputes can be solved by this method if it is used
appropriately.47 Internal complaint procedures can be made more convenient
when complemented with ICT. For instance, the use of ODR software may
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assure that consumers include all critical information needed for the reso-
lution of disputes, thus providing effective case management tools. The
potential downside of this is that ODR software may open the floodgates for
frivolous, vexatious or non-meritorious claims.
2.2.4.2 Escrows and online payment providers
Another dispute avoidance system is the escrow service, which is an online
payment option that, for a small fee, maintains accounts for online buyers
who want to make deposits via electronic money transfers. The money is
transferred to the seller once the buyer receives and approves the purchased
item, after an agreed inspection period.48 This method helps to avoid the
problem of fraudulent sellers.49
Escrow services are not commonly used by online consumers, perhaps
because they cost money and complicate the otherwise quick buying process.
In addition, consumers who use credit cards or other payment services to
make online purchases may already be protected to a similar degree through
the credit card’s chargeback policy.
Online payment providers, such as Paypal.com, first recommend the par-
ties to work through the dispute together. Paypal.com has launched a dispute
resolution centre which facilitates communications between the buyer and
seller. According to Colin Rule, since launching the centre, buyers’ claims
against sellers decreased by 50 per cent, and seller losses on Paypal.com owing
to chargebacks decreased by 20 per cent.50 If the negotiation between the
parties fails to produce a satisfactory result, the buyer may escalate the dis-
pute into a claim; in this case Paypal.com will temporarily retain the money
paid by a buyer when the latter makes a complaint within 45 days after the
payment. Paypal.com holds the money until the dispute is settled, but only
in those cases where the merchandise did not arrive, or the description of the
product was ‘significantly different’ to the product itself.51 In these circum-
stances Paypal.com acts as an online arbitrator which will first examine the
documentary evidence provided by the parties, and then will resolve the dis-
pute, providing the parties with an instant and effective enforcement. How-
ever, in circumstances where the seller withdraws the money from his account
before the buyer makes the claim, Paypal.com will not be responsible for the
buyer’s loss. Both eBay and PayPal offer members comprehensive programmes
that provide protection against loss from non-delivery or misrepresentation
for most purchases up to a certain value.52
2.2.4.3 Online shopping assistants
Online shopping assistants fulfil a similar role as trustmarks as they inform
consumers about the sellers in order help them avoid disputes, particularly
those related to fraudulent issues. An interesting example of dispute avoid-
ance is a software tool created by the European Consumer Centre (ECC) in
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Denmark called the Howard Shopping Assistant.53 It is simple to use. The
consumer only has to type the domain name of the business and the software
will deliver the following information:
• when the website was registered/updated
• the results of an archive.org search, which shows the images of the
website of the online business during the last few years
• official company register information
• the results of a Google search excluding the website of the online
business
• the adherence of the online business to a trustmark scheme
• the existing trustmarks in the country where the online business is based
• the general limitation period, eg a minimum of two years
• the general cancellation period, ie 14 days
• examples of website comparison in the country of the online business
• contact information of the national ECC.
The Howard Shopping Assistant is therefore a website that helps consumers
to check whether an online business is reliable or not. This software is a
very useful initiative that promotes consumer empowerment and dispute
avoidance.
2.2.4.4 Feedback systems
The aim of a reputation or feedback system is to increase the users’ confidence
by giving them the information and experience of former users. Feedback
systems are particularly popular among online auction houses because they
occur to some extent on a ‘blind basis’, that is between unknown sellers and
buyers, where the buyer cannot always adequately assess the seller and the
goods.54 As a consequence, there is a large potential for lack of consumers’
confidence. In order to minimise this, online auction houses such as eBay,
which hosts around 16 million online auctions a day, have developed rating
systems that show comments from former buyers in previous transactions.
The eBay feedback rating system is a prime example of a database
readily available to buyers and sellers alike. Every eBay seller is ranked in
each transaction with positive, negative and neutral feedback by the buyer.
Before purchasing anything on eBay a buyer will first check the reliability
of the seller, and will decide whether or not to do business with that seller,
taking into account the result of the seller’s previous transactions. The
better reputation a seller has, the more trust that seller will inspire in future
buyers. This allows sellers with good reputations to charge higher prices
than other competitors. This system encourages a sustainable market com-
petence that is impossible to replicate in the offline world. Katsh and Rifkin
observe that ‘online auctions, even though they have an innately distrustful
atmosphere, have succeeded because of software that makes the auction a
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convenient multiparty negotiation space and that integrates devices for
building trust.’55
2.2.4.5 Trustmarks
Trustmarks were designed with the aim of distinguishing reputable sellers,
particularly SMEs without widely recognised brands. Trustmarks assure
consumers that trustmark carriers comply with quality standards and that
they pledge to participate in an ODR system should a dispute arise between
the seller and the buyer. For instance, SquareTrade claimed that their
trustmark users increase their sales by over 15 per cent after joining
SquareTrade.56 Trustmarks, trustseals and certification programs are different
words to designate protocols or standards of good practice for privacy, dispute
resolution and e-commerce. Independent trustmark providers are trust
enablers, which supply their seals or slogans to their member websites as long
as they comply with the standards of good practice.57 In order to do so,
trustmark providers generally require a number of requisites, such as that
businesses trade in the online market for a certain period of time, eg a year
before they can qualify to apply for the seal or trustmark.58 If the online
business does not comply with the required standards, the seal may be
removed by the trustmark provider.
According to Rule there are some websites that are reluctant to post trust-
marks on their homepage for a number of reasons: it may not fit the design
of the site, it may look like advertisement or a bit defensive, it may take a user
away from the site etc.59 To minimise these negative effects some merchants
have decided to place their trustmark logo outside the home page.
In order to be effective, a trustmark needs to create a popular brand that
reaches a critical mass. Most trustmarks are mainly national and intended for
particular markets.60 At European level the two largest schemes are Trusted
Shops and Euro-Label but they have not yet obtained a significant market
share.61 Despite this, the European Parliament continues to push for the
expansion of a European trustmark for SMEs.62 Outside the EU only a few
have achieved a successful penetration in e-commerce. This is the case of the
Better Business Bureau (BBB) and TRUSTe.63
To date, the most well known trustmark provider is TRUSTe. This is a not-
for-profit organisation which aims to ensure that its members disclose how
personal information obtained by them is handled.64 It certifies website priv-
acy and e-mail policies, monitors practices and resolves consumer disputes
related to privacy violations. TRUSTe Watchdog is the name of the ODR
program. In order to use this mechanism, TRUSTe first asks claimants to
attempt to resolve their disputes directly with the seal holder through direct
negotiation. When parties cannot reach an agreement TRUSTe Watchdog
studies the claim and produces a decision. In its decision TRUSTe Watchdog
can ask a seal holder to have certain information corrected or deleted; it
can request a website to change its policy on privacy, but it cannot require
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a seal holder to pay monetary damages.65 Appeals can be submitted to
TRUSTe within 10 days of the initial decision. If the seal holder refuses to
comply with the decision, TRUSTe may revoke their seal and communicate,
if appropriate, the matter to the national regulator or the courts.
The reliability of TRUSTe has been widely criticised because, despite
having handled thousands of disputes, to date TRUSTe has never revoked a
single seal. One of the most controversial cases involved a claim against
Yahoo!’s decision to change its personal information policy, which affected
information collected prior to the change of its policy.
The main problem of trustmarks is that their proliferation has brought
confusion and a lack of harmonisation to the standards for consumer protec-
tion. The creation of European minimum standards for trustmarks linking
them to the ECC-Net might help to maintain a minimum criterion.66 In the
EU most e-commerce participants are in favour of creating a European trust-
mark but the main hurdle is the financing of this project. It is debatable
whether self-regulation and private funding in this area are efficient and fair,
particularly when this is supported exclusively by the businesses. Thus, it
may be more appropriate if these trustmark providers are backed by a gov-
ernmental or regional authority, consumer associations and industry groups.
By contrast, if trustmarks are left without any control it may create a false
appearance of protection that is to the detriment of many consumers. This
would result in the opposite effect than the one for which they were created,
ie that of increasing the confidence and protection of consumers.67 Further-
more, empirical evidence suggests that certified businesses are more likely to
breach the code of conduct than those that are not certified.68
The US Better Business Bureau (BBB), in a joint venture with the
Federation of European Direct Marketing, Eurochambers and many other
organisations that encourage consumer trust in e-commerce, embarked in the
development of an international trustmark and ODR cross-border stand-
ards.69 The minimum standards are based on the self-regulation efforts carried
out by the OECD and the GBDe.70 This ongoing project is called the Global
Trustmark Alliance (GTA) and it aims to launch an international trustmark,
co-branding it with the existing national schemes, as well as to provide a
transatlantic system for handling B2C disputes. A similar initiative related to
the GTA was a cross-border complaint project provided by BBB, TrustUK
and WebTraderUK.71 Unfortunately these projects currently seem to be at a
standstill.
On the one hand, the major advantage of trustmarks is that they reduce
fraud by making it more difficult for rogue traders to operate. On the other
hand the major challenge is to attain brand recognition of the trustmark and
to obtain a sustainable financial model. This will be best achieved with the
assistance of a public regional coordination and an effective awareness strat-
egy showing businesses that a trustmark could increase their market share,
increasing consumers’ trust and reducing the chances of court actions when
the trustmark program is complemented with ODR services. If this is done
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effectively it will contribute significantly to increasing consumer confidence
in e-commerce.
2.2.4.6 A proposal: Trustmark complemented with a feedback system
One of the main objectives of consumer ODR is to promote consumer con-
fidence in legitimate businesses. This has already been largely obtained by
companies such as eBay, which has achieved the trust of millions of customers
by using a very successful feedback system. However, there has not been suc-
cess in replicating a feedback system for the global e-commerce market. Often,
when we find a new website selling something, we generally have concerns that
the supplier may be a fraudster or that the product is not as good as advertised.
In order to enhance trust in potential consumers, businesses could adhere to
feedback ratings designed by ODR providers and trustmark schemes.72
The first likely obstacle to this is that many businesses would probably not
want to participate in a trustmark scheme that could give them negative
feedback. Much of the reticence in business to participate in a public forum
for voicing customer dissatisfaction is the fear of negative commentary which
might be unfair or exaggerated. This is particularly problematic on the inter-
net, which moves so fast and allows people to rant, castigate and condemn
so easily. However, if the trustmark scheme is a reputable one (ie one with
public backing, such as the BBB Online and the ECC-Net) and the business
is a small enterprise that does not have anything to lose by opening its
product to the global market, it might be worth it for the business to
join. Perhaps, something along these lines would only be appealing for small
businesses; that alone would be a small step forward to improve the trust of the
online community as well as the competence in the global electronic market,
which is still dominated by large corporations, where brand recognition
remains vitally important.
2.2.5 Dispute resolution
2.2.5.1 Automated negotiation: CyberSettle case study
Automated negotiation is carried out exclusively by an ODR platform with-
out the intervention of a neutral third party. It usually involves a ‘blind
bidding’ negotiation process designed to determine economic settlements for
claims in which liability is not challenged. It occurs when one party invites
the other to negotiate the amount of money in dispute. If the other party
agrees, they start a blind bidding process whereby both parties make secret
offers, which will only be disclosed if both offers match certain standards.
They can usually submit up to three offers and if the difference between them
is less than a percentage (usually ranging from 30 down to 5 per cent) or a
given amount of money, then the settlement will be the mid-point of the two
offers. Although it is a simple method, it effectively encourages the parties to
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settle, splitting the difference when the amounts are close. This method has
proven to be particularly successful with insurance compensations and com-
mercial activities. It is also a valuable tool for disputants because they can use
it without revealing their bottom line settlements (unless an agreement is
reached) and, more importantly, without waiving their right to access the
court, in the case that the negotiation turns out to be unsuccessful.
Currently, the main provider is CyberSettle, which has been working online
since 1998 settling over 200,000 disputes for more than US$1.6 billion,
where US$12.5 million was its largest online settlement.73 There are approxi-
mately 150,000 attorneys registered with CyberSettle, of whom 30,000 have
already used CyberSettle to facilitate the settlement of their clients’ disputes.
CyberSettle commenced resolving insurance disputes but it has now expanded
its services to other claims. For instance, CyberSettle entered into a contract
with the City of New York to assist the city and its citizens in settling claims
related to sidewalks, city property, traffic devices, motor vehicles, personal
injury etc.74 This shows how ODR is useful for resolving bricks and mortar
disputes that arise with businesses, insurance companies and municipalities.
CyberSettle has also developed a system called RapidFunds to provide
settlement funds in less than 72 hours.75 CyberSettle entered into a strategic
alliance with the American Arbitration Association (AAA) allowing its clients
to use both companies’ ADR and ODR services.76 Clients are initially able to
use automated negotiation from CyberSettle and, if they cannot settle their
dispute, they will be directed to use the conciliation, mediation or arbitration
services with the AAA. Similarly, blind bidding can be considered in those
cases where initially a number of issues are at a stake but after the use of
mediation, for example, the only remaining issue in dispute is the amount of
money. CyberSettle now offers optional telephone facilitation for unresolved
disputes.
CyberSettle has been subject to a number of criticisms. According to Weiss
the fairness of CyberSettle is doubtful owing to the fact that repeat users can
‘cheat’ through their capacity to aggregate bid histories and outcomes in a
manner that a one-time user cannot.77 In addition, he argues that the system
fails to provide trade offs. Deffains and Gabuthy contend that CyberSettle
creates a situation similar to the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ (game theory) in which
the aggressiveness of the parties leads them to use a strategic approach that
produces suboptimal results.78 They further maintain that the success of
CyberSettle rests on the protection of their patent and its subsequent lack
of competition. This argument may be contested since there were other
ODR providers, such as The Mediation Room and SmartSettle One, which
provided similar services.79
It is worthwhile noting that the blind bidding system works very well in
the US with CyberSettle, but it did not succeed in the UK. The reason for this
is owing to the way lawyers get paid in both countries.80 In the US, lawyers in
certain claims, such as personal injury claims, may get paid a proportion of
the money recovered (ie contingency fee), while in the EU the system is
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different. In the UK, for instance, solicitors may charge an additional fee
when they win their cases (ie conditional fees), although fees are always
related to the number of billable hours. Therefore, there is a strong economic
incentive to drag disputes out as long as possible.81 However, the system in
the UK may soon change if fixed fees are implemented and contingency fees
allowed.82 If this happens, lawyers will be interested in settling as soon as
possible, thus encouraging the use of systems such as blind bidding.
Objectively, the achievements of CyberSettle are undeniable. CyberSettle
has developed successful software that contributed to the settlement of over
100,000 disputes. This was attained by targeting particular industry sectors,
such as insurance companies, and providing a fast and highly automated
ODR tool that deals with simple monetary claims. The main advantage of
automated negotiation is that it has the potential for saving money and years
of litigation for both parties. The main disadvantage is that it deals only with
monetary disputes where liability is not at stake. Therefore, in order to reach
its full potential automatic negotiation must be used as a complement to
other ODR processes.
2.2.5.2 Assisted negotiation, online mediation and online conciliation:
SquareTrade case study
Mediators use information management skills encouraging parties to reach an
amicable agreement; in doing so, they enable parties to communicate more
effectively through the rephrasing of their arguments. Conciliation is similar
to mediation but, in addition, the conciliator can propose solutions for the
parties to consider before an agreement is reached. Also, assisted negotiation
procedures are designed to improve parties’ communications through the
assistance of a third party or software. In fact, some commentators argue
that assisted negotiation, conciliation, and even facilitation, are just different
words for mediation.83 The major advantages of these processes, when used
online, are their informality, simplicity and consumer friendliness.84
The leading ODR provider for consumer mediation was until recently
SquareTrade. However, following changes in the eBay feedback system in
May 2008, SquareTrade decided to stop resolving eBay feedback disputes
from June 2008.85 It seems that SquareTrade continues to provide services to
eBay users, such as warranty services and the trustmark program. This section
will pay particular attention to SquareTrade as it operated successfully for a
number of years and created a model that furthered the development of ODR.
Currently, the ODR services provided by SquareTrade have been taken over
by eBay and PayPal dispute resolution services, but results on these services
are still scarce. For these reasons, it is still relevant to discuss the functioning
of SquareTrade, which was contracted by a number of market places, the
largest of which was eBay.
SquareTrade did not handle disputes between users and eBay; it handled
only those between sellers and buyers on eBay. SquareTrade offered two levels
66 Online Dispute Resolution for Consumers in the European Union
of dispute resolution: assisted negotiation and mediation, but it was only used
after eBay’s own consumer satisfaction process. eBay limits its assistance by
first ‘identifying the key information that needs to be exchanged between
parties and implementing a procedure that guarantees the exchange of these
data.’86 By contrast, SquareTrade’s automatic negotiation software matches
solutions to problems. During its existence, SquareTrade boasted of having
resolved over 2 million disputes across 120 countries in five different lan-
guages.87 SquareTrade resolved small value disputes using a process in which
a mediator assists disputants through asynchronous e-mail and web com-
munications with the parties. SquareTrade employed around 200 mediators
from over 15 different countries.88 At present, more detailed statistics on the
negotiation and mediation schemes are not publicly available.89
The advantage of dealing with large numbers of disputes is that the same
issues arise many times and thus it is possible to divide the disputes into
different sections. The SquareTrade process started when a buyer or a seller
filed a complaint. To do so, the claimant was asked to fill out a web-based
standard claim form that identified the type of dispute and presented a list of
common solutions, from which the claimant selected the ones that he agreed
to.90 The other party was contacted by e-mail where he was informed about
the SquareTrade process, and asked whether he wished to participate. The
parties were often keen on participating because this was the only manner by
which the buyer could get redress and the seller positive feedback. The other
party filed the response, selecting the resolutions. If both parties agreed on
the same resolution, the dispute was resolved. When an agreement could not
be reached, parties were put into a negotiation environment. A web interface
was used to shape communications into a constructive and polite negotiation.
This was achieved with software tools that limited the free text space, encour-
aged the proposition of agreements, set deadlines and even shaped the tone
of exchanges.
This software was the key element of the process because it took over some
of the expertise of the third party. This process could be defined as ‘mediated
negotiation’. According to Rabinovich-Einy, SquareTrade technology
. . . [i]ntervenes in the negotiations between the parties and, by allowing
parties to formulate and reformulate the problem and the solution, per-
forms some of what would be associated with a mediator’s role, moving
the parties from a problem mode to a solution stance.91
Most disputes (over 80 per cent) were resolved during the first two stages,
which was an impressive success rate given that, in the majority of cases, the
parties had already been involved in some type of failed direct negotiation
before engaging with SquareTrade.92 In the rest of the cases a mediator could
be requested for a nominal fee, acting as an expert evaluator or conciliator that
made settlement proposals to the parties.93 This second stage involved the
payment of a US$29.95 fee. According to SquareTrade, ‘[a] sophisticated case
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management technology enables mediators to handle lower to medium-value
consumer disputes in an efficient cost effective manner’.94 The appointed medi-
ator proposed solutions, if required by the parties to do so. Agreements were
always kept confidential by SquareTrade, and became binding as contracts.
SquareTrade has proven that processes such as online negotiation and online
mediation can be efficient tools to resolve consumer disputes. One of the key
issues for the success of SquareTrade was the simplicity and convenience of
this service. In addition, SquareTrade services to eBay were concentrated on a
reduced number of issues, such as delays, bad descriptions and negative feed-
back. This made possible the development of an efficient automatic process
that enhanced online negotiation. The success of consensual and automated
processes depends on the nature of the dispute, the accuracy of information
provided and the capability of the software or the neutral third party in
assessing and evaluating the facts and evidence. SquareTrade was particularly
effective because it introduced incentives that encouraged parties’ participa-
tion; in other words, both parties wished to resolve their dispute: sellers
wanted to obtain positive feedback and buyers wanted redress.
2.2.5.3 Online arbitration
Arbitration is a process where a neutral third party (arbitrator) delivers a
decision which is final and binding on both parties. It can be defined as a
quasi-judicial procedure because the award replaces a judicial decision.95 In
an arbitration procedure, however, parties can usually choose the arbitrator
and the basis on which the arbitrator makes the decision, ie the applicable
law. Furthermore, it is less formal than litigation, although more so than
any other consensual procedure. It is often used to resolve businesses’ disputes
because this procedure is noted for being private and faster than litigation.
Once the process is initiated, the parties cannot abandon it. Another feature
of arbitration is that the award is enforceable in most countries owing to
the wide adoption of the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.96 Moreover, arbitral awards
frequently prove easier to enforce than court decisions from overseas.
Arbitration is far easier to conduct online than mediation processes because
neutral third parties do not have to engage with the disputants in such an
intense manner. Despite this, arbitration is probably the least popular ODR
method for the resolution of consumer disputes, especially at an international
level. The reason for this is that it is difficult to secure the other party’s
consent once the dispute has arisen. In fact, EU law and consumer groups
have traditionally disfavoured the use of arbitration for fear that arbitration
would impede consumers from enforcing their full procedural and substan-
tive rights in the courts.97 Nevertheless, presently some consumer groups are
taking a more supportive approach given the existing difficulties in applying
domestic laws to cross-border disputes, as well as the increase of consumer
arbitration services managed by reputable providers.98
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The majority of legal studies on online arbitration agree that neither law nor
arbitral principles prevent arbitration from taking place online.99 Although
online arbitration seems admissible under the New York Convention and the
E-Commerce Directive, this is to some extent an assumption by most com-
mentators, rather than a legal statement.100 Currently, most ODR providers
allow parties to carry out part of the arbitration process online, eg parties
may download claim-forms, the submission of documents through standard
e-mail or secure web interface, the use of telephone hearings etc.101
The main challenge for online arbitration is that if judicial enforcement is
required then it partly defeats the purpose of having an online process. For this
reason, some dispute resolution processes have developed self-enforcement
mechanisms such as technical enforcements, black lists and trustmarks.
Nonetheless, this is not always feasible; in order to develop online arbitration
there is a need to amend the New York Convention allowing the validity of
arbitral awards arising from ODR processes. This could also be done through
an EC regulatory instrument that would establish the requirements for the
validity of online arbitral awards. However, to ensure that online arbitral
awards of consumer disputes will be enforced, it will be necessary to set strict
legal standards.
2.2.5.4 Sui Generis arbitration: UDRP and chargebacks
Traditionally, arbitration resolves disputes by delivering a decision that
will be legally binding, ie enforceable by the courts. Non-legally binding
arbitration processes may also be effective when using ODR tools because
they encourage settlements by injecting a dose of reality and objectivity.102
Self-enforcement measures may reinforce the efficacy of non-binding pro-
cesses. The most significant example is the Uniform Domain Names Dispute
Resolution Policy (UDRP) created by the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN). Some commentators have referred to the
UDRP as an administrative process. In any case, the UDRP has developed a
transparent global ODR process that allows trade mark owners to fight cyber-
squatting successfully.103 The UDRP is used for resolving disputes between
trade mark owners and those who allegedly have registered a domain name in
bad faith for the purpose of reselling it for a profit, or taking advantage of
the reputation of a trademark. This ODR process will be examined in detail
in the next chapter.
One of the main focuses of e-commerce to date has been related to secure
payment systems. Chargeback is a remedy used to reverse transactions made
with credit or debit cards when fraudulent usage has occurred, or when there is
a violation of the contract terms. In the UK consumers have the right to claim
damages from the credit card issuer when the purchase value is within the
range of £100–£30,000.104 This would also apply when an UK consumer deals
with a foreign business, which eliminates the need for the consumer to initiate
a legal action in a foreign jurisdiction.105 This method is very popular among
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consumers since this is the main method used to transfer money online and
consumers are not required to give evidence to cancel a payment. The seller has
the burden of proving that the merchandise or service was given according to
the contract terms. Once this is proven, the bank makes the payment to the
seller. Exceptionally, when a particular seller has several chargebacks, the bank
may deny the seller the use of credit card facilities for his transactions.
Chargebacks are largely used around the world for banks and the main
credit card suppliers, such as Visa and American Express. However, the cover-
age of debit and credit cards varies considerably among different countries.
For this reason one of the weaknesses is the fact that chargebacks are not
always extended internationally, thus limiting the scope of the remedy’s
application in e-commerce.106 Commonly, debit card holders have fewer pro-
tections than credit card holders, but these also vary depending on the juris-
diction. In the UK, for instance, credit card holders have more protections
than debit card holders, while in Ireland the protections afforded to consumers
are the same.107 This disharmony occurs even though the same European
directives are applicable to both Member States; this is due to the fact that
most of these services do not depend exclusively on the regulations, but also
on self-regulatory provisions.108
This remedy intends to balance the inequality of power between consumers
and businesses, encouraging the latter to be fair when dealing with con-
sumers. It is regarded as a very efficient dispute resolution method for
consumers because of the speed, accessibility and lack of charge for this
service to their clients, who would simply have to notify their banks to cancel
a transaction. Edwards and Wilson, however, pointed out that there is a lack
of awareness among consumers as to their rights under European law in the
event of a credit card transaction going wrong.109
Conversely, the existing systems are considered largely inefficient for busi-
nesses since the credit card company acts as an arbitrator without engaging
in an adversarial hearing process, which prima facie tends to favour consumers
as the burden of proof is on the business.110 Moreover, businesses are aware
that repeated chargeback claims against them will jeopardise their card privi-
leges and are therefore likely to be cooperative. Rule correctly observes that
the financial market is a good source for the resolution of disputes online
because disputes appear often, it has the means to enforce decisions (as it
holds the money) and there is ample money to finance it.111 The main limita-
tion is that the financial market is heavily regulated and many transactions
are of a low value.
2.2.5.5 Online small claims courts
Small claims procedures provide a middle ground between formal litigation
and ADR, where disputes involving small value claims can be resolved faster,
cheaply and less formally. The main limitation of small claims procedures is
that they are restricted to particular jurisdictions. In order to overcome
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this limitation the European Commission has created the Regulation for a
European Small Claims Procedure (ESCP), which implementation took place
in January 2009.112 The ESCP is predominantly a written procedure that
deals with claims under 2000 arising in cross-border disputes. Its main
advantage is that it provides for the enforcement of decisions in any of the
Member States without the present need to go through the formal mutual
recognition of judgments, ie exequatur.
The introduction of the ESCP will need to rely on ICT if it is to realise the
efficient enforcement of the rights of European consumers. Member States
will decide about the use of ICT for the ESCP; but since the ESCP is a written
procedure which deals with small value disputes between individuals located
in different countries, it will necessarily have to use ICT in order to make
the legal procedure cost effective. However, consumers might still prefer to
use other ODR methods if providers offer better systems, with cheaper and
quicker resolutions.
It must also be taken into account that ESCP is only applicable to EU
Member States, which may persuade businesses with a market outside the
EU to opt for creating a contractual clause referring all disputes to an ODR
provider capable of being equally applicable to EU citizens and to those from
overseas. It must be noted that exclusionary contractual clauses may be con-
sidered unfair under the forthcoming Directive on Consumer Rights for
limiting consumers’ access to justice, unless the agreement of consumers takes
place after the dispute arises. Consumers will only agree to use an ODR process
if it is cheaper and faster than the ESCP.
2.2.5.6 Other ODR techniques
2.2.5.6.1 MED-ARB
Med-Arb allows parties to use a tiered process in which the parties are given
the chance to negotiate on their own or with the assistance of a mediator.
If the parties are incapable of reaching an agreement, then they may ask the
online mediator to act as an arbitrator and to render a decision on the
unresolved issues, which can be binding or not binding, as the case may be.113
2.2.5.6.2 NEUTRAL EVALUATION
Here, similarly to arbitration, a neutral third party makes a decision on the
basis of the written submissions and evidence provided by the parties. How-
ever, in the case of evaluation this decision takes the form of a non-binding
recommendation. This feature may make participation more attractive for the
parties, but it cannot ensure the resolution of the dispute. Kaufmann-Kohler
and Schultz believe that there is clear potential for the development of neutral
evaluation.114 In fact, SquareTrade offered these types of services when the
mediator suggested settlements.
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2.2.5.6.3 OMBUDSMEN
These are independent bodies which carry out investigations on the failure of
services, when a consumer lodges a complaint. Most schemes are controlled
by professional sectors, such as the ombudsman in insurance and finances.
Ombudsman’s proceedings generally use mediation and conciliation tech-
niques. These services are free of charge for consumers and decisions are only
binding towards the professionals involved in the particular sector.115 An
example is the European Ombudsman, which investigates complaints (which
may be filed online) about maladministration in the institutions and bodies
of the European Union.116
2.2.5.6.4 MOCK JURIES
These are ODR processes whereby a jury of voluntary peers makes non-
binding decisions of the issues in dispute via a web-based platform, eg eBay
Community Court and iCourthouse.117 The lack of deliberation at some web-
sites makes the experience seem closer to an online opinion poll than to a
traditional jury trial. According to Marder, these cyberjuries are evolving
from online opinion polls to online mock juries, where lawyers test cases in
cyberspace before presenting them to a jury in a court room.118 Perhaps, the
next step will be online juries.
2.2.6 European initiatives promoting the use of consumer ODR
The European Commission has funded several initiatives with the aim of
strengthening the internal market. Among these initiatives there are several
projects related to ODR which are intended to increase consumers’ confidence
in the European market. This section discusses three of the most relevant
European projects: Consumer Complaint Form, ECODIR and ECC-Net.119
2.2.6.1 Internal complaint handling: The consumer complaint form
The initial project was launched by the European Commission in 1999 and
was known as the CCform, which stands for consumer complaint form.120 The
CCform was designed to help European consumers to file complaints and
businesses to process them through the use of a consumer friendly form with
standardised questions based on a multiple tick approach. The CCform could
be translated into 11 languages, with the exception of the free comments area.
This initiative allowed consumers to file free online complaints to those
SMEs which had been registered under the CCform programme.121 Com-
plaints could also be sent to non-registered merchants. In these cases, the
CCform platform first approached the merchant to confirm its registration.
Businesses that joined the CCform project were joined into the contract of the
CCform Code of Conduct and were required to display its logo on their
websites as a trustmark. A serious breach of the Code of Conduct would result
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in sanctions, such as financial penalties, public censure, or temporary or per-
manent cancellation of CCform membership.
The CCform was turned into what is now called the ‘consumer complaint
form’, which provides a standard complaint form for European consumers.122
The new complaint form is also available in 11 languages on the websites of
the European Commission and the European Consumer Centres Network
(ECC-Net). The form consists of four pages, together with a User’s Guide. It
can be used for national and cross-border disputes regardless of the amount
involved. The European Commission intends to launch a pilot project in the
near future, in order to assess the form’s relevance and effectiveness.123 It
appears from the limited existing empirical studies that it is still relatively
unknown among most consumers and businesses.124
2.2.6.2 Dispute resolution providers: ECODIR
At the European level, the first and most developed ODR project to resolve
cross-border consumer disputes is ECODIR (Electronic Consumer Dispute
Resolution). This project came as a result of the intention of the European
Commission to improve European consumers’ access to justice through the
use of ICT and ADR.125 ECODIR was funded by the European Commission
and two research centres, from University College Dublin and the University
of Namur. The programming support came from the Canadian project
eResolution. ECODIR was designed to resolve small value consumer disputes
through a tiered procedure that included, first, negotiation, then mediation
and, finally, recommendation. ECODIR provides a mechanism similar to
SquareTrade, and allows the filing of complaints in two languages, namely
English and French.126 During the pilot phase ECODIR allowed the parties
voluntarily to file their disputes free of charge. The limited experience of
ECODIR has revealed that most cases were resolved during the mediation
phase.127
ECODIR was intended to be launched on the market as a not-for-profit
organisation in 2003. However, this was frustrated largely to two main
hurdles: first, the lack of awareness from businesses and consumers; and,
secondly, the withdrawal of public funding.128 ECODIR’s rights were sold to
the National Arbitration Forum (NAF). Cruquenaire, ECODIR coordinator,
observed that a lesson learnt from ECODIR was that it failed to engage the
parties, suggesting that trustmarks and convincing businesses to seek legal
advice through their lawyers might have been a more effective approach.129
Hutchinson, supervisor of ECODIR, also pointed out that the main difficulty
was to persuade businesses to participate.130 Seemingly, this occurred par-
tially because of misinterpretation of ECODIR, which was often identified as a
consumer watchdog and as an investigatory authority, instead of a neutral and
secure environment for consumer dispute settlement.
ECODIR experience proves that the promotion of awareness is a central
issue that requires the cooperation of the parties’ representatives, consumer
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groups and professional associations. Before online businesses decide to
join in any ODR scheme, they must understand clearly its value in practical
terms. Awareness must be communicated in an appropriate manner and
with the necessary incentives, for instance in the form of reputation (eg
trustmarks) and cost savings (eg online proceedings as opposed to offline
complaint handling proceedings).
2.2.6.3 Clearing houses: The ECC-NET
The European Consumer Centres Network (ECC-Net) is an EU-wide net-
work that includes all the Member States as well as Norway and Iceland. Its
primary function is to promote consumer confidence within the European
market by informing consumers about their rights and remedies in cross-
border transactions. The network is co-financed by the Health and Consumer
Protection Directorate General of the European Commission and each of
the national governments. The secondary functions of the ECC are to pro-
vide feedback to the European Commission on consumers’ disputes and to
co-ordinate the operation of approved national ADR and ODR schemes. The
list of approved ADR and ODR providers is available online with the links of
those that comply with EU Recommendations 1998/257/EC and 2001/310/
EC.131 For instance, in Ireland, a dispute resolution provider may apply to the
Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment (DETE) to be approved
by completing an online form. Both DETE and ECC-Ireland must review
the application and, once it is agreed that the applicant satisfies all the
requirements established in the recommendations, the provider will be added
to the database of ADR providers.
It is worth noting that, even though almost half of the complaints con-
cern e-commerce transactions,132 only a small number of the approved ADR
schemes also offer ODR services. The lack of a formal monitoring system
makes one wonder whether the existing ODR services comply on an ongoing
basis with the minimum legal requirements established by European law.
A recent independent report for the European Commission has remarked
that not all of the approved national ADR and ODR service providers comply
with the recommendations.133
Consumers’ queries are directed to the national ECC. The habitual
methods of communication are by e-mail or telephone, although it is possible
to post letters or visit the offices.134 The website has information related to
consumers’ rights and frequently received complaints. When consumers con-
tact the ECC staff directly, they will be advised on their rights and, if neces-
sary, the ECC may recommend approaching the trader to seek an amicable
solution. If that fails, the ECC may contact the trader directly or recommend
the use of the approved ADR or ODR providers. However, given that this
works on a voluntary basis, if traders refuse to cooperate the only option
left to enforce consumers’ rights is through litigation. According to the ECC-
Ireland, this option has never been recommended in cross-border disputes
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because it was considered unfeasible, at least up until the implementation of
the European small claims procedure.135
2.3 ODR challenges
2.3.1 Challenges to ODR
Despite the fact that the performance of national litigation with online dis-
putes has been impractical and expensive, ODR has not yet achieved wide-
spread market implementation. Indeed, ODR is still emerging. Successful
providers are used for specific subject matters (eg UDRP for domain names)
or for specific market places (eg PayPal for eBay) where the ‘demand is very
high and competitors perform quite badly’.136 A report from the OECD
concluded that one of the reasons why ODR has not reached its full efficiency
is because it has not yet been able to achieve the desire of cost effective
services appropriate for the resolution of mainstream e-commerce disputes,
ie small value disputes.137
This section examines the main challenges posed to consumer ODR service
providers for achieving effective market implementation. It starts by con-
sidering how present ODR projects are being funded and the perils of
impartiality that this may cause. Directing parties to ODR is another major
challenge, which needs to be overcome by promoting awareness, using con-
tractual clauses referring to ODR, providing the right balance between con-
fidentiality and transparency and using trustmarks. Due process issues are at
stake when a power imbalance exists; in this regard, this section examines key
aspects such as the selection of neutral third parties, review panels, reasoned
decisions, legal representations and the exertion of control over ODR pro-
viders. Enforcement can be difficult in voluntary ODR procedures; thus,
public and private strategies are examined. Finally, the role of technology as
the fourth party assisting individuals to resolve their disputes is evaluated. The
key to delivering better expertise to the parties appears to be in designing
ODR systems that focus on certain types of disputes.138
2.3.2 Funding
2.3.2.1 Public funding
ODR models may be promoted as matter of public policy by governments
since efficient ODR can contribute to the sustainable growth of e-commerce.
In fact, to date most B2C ODR projects have obtained some funding from
public bodies. The Better Business Bureau (BBB) has suggested that the
expense of effective systems will require a partnership amongst governments,
not-for-profit foundations, academic institutions and the private sector, in
order to ensure that, at the least, the technological infrastructure is created.139
The American Bar Association (ABA) Task Force has also supported the idea
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of government subsidies.140 The ABA maintains that if disputes are resolved
using ODR, courts’ expenses may be reduced. Although it has to be acknow-
ledged that most online disputes are of low value, they would not have ended
up in court if ODR services had not been provided.
The assistance of ICT is being introduced to court procedures as well as to
ADR services. The funding for court processes, such as the Online Money
Claim in the UK, and the Online Small Claims in Ireland, are the same as in
the offline world: co-funded between the state and the litigants. This is true for
most ADR services. For instance, the Dutch Foundation of ADR Committees
for Consumer Affairs, an independent organisation offering ADR services, in
addition to the users’ fees, has received financial support from the Ministry of
Justice.141 Also, the Danish Consumer Complaints Board is funded by public
funds and fees paid by businesses and consumers. The fee is refunded when
parties either settle or win the claim. Similarly, the UK Chartered Institute of
Arbitration charges claimants a low registration fee that will be refunded if
they succeed with their claim. In other cases, such as the Arbitration Scheme
in Spain, participation is free for consumers.142
2.3.2.2 Private funding
Ponte observes that insurance policies might cover ODR expenses instead
of legal expenses, though such policies will be more costly as the number of
claims with ODR services will increase.143 Insurance companies can calculate
the risk of bad transactions among all participants and cover those transac-
tions that go awry. Rule points out that this may be an incentive for sellers
to engage in fraud knowing that the insurance company will cover buyers’
losses;144 however, insurance premiums could increase accordingly.
Private funding to secure sufficient income may jeopardise the independ-
ence of an ODR service provider, especially in B2C transactions where a
unilateral fees model, from the business, seems to be the most common way
to encourage consumers’ participation. In order to avoid a perception of bias
Katsh and Rifkin note that the ODR provider should publish if there is
any funding given by the business.145 Transparency should be complemented
with additional mechanisms to ensure impartiality, such as systems to handle
complaints when procedures were not followed.146
The only available survey on ODR funding sources found that user fees
have been the predominant funding mechanism for ODR providers.147 This
has taken many forms, including a filing fee, an hourly rate for neutral third
parties, a standard fee or a percentage of settlement reached.
Most ethical rules for dispute resolution practice state that the fee for dis-
pute resolution process cannot be contingent on the outcome of the case.
For instance, actions of the mediator can be easily affected by such condi-
tional compensation, allowing an inequitable settlement or lowering the
expectations of one party.148 Even though, economic incentives may create
problems in the neutrality of human managed ADR processes; it may not
76 Online Dispute Resolution for Consumers in the European Union
cause problems in an ODR process where automated processes are used, eg
CyberSettle.com.
If the market considers that the use of ODR is necessary for its develop-
ment it will subsidise it. This was the case of eBay which funded SquareTrade
in order to promote trust in its online auctions. Consumers International
recommends the participation in ODR free of charge thus encouraging
its use; alternatively, it has been suggested that a moderate charge would
make the process more valuable and would discourage frivolous claims.149
Costs could also follow the event if the parties agree to that, but the full
payment of the fee must be made in advance to ensure an expeditious
enforcement.
It appears, however, that funding is not the only challenge or difficulty for
the implementation of ODR. Conley Tyler observes that for ‘providers that
have not attracted business, the fees charged do not appear to be the problem:
their fees are not notably more than for successful enterprises’.150 Evidence
of the truth of this was through the ODR providers who failed to attract
parties despite offering free services during their initial pilot phase, such as
the VM funded by the University of Villanova and ECODIR funded by
the European Commission. Since public funding is not the only requirement
for creating efficient consumer ODR, governments could fund ODR services
in a more effective way to ensure market implementation. Different strategies
could be adopted, such as giving funding to those ODR programmes which
have achieved market implementation, subsidising e-businesses in creating
effective in-house customer services, providing some type of tax incentives for
those businesses that adhere to ODR service providers etc.
2.3.3 Directing disputants to ODR services
2.3.3.1 Awareness
Greater awareness and understanding of ADR concepts and processes are
needed for ODR to flourish.151 ODR is futile if consumers are unaware of its
availability and where to find it.152 Even in the event that an individual has
submitted a complaint to an ODR service that is not linked to the other party
(generally the business), the real challenge will be to convince the party to
participate. This is particularly difficult when there is an imbalance of power
between the parties. Participation may vary depending on the chosen ODR
process. In the case of arbitration it would be easier to engage when parties
have agreed before the dispute arises. This, however, may present legal prob-
lems within the EU, unless it is a non-binding arbitration, or binding only on
the business. In the case of mediation it would be easier to obtain the parties’
participation, particularly when there is no significant imbalance of power
between them, where there is an interest in maintaining the relationship and
when the dispute is not highly confrontational.
Katsh and Rifkin maintain that businesses may be reluctant to offer ODR
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in case their customers might think that disputes were a frequent occurrence.
They suggest that consumers must be informed not just about their rights,
but assuring them that they also have remedies which can be enforced.153 ODR
can build trust, but it needs to be advertised appropriately. Intermediaries
such as lawyers, consumer organisations and chambers of commerce, may
influence the type of remedies available to the parties.154 In addition, ODR
is frequently offered in the context of affiliation programmes, ie trustmarks.
Traders generally affiliate to these schemes on a voluntary basis to enhance
consumer confidence. In this context, the goal of ODR is not just to settle
disputes but also to enhance consumer confidence in e-commerce.155
In order to obtain the parties’ confidence in ODR it is necessary to attain
the right balance between transparency and confidentiality.156 However,
approaches to transparency and confidentiality may vary depending on the
ODR process in question. For instance, online arbitration systems need to
be more open with decisions than consensual methods, such as mediation,
because precedents, concerns about bias and conflicts of interest are more
pronounced.
2.3.3.2 Transparency and informing parties
In order to enhance trust in ODR providers, some relevant information must
be given to the parties, particularly when the ODR provider offers an alterna-
tive forum for resolving rights that consumers may have recognised in a
legal process. All ODR providers should be subject to mandatory disclosure
requirements, including:157
• the type of ODR procedure and its main features, eg languages
• restrictions of the procedure, eg monetary threshold etc
• requirements that consumers must meet, eg the previous attempt to
obtain redress through the business internal complaint system
• governing structure
• criteria for becoming a neutral third party
• costs, including fees and possible extra costs when decisions need to be
enforced
• rules that serve as the basis for the body’s decisions, eg legal provisions,
considerations of equity, codes of conduct etc
• security measures to keep private data confidential
• enforceability of decisions and agreements
• an annual report evaluating the functioning of the provider.
Of particular importance is the publication of reasoned decisions, which is
necessary in order to create a degree of transparency and legal certainty,
essential to increasing trust in ODR. This is indispensable in adversarial
procedures, especially when resolving B2C disputes with a clear disparity. In
addition, it would allow the users, consumers’ organisations and governments
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to participate in the evaluation of ODR services, thereby improving their
accountability.158 On the other hand, the publication of decisions may ham-
per confidentiality, one of the main attractions of ADR. In the B2C context,
businesses do not want publicity for their wrongs, and many users are keen to
maintain their privacy. Therefore, a certain balance between these two basic
elements, confidentiality and transparency, must be met in order to develop
an effective system.159 Gaitenby suggests that the names of the parties may be
kept confidential; however, this is compatible with maintaining a transparent
online process where the decision is published as well as the name and profile
of the neutral third party.160 Other solutions would be the use of impersonal
statistical data, sample cases, selective publication of decisions etc.161
2.3.3.3 Trust
ODR seeks to provide trust in online commercial contexts but there still is a
considerable lack of trust in ODR itself.162 This distrust is augmented by the
impotence of a newly acquired distrust derived from the number of disputes
arising out of e-commerce.163
There are several ways by which ODR providers can enhance confidence in
their services; for example by providing press articles and contact information
(including e-mail addresses, telephone numbers, real addresses and data pro-
tection rules);164 supplying simple information about the process and third
neutrals; the use of trustmarks; and providing feedback mechanisms. Feedback
is a major advantage that ODR has over ADR.165 Parties should be allowed to
provide feedback regardless of whether their process was successful or not.
According to Rule, the best insights on how to improve ODR will be given
by the users.166 Therefore an effective feedback system can be invaluable.
2.3.4 Fairness and due process
There is a concern about the imbalance of power between businesses and
consumers. A consumer may use ODR once or twice a year, while a business
as repeated players may be using it for dozens of cases at any given time. This
increases the imbalance where businesses are likely to make more informed
choices than consumers. For this reason, it is important that outside bodies
set standards ensuring procedural fairness in B2C processes.167 Due process
rights need to be respected, but that is not sufficient, consumers need to
perceive that their rights are being respected too.168
2.3.4.1 Impartiality
Third parties must be aware of the jurisdiction and the cultural background
of the disputants, who may perceive impartiality in different manners.
Public institutions may also take an important role ensuring and monitoring
impartiality.169
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The extent of neutrality can be questioned when it reaches a point where
the mediator refuses to intervene in a decision, even when the parties reach a
poor decision. It is arguable whether mediators can suggest outcomes or
whether this could conflict with the facilitative role of the mediator.170 In
cases where the mediator shifts to other roles during the process, eg med-arb,
this cannot be considered unethical when parties expressly agree or the code
of conduct provides for this possibility.171 Although, it should require that
the mediator offer the parties the option of selecting another third party. Rule
observes that computers are less concerned with perceptions of bias, eg ODR
providers, such as SquareTrade (and now PayPal), automatically display a list
of common resolutions depending on the type of dispute.172
ODR providers must be very scrupulous about preventing any conflict of
interests because credibility is essential to gain the trust of disputants and
once damaged it is very difficult to re-establish.173 Codes of conduct generally
ask mediators to acknowledge and withdraw on grounds of independence
where there is a conflict of interest, unless all parties agree to retain the
mediator.174 Conflict of interests would include family ties, business relation-
ships, intimate relationships, former legal representation, etc. In the ODR
field there is a concern that the majority of providers do not disclose informa-
tion on which their major shareholders are, and this is very important in order
to avoid conflicts of interest.
2.3.4.2 Selection of neutral third parties
Neutral third parties should have the necessary training to obtain the appro-
priate skills for assisting in the resolution of online disputes in a fair and
satisfactory manner. A higher degree of knowledge of the subject matter will
be expected from arbitrors than from mediators, in order to ensure competent
and fair awards. In addition, most of the literature considers that special
training for ODR services is necessary, but law degrees should not be always
required.175 The suitability of lawyers as neutral third parties is arguable; for
instance, it is generally understood that lawyers are more prepared for dealing
with IP disputes, while family disputes can be better dealt with by counsellors
and social workers. Furthermore, it can be argued that lawyers with insuffi-
cient training might not always be good mediators, particularly if they are
unable to depart from their roles as advocates in the judicial process, instead
of focusing on assisting the parties to reach a suitable solution amicably.
Online neutral third parties generally have training and experience in the
offline world. Gaitenby suggested the transposition of third party training
standards and experienced neutral third parties from the ADR field to the
ODR field until ODR has achieved enough experience to supply its own
training standards and third parties.176 Syme points out that ‘[d]ifferent cri-
teria may be needed for selecting on-line practitioners. For example, written
communication skills and typing speed may become more important than
oral communication skills and body language’.177 For this reason, neutral
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third parties must adapt their communication skills to interact with com-
puters, since there is not a direct correlation between ADR skills and the
ability to use ODR efficiently.178 Training is needed to teach neutral third
parties how to use an ODR platform, answer technical questions from the
parties (avoiding the participation of technicians), send efficient and frequent
communications with the parties, the use of concurrent caucusing and
so on.179 The use of ICT facilitates screening of the performance of neutral
third parties and identifying mistakes and excluding those who do not work
appropriately. This, however, requires substantial investment.180
ODR has the advantage of providing a pool of neutral third parties that
is not geographically limited, which facilitates the selection of neutral third
parties in accordance with the characteristics of the disputes, including tech-
nical knowledge, cultural differences, languages, gender and ethnicity.181
Nevertheless, the most appropriate neutral third party may be too expensive
because the greater the skill and competence of neutral third parties, the
greater the amount they charge for their services. Consequently, an inherent
risk in dealing with low value disputes is that neutral third parties may come
from less experienced staff, which in turn might affect the fairness of the
procedure. In order to avoid this Bygrave proposes the merging of similar
claims when possible.182
2.3.4.3 Legal representation
The manner in which lawyers manage and deliver information is compatible
with the use of ICT. ODR must allow legal representation when it is needed
since ODR aims to promote and accelerate fair resolutions and not to reduce
them. Whenever legal representation takes place, it must be disclosed to the
other parties. There are, however, some concerns that may arise from the
use of legal representation in ODR procedures. First, the parties might not
feel comfortable when their legal representatives or the neutral third parties
are less skilful in using ICT. This can be reduced by appropriate training.
Secondly, it would be more difficult to monitor licences and the quality of
legal representation by bar associations from different countries. These issues
may be overcome in time, particularly at a regional level. Thirdly, the down-
side of legal representation is that it increases the cost of dispute resolution
procedures and it adds the risk of making procedures lengthier.183 Thus, in a
low value dispute parties should avoid obtaining legal representation when-
ever possible. This can be achieved by using consensual processes and ODR
platforms that are user friendly.
Legal representation is not always necessary. For instance, some inquisi-
torial processes facilitate self-representation, eg the ombudsman. However,
legal representation will be more necessary in adversarial processes, assisting
disputants in understanding the procedure, the rules and the best manner in
presenting their cases.184 Under the domestic law of every country there is a
possibility of applying for free legal aid in cases where a party lacks sufficient
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resources. In many cases, it can be used for litigation as well as extrajudicial
processes. For instance, the AAA in the US, which is the largest not-for-profit
ADR organisation, has a fee waiver scheme in favour of consumers without
sufficient economic means.185
In the EU, since May 2006 a European directive has unified the free legal
aid provisions for cross-border disputes.186 Legal aid may be used to encourage
extrajudicial dispute resolution methods. Notwithstanding this, legal aid
has some limitations, because in order to qualify for it, applicants must
demonstrate that they have reasonable grounds to initiate proceedings.
According to Duggan, reasonable grounds means that the applicant must
have a good probability of winning the case and that there is a substantial
amount at stake.187
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that due process is not the only
challenge to ODR. Indeed, according to Edwards and Wilson, even non-biased
providers of ODR services such as ECODIR ‘indicate that although due
process is a prominent issue in the literature, in reality it neither particularly
prevents nor impedes e-commerce consumers to go to ODR’.188
2.3.5 Enforcement
Most experts agree that another reason which may hamper the development
of ODR is the legal uncertainty regarding ODR enforcement. Thornburg con-
siders that governments must ensure that ODR providers comply with min-
imum standards of due process because they perform public functions, which
may ultimately require courts to enforce the outcome.189 When parties volun-
tarily agree upon a decision, compliance may be expected, but it cannot be
always assured. In these cases a national court may have to intervene in order
to enforce a contractual settlement, which if it is not done efficiently, might
empty the utility of the previous ODR service. Presently, there is no clear
case law on how courts enforce online agreements. The first ODR enforceable
decisions will come from public institutions, such as the Spanish Online
Consumer Arbitration Boards, whose decisions are directly enforceable in
courts. However, at the time of writing most of the existing initiatives are not
delivering online decisions; although that day may not be far off.
In order to avoid enforcement from the judiciary, some ODR services
have designed efficient self-enforcement mechanisms. ICANN, for example,
requires domain name registrars to enforce UDRP decisions within 10 days of
the decisions’ publication. There is only one exception, if a legal proceeding is
initiated, then enforcement will not take place until the judicial proceeding
concludes.190 In practice, however, court actions are extremely rare. This may
be for a number of reasons: (i) the high cost of litigation; (ii) the fact that
cybersquatters may consider their chances for redress very low or; (iii) the
10 day period to bring a court action may be too restrictive etc. As a result,
the vast majority of UDRP decisions are final and enforceable.191
Trustmarks could also require business members to contribute to a fund
82 Online Dispute Resolution for Consumers in the European Union
out of which consumers are compensated when business members fail to
honour ODR decisions or agreements. Also blacklists may be effective.
The Consumer Complaint Board in Denmark states that 80 per cent of
its decisions are voluntarily complied with by the businesses. The remain-
ing decisions are published in a blacklist of defaulters on the consumer agen-
cy’s website. This strategy of ‘naming and shaming’ has led to eventual
compliance with an additional 30 per cent of the remaining decisions.192
Furthermore, the publication of these decisions makes consumers and busi-
nesses aware of the importance of buying from a business that has adhered to a
dispute resolution scheme and this, in turn, leads businesses to join these
schemes.193
2.3.6 The role of technology
2.3.6.1 ICT tools used in ODR
When comparing ODR with ADR, the main difference is ODR’s lack of face-
to-face (F2F) interaction between the parties, which is a pillar of ADR. Early
writers, such as Eisen, even maintained that the lack of F2F communications
would not allow the development of ODR.194 Although this assumption has
been proven wrong by successful ODR providers, such as the UDRP and
CyberSettle, the lack of F2F contact brings new challenges. Certainly, the use
of ICT cannot and should not always substitute F2F interactions, although
ICT may complement F2F interactions when this benefits the parties. In some
circumstances there are reasons for not using F2F communications, because
F2F interaction is neither always essential nor superior to ICT communica-
tions and, most importantly, F2F communication is not always feasible to
resolve e-commerce disputes.195
Studies in the field of ODR have revealed that in some cases the lack of
physical interaction may benefit the resolution of disputes, for example by
cooling down the nerves of the meeting and by compensating those who are
not particularly articulate, or who do not have a pleasing physical appearance.
In addition, the development of ICT, as well as the rapid increase of broad-
band users, makes the use of F2F substitutes more accessible, such as video-
conferencing and other telecommunications tools like emoticons, helping
parties in representing their feelings and emotions.
The first challenge confronting ODR platform designers and neutral
third parties is choosing among the different types of online communications.
Each online communication technique has its strengths and weaknesses.
Hence, ODR providers and neutral third parties must evaluate them in
deciding which process is the most appropriate for the needs of a particular
dispute.196
A difficulty in the growth of ODR is to devise technology which would be
compatible between different users and providers. This is important when
ODR users may need to store and exchange evidence and other documents. To
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such end there are ongoing efforts to develop ODR-XML (Exchange Markup
Language), which is a variant of XML that enables information exchange
among ODR systems, providing a standardised system.197
ODR will change at the same rate as new online tools and resources are
developed.198 According to Katsh and Wing, ICT advance is occurring
exponentially because ICT expansion increases with the passage of time.199
This is clearly seen with the advances in computers and internet connections
over the last decade.200 The European Commission predicts: ‘ICT will become
smarter, smaller, safer, faster, always connected and easier to use, with content
moving to three-dimensional multimedia formats’.201 Colin Rule, probably
the world’s best ODR visionary foresees that:
If wireless access becomes the norm, people may have the ability to
engage in dispute resolution procedures on their handheld devices or
cellular phones. If artificial intelligence advances rapidly, we may witness
a growth in the use of non-human mediators and arbitrators. Translation
technology may eventually allow for seamless interactions between
people who do not speak the same language. All of these what-ifs may
sound like science fiction, but their development will play a crucial role
in determining the future of ODR. The only sure thing is that technol-
ogy will continue to evolve, and in a few years our current tools and
techniques will look primitive.202
2.3.6.2 Security issues
Security issues are important, in particular when sensitive issues are involved.
When using ODR, the parties need to be assured that their communications
are protected from external parties to encourage open participation. Security
mechanisms are improving with the innovation of technology. Initially,
ODR platforms relied on e-mails, where the level of privacy has been com-
pared by Schultz as that of a postcard.203 As with due process, the level
of security must be in proportion to the amount of money involved in a
dispute.
ODR websites are also at risk of virus infections, intrusions or computer or
networking crashes. Firewalls, back-up policies and antivirus systems are the
standard mechanisms to reduce these risks.204 Larson observed that ‘[w]e are
fighting our way through computer viruses and worms that lead us to ques-
tion the value and reliability of the online environment’.205 Yet, as Hörnle
noted, there is no communication method that is absolutely secure; even
paper documents can be intercepted, copied or otherwise compromised.206
In the online sphere, the most common procedure to encode information is
the use of Hyper Text Transfer Protocol [http] plus Secure Socket Layer [SSL])
which is indicated by a domain name preceded by ‘https’ and displaying a
lock symbol in the corner of the user’s screen. An additional secure method is
the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) encryption system, which is comprised of
84 Online Dispute Resolution for Consumers in the European Union
a public key (held by the client and server) and a private key (held exclusively
by the client). Only clients can decode the information using both keys.207
2.3.6.3 Technology as the fourth party
In ODR, the information management is not only carried out by physical
persons but also by computers and software. The assistance of ICT has been
named by Katsh as the ‘fourth party’ because ODR is seen as an independent
input to the management of the dispute.208 In addition to the two disputants
and the neutral third party, the labelling of technology as the fourth party is a
clear metaphor which stresses how the use of technology can be as powerful as
changing the traditional three sided model. The fourth party embodies
a range of capabilities in the same manner that the third party does. While
the fourth party may at times take the place of the third party, ie automated
or assisted negotiation, it will frequently be used by the third party as a tool
for assisting the process.209
The fourth party may do many things, such as organise information, send
automatic responses, shape writing communications in a more polite and
constructive manner, eg blocking foul language. Furthermore, it can monitor
performance, schedule meetings, clarify interests and priorities and so on.210
The level of assistance by the fourth party increases the more technological
advances, hence reducing the role of the neutral third party.
In offline settings, arguably, the features of the place where parties meet are
not important, but when parties meet online the role of cyberspace is of
paramount importance, because the fourth party shapes the way expertise is
delivered and the way communications take place.211 In online negotiation
and online mediation the use of the software (fourth party) helps the parties in
reaching an agreement by taking on part of the role of the third party.
2.4 Conclusion
ODR is understood to be any dispute resolution process which is mainly
carried out with the assistance of the internet and ICT. Clearly, ODR has
several advantages, but the most significant one is that ODR allows com-
munication at a distance, eliminating the need for travelling and reducing
costs. It also allows the use of asynchronous communications delivering a
more convenient and flexible option for resolving disputes. As a result, ODR
has important potential to increase consumer access to justice. In this regard,
ODR may be an alternative to lack of access to justice, rather than an alterna-
tive to courts. However, ODR also has a number of pitfalls, such as the lack of
face-to-face communications, technological burdens, legal restrictions and so
on. In order to release the full potential of ODR, a system must be designed
in the best possible manner so as to reduce the number of difficulties and
exploit all the advantages of ODR.
ODR can work at two levels. First, ODR can be employed as a dispute
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avoidance mechanism, which aims to limit disputes arising out of B2C trans-
actions. The most significant methods are internal complaints procedures,
escrows, trustmarks and feedbacks. Governments may promote the develop-
ment of these mechanisms, in particular by providing financial support and
monitoring their efficiency. Secondly, many disputes need to be dealt with
through neutral third parties using dispute resolution mechanisms. The most
significant online methods for resolving consumer disputes are automated
negotiation, assisted negotiation, mediation, arbitration and small claims
court procedures. Most of the existing data and statistics on cases resolved and
other issues relating to ODR providers are not publicly available, which makes
it rather difficult to draw more specific conclusions as to the efficacy of the
majority of existing ODR providers. Depending on the dispute, the jurisdic-
tion and the participants involved, it may be more appropriate to use one ODR
method over another. Within the EU there are some initiatives promoting the
use of ODR but they have not achieved a large scale market implementation.
It appears clear that in order to develop efficient ODR services that can
achieve market implementation, it will be necessary to overcome a number of
challenges as previously identified in this chapter. First, ODR services need to
obtain funding from public or private sources while maintaining their
independence. Currently, the majority of ODR services in the EU are being
co-funded between governments, businesses and consumers, but private fund-
ing is not always as transparent as it is required to be for effective and fair
ODR in B2C disputes. Greater public financial support would contribute to
overcoming the existing lack of awareness and trust. Secondly, another key
aspect is to assure that the parties participate, which has been achieved in part
by using trustmarks and market referrals (eg SquareTrade) and targeting a
particular industry (eg CyberSettle). Another method that still has not been
fully explored is the reference of the disputants by clearing houses that moni-
tor and recognise efficient ODR services (eg ECC-NET). Participation in
ODR can be strengthened by promoting awareness, increasing users’ trust,
putting transparent procedures in place and fostering public recognition of
the efficient ODR services.
Thirdly, full due process principles are important when there is a power
imbalance between the parties, in particular, when the funding and time
available for the resolution of disputes is limited. Yet it may be impossible to
deliver a full coverage of procedural rights, since it is difficult to deliver
the rule of law without the cost of due process requirements. The objective
is to balance the value of disputes with the level of due process that assures
impartiality, transparency and legal representation when necessary. Fourthly,
effective enforcement mechanisms have to be assured. On the one hand, these
mechanisms may come from judicial enforcement, although it is not clear
yet whether existing regulations allow for the enforcement of ODR agree-
ments. On the other hand, private self-enforcement mechanisms have proven
effective, such as blacklistings, feedback mechanisms and technical control
(eg ICANN).
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Finally, since ICT plays a central part in ODR, the role of technology as
the fourth party is of key importance. The fourth party must be intuitive and
the ODR interface must be user friendly. ODR methods and security issues
need to take into account the needs of the disputants, which at a minimum
should incorporate private and public spaces. If ODR tools are ineffectively
used they can be a burden on the dispute resolution process. By contrast,
when appropriate ODR technology is effectively utilised, it can be a great
contribution to the dispute resolution process. Parties, in particular trained
neutral third parties, should clearly understand the weaknesses and strengths
of the ICT tools used.
With many existing ODR providers worldwide, ODR is no longer ‘science
fiction’; it has the potential to become a major part of dispute resolution
practice. The future outlook for ODR development seems positive. There are
two reasons for this: e-commerce is growing as well as users’ confidence and
ability in interacting online. ODR is still at an early stage and, as it was
conceived online, its growth will depend upon the expansion of cyberspace,
the progression of e-commerce, the evolution of technology and the user-
friendliness of ODR software. ODR, however, does not depend exclusively on
ICT development; it also depends on other issues, such as creating adequate
legal standards with the backing of the courts and the legal community. This
last aspect will be closely examined in the following chapters, which consider
how regulation may contribute to the development of consumer ODR.
In particular, the following chapters deal with specific ODR methods
(online small claims courts, arbitration and non-adjudicative methods, espe-
cially online mediation) and will examine their potential for efficiently resolv-
ing consumer disputes. Governments have an important role in promoting
awareness of ODR and in supervising ODR to ensure its compliance with
due process concerns. To that end it is necessary to examine if the existing law
allows the effective use of consumer ODR, or if new laws need to be created to
promote the development of effective and fair ODR services.
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Court processes and arbitration
ODR has the potential to fundamentally change the way litigators function
and to become mainstream.1
The foundations of dispute resolution will be rocked by a combination of
electronic disclosure, e-filing in the courts and online dispute resolution.2
3.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses how adjudicative dispute resolution processes are
implementing technology, thus potentially allowing the resolution of online
disputes. To that end, this chapter examines the effects of such procedures,
eg mandatory use, binding decisions and so on. In addition, it assesses which
adjudicative process, whether litigation or arbitration, is more suitable for
dealing with consumer disputes arising out of e-commerce. Throughout this
chapter, there is also an underlying discussion that considers how the law
allows for the establishment of online adjudicative processes, and which
circumstances contributed to their appearance, shortcomings and success.
This chapter is divided into two main parts: judicial and arbitral processes.
The first part (3.2) considers judicial procedures supported by ICT. The first
section comments on three domestic judicial procedures, namely the Irish
small claims procedure, the English Money Claim Online and the Australian
eCourt initiative. Thereafter, this section evaluates the regulation establish-
ing a European small claims procedure, which is a judicial procedure imple-
mented since January 2009 to deal with cross-border disputes of low value
(below 2000) between parties situated in different Member States.
The second part of the chapter (3.3) deals with consumer arbitration and
its compatibility with the use of ICT. First, this part examines the existing
legal obstacles in the implementation of online arbitral procedures for con-
sumer disputes. This section begins by considering the legality of pre-dispute
arbitral clauses in two contrasting jurisdictions, the EU and the US, making
a comparison between them. It then moves on to examine the enforceability
of arbitral awards under the New York Convention. The second section
examines the regulation of a national arbitration programme: the Spanish
consumer arbitration boards, which specifically regulate online arbitration.
The last and most extensive section evaluates international arbitration analys-
ing, in detail, the online (non-binding) arbitration scheme for the resolution
of domain name disputes (UDRP). This process has been involved in some
controversy, with many commentators appealing for reform; despite this, it
is a relatively fast and inexpensive procedure that deals efficiently with cyber-
squatting complaints. This section also discusses how the online arbitral
procedure for domain names could be improved by reforming the existing
process. Lastly, this section considers whether it would be possible to adapt
the UDRP to resolve mainstream B2C disputes arising out of e-commerce
transactions.
3.2 Online judicial processes
3.2.1 Domestic disputes: The incorporation of technology into the
judicial process
The use of technology in judicial processes is hoped to increase their access
and effectiveness since parties involved in an online process are expected
to save money and time. Courts are increasingly incorporating the use of
ICT with features such as online case filing, case management and litigation
support tools.3 The incorporation of ICT in the courts is generally referred to
as e-Justice.4 Although these features do not qualify the traditional courts
as ODR schemes per se, they form the first step towards the constitution of
ODR, which combined with other applications for communications or
decision-making will provide a true ODR system.
3.2.1.1 Ireland: The online small claims court
The online Small Claims Procedure (SCP) in Ireland has already been discussed
in Chapter 1; thus, rather than set out its procedure again, this section will
consider some of its consequences in practice.5
The Irish procedure allows consumers to lodge claims online and follow
their cases through a web-based platform accessible using a PIN number. In
the event that the defendant does not accept liability for the claim and
decides to contest it, the parties will physically have to attend the hearing at
the district court. Hence, the online process is only limited to certain aspects
of the procedure.
Initially, the main hindrance with the SCP in Ireland was the lodging of
the claims; in many cases claimants did not correctly include the name of the
respondent, ie the name of the legal entity.6 According to the registrar of
the Cork District Court, in 2007 there were over 100 claims made through
the online service in court, of which half were dismissed because the claimant
had failed to comply with some of the legal requirements.7 The reasons
were mainly owing to defects of form, such as failing to write the legal
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name of the business, or defects of substance, that is when the claim fell
outside the scope of the SCP, such as debts or private sales.8 It must be noted
that when parties file their claims physically in the district court office, they
are directly assisted by the registrar. Consequently, most of these offline
claims are admitted.
3.2.1.2 The UK: Money Claim Online and Possession Claim Online
The online procedure can be used by consumers, businesses, government
agencies and solicitors claiming debts in England and Wales. Computer
requirements are very basic, such as an internet connection and Acrobat
Reader.9 The claimant only needs to send the claim and the court in turn
notifies the defendant. The defendant can enter a defence online and at every
stage parties are encouraged to settle their dispute amicably.10 During the
procedure parties can view the status of their claim, judgment or warrant.
Parties may also pay their fees (which are lower than in the physical courts) to
issue claims and warrants online by debit or credit card. The online procedure
has been designed to be user friendly and it is supported by a customer help
desk, which may be contacted by email or phone.11
Money Claim Online has handled over 200,000 claims and it is proving
even more popular in recent times. The number of cases has increased signifi-
cantly in recent years, passing from handling 300 new cases a day in 2006 to
double this number in 2007.12 One of the reasons for such an increase appears
to be that people are using the website to reclaim unauthorised overdraft
bank charges, which are not reviewed by the Financial Ombudsman. This
situation, however, illustrates how the use of online lodging may open a
floodgate of cases slowing down the process of applications.
Similarly, Possession Claim Online (PCOL) was launched by Her Majesty’s
Courts Service in October 2006 to deal with claims of possession of residen-
tial property.13 The new service enables property owners, such as landlords,
local authorities and mortgage lenders, to apply electronically for repossession
when rent and mortgages are not paid.14 The PCOL allows parties to fill out
their claims online, track their claims through the website and even to plea
for warrants to be issued via the online service.15
Online processes were initially applied to simple legal matters such as
debts and repossession claims. Nevertheless, distant communications are
being increasingly included into the ordinary procedures. Thus, in the UK
the use of telephone hearings is being introduced in the county courts, with
the aim of making them the norm. However, telephone hearings will not be
conducted where parties are without legal representation, where more than
four parties apply for physical hearings or where the hearing could result in
the final determination of the whole or part of the proceedings. This initiative
follows the success of pilot schemes in Newcastle Combined Court Centre,
and in Luton and Bedford county courts.16
More recently, in January 2010, a new Practice Direction complementing
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the CPR was issued to regulate an Electronic Working Scheme that is oper-
ational since April 2010. Under the new scheme it is possible to initiate
claims online pursuant to Parts 7, 8 and 20, and also arbitration claims and
admiralty proceedings in the Admiralty and Commercial Court, the London
Mercantile Court, the Technology and Construction Court, and in the
Chancery Division of the High Court.17
3.2.1.3 Australia: The eCourt initiative
ODR technology can be useful not only to resolve those disputes that are
impractical for the courts (eg e-commerce disputes) but also in the adminis-
tration of public justice. As put by Clifford J of the Supreme Court of
New South Wales, the ‘use of technology to achieve necessary efficiencies in
relation to litigation is not only highly desirable but sometimes absolutely
essential’.18 With this purpose, the Federal Court of Australia has developed a
pilot programme called eCourt that aims to take full advantage of ICT tools
to resolve certain disputes, in particular demands on native title jurisdiction,
where many parties are located far away. In 2004 the court implemented
Casetrack, which is software that manages the court information. This in turn
allows a number of ODR services.
First, case law is uploaded to the court website in real time and the e-search
tool allows the parties to browse information on specific cases. The e-filing
system permits the lodgement of applications, evidence and the payment of
fees online. Under this new programme the court can give directions to the
parties through the website forum (ie e-Court Forum), which the parties can
access with a password. The forum is also used for mediation with court
registrars playing the role of mediators. In addition, the forum may be
employed for pre-trial matters, such as sending receipt of submissions,
affidavits, hearings through video and telephone conferencing etc.
The advantage of these procedural features is that courts have the flexibility
of using them whenever deemed necessary. For instance, according to the
Leuven Report:
[T]he Conciliation, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal Act 2001 empowers the
Tribunal largely to determine its own procedures, allowing it to be as
flexible and informal as circumstances require, which may include lodging
forms online and conducting hearings by telephone.19
In addition, the Electronic Transactions Act 2000 empowers the Attorney
General to establish an electronic case management system that could enable
documents to be served electronically, communication between the parties
and the court to be in electronic form and the tracking of cases online etc.20
Online judicial processes are increasingly utilised in multiparty complex
litigation. An example is the native title case of De Rose, which was an
electronic trial from start to finish.21 This case, however, raised a number of
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issues with regard to security, costs and technical support. These issues con-
vinced the court of the necessity of creating new guidelines and practice notes
for the parties who wish to consider the use of electronic trials.22 Tamberlin
discusses the three main criticisms of the e-Court initiative:23
(i) The limitation of access to justice; where most submissions are made
online in writing may place a disadvantage on those with literacy or
language difficulties. However, when parties are provided with legal
assistance, written submissions should not present an imbalance of power
between the parties.
(ii) The use of ICT tools often does not have the benefit of body language
communications. Tamberlin maintains that ICT must be a complement
to the procedure, using it only when it is beneficial.
(iii) Another criticism is the lack of publicity, but it is suggested that pub-
licity can be respected by the use of the court registry. In other words,
although the hearings may be conducted in private, the judgments of
these cases could be uploaded onto the court website.
3.2.2 Cross-border disputes: European small claims procedure
This section considers the regulation establishing the European Small Claims
Procedure (ESCP), which came into force in all Member States, with the
exception of Denmark, in January 2009.24 With the objective of increasing
consumer confidence and a truly integrated Common Market, the European
Commission has produced a pan-European procedure to deal with low value
disputes. The ESCP is predominantly a written procedure that deals with
claims under 2000 in value arising in cross-border disputes within the EU.
It provides enforcement of contested decisions in any of the Member States
without the need of going through the mutual recognition of judgments.
This section discusses the challenges posed by the new procedure and it
suggests that the ESCP, in conjunction with ICT tools, has the potential to
realise more efficient enforcement of consumers’ rights. However, the optimal
effectiveness of this procedure might be hindered by some of its restrictions,
such as its exclusive competence for cross-border claims, its low economic
limit and its lack of support of ADR and ODR.
3.2.2.1 Genesis of ESCP
The development of e-commerce and the increasing use of the EC rights
of free movement of persons, goods and services had a knock-on effect in
number of cross-border disputes within the EU. The Amsterdam Treaty
empowered the Community to adopt measures in the field of judicial
co-operation in civil matters with cross-border implications, insofar as this is
necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market.25 The ESCP was
first proposed in the Tampere European Council in October 1999, together
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with other two initiatives: the European Enforcement Order (EEO) and the
European Order for Payment (EOP).26 One of the dangers of the ESCP is that
large businesses and corporations may use this procedure mainly for the col-
lection of small debts from consumers and small businesses. Hence, on the
one hand the European Commission has opted for creating a specific process
to deal with debts, the EOP. On the other hand, the EEO is a method of
enforcing foreign judgments of uncontested claims in the EU and without
the need of going through the recognition procedure set out in the Brussels
Regulation.
The EOP is a fast written procedure that deals with uncontested debts. In
the event that the defendant contests the claim it would automatically trans-
fer the claim to the ordinary civil procedure. These two initiatives, unlike the
ESCP, are restricted to pecuniary claims (without financial limits) and they
are available for cross-border as well as domestic litigation.
3.2.2.2 Main features of the ESCP
3.2.2.2.1 SCOPE OF THE ESCP
The scope of the ESCP is all civil and commercial matters. This includes not
just consumer disputes but a range of civil claims, such as personal injury
compensation, disability discrimination and unequal access to services. There
are a number of exceptions to the ESCP, given existing deep differences
among Member States. Under the ESCP claims cannot exceed 2000 in
value – excluding interest and legal costs. The UK Government and the
European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), as well as many other
organisations in the UK, have defined this threshold as an ‘unrealistic low
limit’, taking into account the possibility of ending with ‘disproportionate
legal costs’ for claims that are just above this monetary threshold.27
Increasing the monetary limit may bring a risk to the whole procedure,
because the higher the monetary limit, the more complex and lengthier the
procedure may become. For instance, in England where the economic limit is
£5000, the average duration of the SCP is 53 weeks; while in Ireland where the
economic limit is 2000, the average duration is between 8 and 12 weeks.28
It has to be taken into account that this short average duration is probably a
result of the high number of settlements thanks to the intervention of the
court registrar (over 50 per cent). In any event, the statistics illustrate how
low value claims should reflect in quicker judicial procedures.29
The ESCP has sought to insert a uniform threshold taking into account
the diverse standard of living of the various Member States, which left the
European Council with little choice but to compromise at the 2000 limit.
This final figure, however, excludes many claims above this monetary limit,
which find serious redress difficulties, particularly in those Member States
where the standard of living is higher. An independent report made for the
Commission considered the 2000 limit as too low a limit and one that may
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not be cost-efficient.30 For this reason, it is to be expected that the EU will
increase the existing economic limit in forthcoming years.
3.2.2.2.2 EXCLUSIVENESS FOR CROSS-BORDER DISPUTES
The European Commission proposed that the ESCP should be applied in all
Member States as an additional procedure for cross-border disputes as well as
for domestic disputes. This issue was debated in the European Council where
most Member States proposed that the ESCP should be restricted to cross-
border disputes.31 The UK Government expressed its opposition to the use
of the ESCP in domestic disputes, based on Article 65 of the EC Treaty (now
Article 81 TFEU), which limits the Community participation in cross-border
issues, and consequently on the principles of subsidiarity and proportional-
ity.32 Finally, the European Parliament introduced an amendment whereby
the ESCP would only be applied to cross-border cases.33 A cross-border
dispute is understood to be one
. . . [i]n which at least one of the parties is domiciled or habitually
resident in a Member State other than the Member State of the court or
tribunal seised.34
A major danger of this restriction is that often claims do not appear to have a
cross-border element until the enforcement phase. In these cases it would be
possible to use the EOP when dealing with uncontested monetary claims. In
the rest of the cases the enforcement procedure will have to follow the exequatur
procedure or declaration of enforceability, which would require a second
judgment by the court of the Member State of enforcement, frustrating one of
the main advantages of the proposed ESCP. In order to prevent that, it will be
necessary to have a provision by which judges could change from the domestic
procedure to the ESCP. However, this should only be allowed in exceptional
circumstances without jeopardising the legal certainty of the procedures.
The use of the ESCP, as an optional procedure for domestic disputes, would
make individuals feel equally protected with a familiar legal procedure
regardless of the Member States of action and it will also remove the national
limitations of domestic procedures.35 As previously mentioned, the SCP in
Ireland is exclusively used for consumers in a limited number of situations.36
In Spain the upper limit of a small claim is 900; above this limit legal
representation is obligatory.37 Many Member States do not have a domestic
SCP at all and they could benefit from its use. It is therefore recommended
that Member States use the ESCP to resolve domestic disputes. Furthermore,
the use of this cross-border procedure for resolving domestic disputes would
be particularly necessary in those Member States who do not have their own
national procedure for resolving small value claims (ie a SCP).38 This might
take a step towards a legal uniformity and the objective of obtaining a single
and coherent area of justice within the EU.
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3.2.2.2.3 LEGAL REPRESENTATION
Litigants are not obliged to be represented by lawyers either during the ESCP
or during their appeals.39 However, parties will be compensated for the costs
of legal representation when the judges consider these costs necessary and
proportionate to the value of the claim.40 Furthermore, it is understood that
litigants can be represented or assisted by someone who is not necessarily
a lawyer by training.41 It is regrettable that a specific provision has not been
included allowing consumers to be represented by consumer associations
and professional associations to represent their members. This is common in
ADR processes but not in litigation, where national procedural rules may
prohibit it.
3.2.2.3 Procedure
3.2.2.3.1 SUBMISSION OF THE CLAIM
The procedure commences when the claimant submits a claim to the com-
petent court, which will forward it to the defendant for a response within
14 days. There are no provisions on how legally unrepresented claimants
should be advised on which is the competent forum to hear their cases. The
ESCP does not include forum selection or choice of law provisions so it will be
necessary to refer to the Brussels Regulation and to the Rome Regulation.42
In e-commerce, when a consumer buys an item online, if the site targets the
consumer’s location, eg using the consumer’s language and currency, then the
court of the consumer’s domicile is competent to hear the case.43
Litigants are able to draw up their claims without making any legal refer-
ence by using a multilingual uncomplicated standard form (Claim Form and
an Answer Form) which uses a tick-box-approach insofar as possible.44
Although these forms are simple enough to fill in without the assistance of a
lawyer, the ESCP provides that claimants must be supported with practical
assistance to complete the form. The type of practical assistance required is
unclear; it could be a written guideline or help from a court official or civil
servant in a similar way to the Irish small claims.45 In addition, when parties
are unrepresented the judge must assist them with procedural matters.46
The defendant may make a counterclaim in his or her response. If the
amount of the counterclaim is above the limit of the procedure and it derives
from the same legal relationship, then both the claim and counterclaim are
excluded from the ESCP.47 This event could lead to the possibility that
defendants acting in bad faith could frustrate the efficiency of the ESCP by
making frivolous counterclaims over the 2000 threshold.
3.2.2.3.2 WRITTEN PROCEDURE
Following the civil law tradition the procedure is designed to be carried out
fully in writing. This is due to practical reasons in order to reduce costs and
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speed up the procedure. An oral hearing can exceptionally be held when the
court considers this necessary; the regulation of the oral hearing is left to the
Member States. Parties tend not to apply for an oral hearing given that
generally it is not a pleasant experience to go to court. Despite this, if both
parties request an oral hearing the court may refuse such request when it
appears that an oral hearing is not necessary for a fair resolution.48 The inter-
pretation of this provision should therefore be treated with extreme caution
by the court if there is no intention to threaten the adversarial principle and
the right to a fair trial;49 this may even raise constitutional issues in some
Member States, particularly in those that follow the common law tradition.
Nevertheless, the EU has formerly stated that oral hearings are not always
necessary for resolving consumer disputes.50
3.2.2.3.3 LANGUAGE
A challenge that faces the ESCP is the translation of documents. This is of
particular importance because it affects the length and cost of the proceed-
ings. It is the role of the standard claims with multi-choice options and ICT
tools to deliver a workable scheme. There has been debate on which language
the forms should be completed. On the one hand, it was argued that it should
be in the language of the claimant, thus facilitating claimants’ access to the
ESCP. On the other hand, it was also argued that the language of the whole
procedure should be that of the court where the case is being presented. The
European Parliament opted for the latter argument by deciding that parties
must submit their forms in any of the languages admitted by the court. In
addition, the translation of additional documents can only be requested when
such translations are necessary for obtaining a judgment. It appears reason-
able that the parties must pay their own costs of the translation of documents
as long as the judge has the discretion to impose legal costs when necessary.
3.2.2.3.4 COSTS
Currently, the procedural rules with respect to reimbursement of costs differ
significantly among those Member States with a SCP. The Commission pro-
posal on the ESCP decided that the unsuccessful party must pay the costs of
proceedings but excluded the payment of lawyers’ fees by an unrepresented
natural person.51 The European Parliament deleted this exclusion on the
grounds that the successful party should not be disadvantaged from taking
legal representation. Ireland proposed in the Council Group to amend the
Commission proposal to ensure that the ESCP is cost-effective by stating that
legal fees must be proportional to the value of the claim.52 Parties should be
informed at the start of the proceedings about the system of costs and the
reimbursement. Both measures have been incorporated into the text by the
European Parliament’s amendments.53 However, it would be desirable to
establish a limit to the reimbursement of costs, eg 20 per cent of the claim
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value, with an exception for frivolous claims. Furthermore, the application of
these provisions may hinder the cost-efficiency of the ESCP, particularly when
using the present monetary limit of 2000 where translations and experts’
reports may be required.
3.2.2.3.5 ENFORCEABILITY
Probably the main advantage of the ESCP is that it allows the enforcement of
a judgment in any Member State (with the exception of Denmark) without
the need of obtaining the mutual recognition of judgments (exequatur).
The ESCP is carried out without condition of a security by filling in a form
making the enforcement considerably faster and less expensive. A significant
exception to this rule is judgments from uncontested claims, ie those default
judgments where the defendant has not participated during the process. The
peril of this exception is that defendants who are aware of this may refuse to
participate in the procedure in order to hinder the enforcement of the judicial
decision that will follow the recognition procedure.
3.2.2.3.6 JUDICIAL REVIEW
International law does not consider the right of appeal in civil procedure as a
fundamental right but as a matter to be determined by the national legis-
lature. Consequently, there is a significant diversity on this matter under
national laws. As a result, the ESCP leaves it up to Member States to decide
whether an appeal is available and communicates it to the Commission.54 As
noted by the House of Lords, ‘the absence of a common rule on appeals is
disappointing’ because it does not conform with the intention of unifying the
resolution of small claims with cross-border elements.55
3.2.2.4 ICT in the ESCP
The use of the internet and ICT tools reduce barriers to access to justice by
simplifying court formalities, lowering costs, increasing international co-
operation and promoting the use of major languages.56 Another major advan-
tage of the internet and ICT is that it provides information in a fast and
centralised way, which is useful in a judicial procedure with an international
dimension.57 In this regard the European Parliament has introduced informa-
tive web links for parties involved in the ESCP.58 The claim and answer forms
are available on the internet, a requirement which further facilitates access to
the ESCP. However, the regulation leaves it up to the Member States to
decide to provide the use of online lodging of claims, the use of e-mail for
interrogating witnesses or to admit experts’ opinions etc.
The objective of the ESCP is the creation of a cost-efficient procedure
applicable to small value claims in cross-border disputes. This objective can
only be achieved by using a written procedure, assisted by electronic forms
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such as e-mails and video-conferencing, as foreseen by the proposed ESCP.
Additionally, the ESCP enables the use of new technologies in transferring
information and evidence between the courts of the different Member States.
However, it is the Member States who decide, through their own regulations,
which specific means of communication are acceptable in their courts. Given
that the ESCP is a regulation and not a directive, it is arguable whether it
leaves too many aspects to the discretion of Member States, which could call
into question the legal certainty expected from a European regulation. This
approach, on the one hand, risks the emergence of some degree of procedural
disharmony within the EU. On the other hand, it seeks to comply with the
principle of subsidiarity and to promote the use of ICT. Thus, it is expected
that, in due course, electronic communications will reach every possible and
reasonable aspect of the judicial procedure to assist in the resolution of online
as well as offline disputes.
3.2.2.5 ADR as a complement to ESCP
The use of ADR can be particularly useful for some types of contractual rela-
tions, such as those where there is a cross-border element and where a long-
term relationship exists between the parties. Non-adjudicative ADR is also
effective in resolving those disputes where both parties are willing to reach an
agreement. Clearly, ADR has some advantages when compared to litigation:
it is more flexible, it has less jurisdictional problems, it can be more cost-
effective, etc. Furthermore, when two parties settle a dispute amongst them-
selves the result will be convenient for both of them; by contrast, when the
dispute is resolved in court the award may not satisfy both parties to the same
level. Nonetheless, the use of litigation is still necessary when one party
refuses to negotiate a settlement, which leaves the courts as the only remain-
ing opportunity to obtain redress. It must be also noted that unnecessary use
of ADR could cause additional expense to the parties.
The regulation vaguely states that ‘[w]henever appropriate, the court or
tribunal shall seek to reach a settlement between the parties’.59 This includes
sending the parties to use ADR or ODR if appropriate. In these cases, it must
be emphasised to the parties that these methods will reduce time spent in the
resolution of the dispute, that any agreement reached will be voluntarily
reached, and that if everything fails the parties still may use the ESCP. The
English Small Claims Track has taken a more direct approach by stating in its
leaflet that litigants should consider the use of ADR, to the extent that if it is
refused unreasonably by one party the judge in his discretion may impose
legal fees on that party whether or not he is successful in the proceedings.60
This situation creates a number of issues, however. First, it is questionable
whether all cases are appropriate for ADR, eg a defendant may consider a
claim to be frivolous. Secondly, a litigant may assist an ADR programme
without being co-operative. It is arguable how the judge can weigh the
co-operation of the parties without being informed by the neutral third
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party (who has the duty of confidentiality) and without colouring the judge’s
thinking on the case. These and other related issues will be examined in the
next chapter of this book.
According to Wissler there are three types of disputes that are more likely
to settle in mediation, with the consequent mutual satisfaction of both par-
ties. First, these are disputes where the defendant admits partial or total
liability. Secondly, they are those disputes where parties seek resolution
rather than self-recognition, ie public recognition of being right. Lastly,
certain types of disputes are more likely to be resolved in mediation, eg
disputes related to the payment of goods or services.61
The use of ADR must be complemented by ICT in order to deal effectively
with disputes arising from e-commerce. At present, ODR has proven to be an
effective tool for resolving small value claims amongst consumers. Accord-
ingly, the use of ADR and ODR can complement the ESCP. Colin Rule
suggested that ODR services for consumers should be the substitute for the
offline small claims court.62 If this is done appropriately, for example by
informing the parties and by means of imposing legal fees on a party if
participation in ODR or ADR is unreasonably refused, it may encourage
litigants to settle their disputes in a faster and more efficient way. In addition,
the majority of B2C online disputes will allow consumers to initiate the
ESCP in their own jurisdictions. This situation may encourage online busi-
nesses to press for consensual ODR avoiding the need of going to court.
3.2.2.6 Assessment
In evaluating the current national SCPs it can be concluded that SCPs are a
suitable mechanism for resolving local disputes, which in some jurisdictions,
such as Ireland, part of the proceedings are available at the click of a mouse.
National procedures, however, often have very limited scope; for instance,
the Irish procedure is only available to consumers in a very limited number of
disputes and the Spanish procedure has a low monetary limit (900). Never-
theless, national procedures are about to be complemented by an ESCP which
deals with many types of cross-border disputes. The proposed ESCP is a
written procedure that offers European consumers with cross-border disputes
a new option for access to justice. It is suggested that the ESCP – if assisted
with ICT tools – has the potential to increase effectiveness in the enforcement
of consumers’ rights across the European Union. However, some issues will
need to be carefully addressed when adopting online court procedures. Above
all, it must be ensured that technology does not operate as a barrier to access
to justice. If these issues are properly dealt with, the use of ICT would bring
significant benefits to courts and litigants.
It must be noted that the potential of the ESCP may be limited by its own
restrictions. Those restrictions are mainly the exclusive application of the
ESCP to cross-border disputes and contested claims, its low monetary thresh-
old and the lack of adequate provisions supporting ADR and ODR. The use
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of the ESCP as an optional procedure for domestic disputes would provide a
useful instrument in those Member States which lack their own small claims
procedures and it would also remove national limitations where they already
exist. Furthermore, the regulation is far from exhaustive and this could lead
to different practices in the Member States. The inclusion of the recognition
procedure for uncontested claims will stop those who attempt to delay the
enforcement of decisions. In addition, the current economic limits may need
to be raised given that this procedure may not be the best option for the
lowest monetary claims. ODR methods, such as online negotiation and
online mediation, have proven to be a more cost efficient and faster solution
for such claims as well as many others such as those arising from the internet
or involving one party outside the EU.63 This section concludes that the use of
consensual ODR is a necessary complement to the ESCP and the existing
national procedures. To that end, it is regrettable that clear provisions refer-
ring to and encouraging the use of ADR and ODR have not been included in
the regulation for an ESCP. Despite this, since consumers’ jurisdictions will
apply in most online B2C disputes, online businesses may prefer and encour-
age consumers to use consensual ODR.
An effective implementation of the ESCP may in turn increase consumers’
confidence in buying goods in other Member States and thus promote the
development of a truly integrated European market. The ESCP is the first
step towards a unified European procedural law and its success will determine
an expanded implementation to higher claims and in other new areas outside
civil and commercial law. In this regard, the implementation of the ESCP and
the Rome (I) Regulation are expected to increase consumers’ access to justice.
The ESCP may consequently increase businesses’ interest in using post-
dispute ODR arbitral clauses in order to avoid the risk of legal actions in all
of the EU Member States.
3.3 Online arbitration
3.3.1 Introduction
Arbitration is increasingly being chosen as a method for the resolution of
international disputes for various reasons. Arbitration limits appeals and is
hence faster than litigation. Whereas judges are legally appointed and might
lack expertise regarding matters of conflict, arbitrators can be selected by the
parties from a pool of experts.64 Other features are the confidentiality of the
process and the freedom of the parties to choose particular substantive and
procedural rules. According to Ponte and Cavenagh, arbitration may be pre-
ferred when dealing with one-off transactions between strangers who are not
concerned with maintaining professional or personal relationships and when
parties are not willing to compromise over a disagreement and they need a
quick, cost-effective decision.65 Businesses also choose arbitration because
arbitral awards can be easily executed in over 150 countries signatories to the
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New York Convention of 1958, and in other jurisdictions through bilateral
agreements or regional conventions, such as the European Convention on
International Commercial Arbitration of 1961.
If a national court recognises an agreement to arbitrate as valid under
national law, it will stay litigation pending the arbitration. According to
Stipanowich, the law of arbitration has the role of ‘regulating the interface
between the private forum of arbitration and the courts, with primary
emphasis on the judicial enforcement of agreements to arbitrate and of the
resulting arbitral awards’.66 However, national laws rarely impose any restric-
tions on the qualifications required of arbitrators, nor on the procedures
to be followed, as long as it is a fair process that complies with minimum due
process requirements.67 This nonetheless may be understood in different ways
across the world, particularly when power imbalance affects the autonomy of
the parties.
Traditional arbitration resolves disputes by delivering a decision that will
be binding, that is, enforceable by the public authorities in the same manner
as a judgment. Non-binding arbitration as used with domain names seems to
be a preferred method when using online arbitration, because it avoids the
legal obstacles that will be discussed below. Online arbitration brings the
convenience of the internet to the dispute resolution process. Moreover, it
requires neither much training nor much ODR sophistication because pro-
ceedings are mostly written.68 Thus, to use arbitration for dispute resolution
there is seldom a need for more than e-mail and secure communications.69
The majority of legal studies on online arbitration agree that the existing law
and arbitral principles do not prevent arbitration from taking place online.70
Currently, most arbitration providers have introduced some ODR tools into
the arbitration process, eg allowing the parties to download claim forms, the
submission of documents through standard e-mail or secure web interface and
so on.71 Entities such as the National Mediation Board handle approximately
10 per cent of their arbitration cases online.72 Examples of other well estab-
lished online arbitration providers are the American Arbitration Association
(AAA), the Better Business Bureau (BBB), the National Arbitration Forum
(NAF), the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Arbitration
and Mediation Centre and the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services
( JAMS).73
3.3.2 Obstacles to the online arbitral process
3.3.2.1 Agreement to arbitrate: US and EU approaches
3.3.2.1.1 ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN THE EU
Businesses may introduce an arbitration clause when contracting with con-
sumers. The contractual clause will require the parties to resolve all dis-
putes by a particular arbitration process. However, within the EU, consumers
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have the right to go to court and this right is often considered as a right
which cannot be waived. In this regard, the EU has issued a number of laws
ensuring that consumers cannot be excluded from seeking judicial redress, ie
consumers can only agree to arbitration once a dispute has arisen and not
before. However:
• Article 6.1 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) states:
‘In the determination of his civil rights and obligations [. . .], everyone is
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal established by law’. Notwithstand-
ing, this right is not absolute and restrictions can be made if they pursue
legitimate aims. An arbitration clause, therefore, if it has undeniable
advantages for the individuals concerned as well as for the administration
of justice, will not violate the ECHR.74
• Annex [q] of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive and
Annex II paragraph [c] of the proposal for a Directive on Consumer
Rights also challenge the validity of arbitration clauses.75 According to
the directive a term is invalid if it excludes or hinders the consumer’s
right to take legal action or to exercise any other legal remedy, in particu-
lar ‘terms requiring the consumer to take disputes exclusively to arbitra-
tion not covered by legal provision’.76 This provision confines the validity
of pre-dispute agreements to public arbitration schemes which are
regulated by ad hoc statutory regulations.77
• Article 17.1 of the Brussels I Regulation states that the contractual
exclusion of the courts in consumer disputes is void if this takes place
before the dispute arises.
• The Council Resolution on a community-wide network of national
bodies for the extra-judicial settlement of consumers’ disputes provides
that any out-of-court resolution of consumer disputes should be based
on voluntary participation and should not prejudice any other means of
judicial redress.78
• Article 4 of the EC Recommendation on the principles applicable to the
bodies responsible for out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes pro-
vides that consumers should not be bound by a pre-dispute arbitration
clause.79
It must be noted that all restrictions on mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
clauses apply exclusively to consumer arbitration services; thus, in other
civil law areas, such as landlord-tenant relations, the above restrictions do
not apply.
The implementation of the Directive on Unfair Terms appears to vary across
the EU.80 In France, article 2061 of the Civil Code only allows arbitration
clauses in contracts concerning professional activities, ie not in consumers’
contracts; but this article does not apply to international arbitration.81 A case
on the legality of an international arbitration clause was discussed by the
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French courts in the Jaguar case.82 The first instance court stated the clause to
be illegal, the Court of Appeal reversed that decision and the Supreme Court
admitted the arbitrability of the dispute in the circumstances at hand (it was
a transaction of high value and the consumer was not in a weaker position).
The England and Wales Arbitration Act 1996 and the Unfair Terms in
Consumer Contracts Regulation 1999 allow pre-dispute consumer arbitration
clauses only when the amount at stake is more than £5000.83 Nevertheless,
consumers may prove an arbitration clause as unfair, even when the amount
of the claim is over £5000, using the tests set out in the directive and the
regulation. In consumer disputes below the limit of the small claims court
(£5000 in England and Wales, £750 in Scotland, £1000 in Northern Ireland),
such clauses are automatically not binding on the consumer. Accordingly, the
Office of Fair Trading has consistently required businesses to delete pre-
dispute binding arbitration clauses below this economic threshold.84 This has
influenced businesses and ODR providers to act accordingly; for instance,
the Ford and ABTA Travel Association business members of the Chartered
Institute of Arbitrators only use post-dispute agreements, which only are
unilaterally binding on businesses.85 Under EU law, unlike under US law, in
order to uphold arbitration clauses, it is not sufficient that the consumer is
aware of the significance of such clauses; the proposed arbitration must be a
suitable and fair process.
Overall there is still some legal uncertainty, which could be resolved by
using arbitration that allows court appeals, unilateral binding arbitration,
post-dispute arbitration agreements and public arbitration bodies or tri-
bunals. The European Commission has listed on its website a database with
the contact details of consumer arbitration bodies. The database includes the
bodies that, according to the Member States, comply with the Recommenda-
tion 98/257/CE, such as the Spanish arbitration boards, whose procedure is
examined later in this chapter.86
3.3.2.1.2 US ARBITRATION
In the US, consumer arbitration clauses are used as a common solution to
avoid conflicts of law. As a result, many US standard terms in electronic
contracts often include arbitration clauses. There have been several attempts
to shift arbitration online, but no mainstream consumer-specific arbitration
tribunal has yet been introduced despite continuous interest from ADR and
ODR providers.
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) considers arbitration clauses, even pre-
dispute binding agreements, as ‘valid, irrevocable, and enforceable’, without
distinguishing between business contracts and consumer contracts. In this
respect, several US Supreme Court cases have rejected challenges to pre-
dispute arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, eg Buckeye Check Cashing,
Inc. v Cardegna.87 In this case the court ruled that the arbitration clause of
an alleged illegal and void contract was enforceable for two reasons. First,
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according to the court, the validity of the contract can only be decided by the
arbitrator; and, secondly, because the validity of an arbitral clause is
independent from the rest of the contract.88
In Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v Dobson the US Supreme Court included
consumers within the scope of the FAA, stating that ‘[the] Congress, when
enacting [the FAA] had the needs of consumers, as well as others, in mind’.89
In this case the Supreme Court held that Alabama’s statute prohibiting man-
datory pre-dispute arbitration clauses was pre-empted by the FAA.90 In those
cases where the FAA does not apply, state arbitration law governs. Moreover,
under most state laws, consumer arbitration agreements are also enforceable.91
Pre-dispute arbitration, nonetheless, has certain restrictions. In a recent
decision, Ross v Bank of America, the Second Circuit Court held that the
credit card industry had breached anti-trust laws by conspiring to limit
consumers’ dispute resolution choices through pre-dispute mandatory arbi-
tration clauses.92 This decision can only be changed by the US Supreme
Court, and it could be extended to other industries with similar practices,
such as mobile phones, auto dealerships etc. Other exceptions to defeat the
enforceability of agreements to arbitrate are based on general contract law
defences, such as coercion, fraud, duress or unconscionability, although those
defences are usually construed narrowly.93
Accordingly, only a clearly unfair arbitration agreement will be recognised
as unenforceable by the courts.94 In Comb and Toher v Paypal the judge found
Paypal’s arbitration clause unconscionable for consumers, holding that Santa
Clara County in California was not a neutral forum.95 Another reason for
unconscionability is concerned with the one-side nature of the contract and its
oppressiveness, eg a clause restricting consumers’ redress to arbitration while
allowing the business to go to court.96 Reasons for unconscionability would
also be the suppression of consumers’ rights recognised by their legal forum
and imposing excessive arbitration fees.97 In addition, US law found uncon-
scionable clauses where there is a limit on damages, attorneys’ fees or limita-
tion period, where the arbitration clause surprised the consumers because it
was buried in the contract, when the consumer cannot read English etc.98
Arbitration is generally faster than litigation because the arbitrator is often
an expert on the subject matter, and procedural rules are simplified. This is,
however, arguable. In Brower v Gateway, Inc. the New York Appellate Court
held that a consumer clause referring disputes to the International Chamber
of Commerce was unenforceable owing to the high cost of this procedure, ie
US$4000.99 In fact the cost of many arbitration services often excludes low
value claims; for instance, the International Chamber of Commerce has a
minimum administrative fee of US$2500.100 Some arbitration services in the
US, such as JAMS and NAF offer consumers the opportunity to opt out from
their service when they prefer to pursue the matter in the small claims court,
regardless of any contractual clause.101
In addition, some entities such as the AAA, NAF and JAMS have intro-
duced reduced fees for small claims. In order to make arbitration more cost
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efficient class actions may be permitted.102 In Green Tree Financial Corp. v
Bazzle the US Supreme Court stated that unless class arbitration is excluded
in the arbitral clause, the arbitrators, and not a court, will decide whether a
class action is appropriate.103 Even though class arbitration can be contractu-
ally excluded,104 it must be taken into account that its exclusion might be
considered unconscionable.105 This will be decided by the court on ad hoc
basis.106 It appears advisable to enact legislation on this matter to ensure that
restrictions to class actions are not allowed.107
3.3.2.1.3 COMPARING THE EU AND THE US APPROACHES
Albeit, in both jurisdictions the courts police the fairness of consumer arbi-
tration agreements on a case-by-case basis, the legal approach taken in con-
sumer contracts in the EU differs from that taken in the US. The US courts
generally uphold pre-dispute arbitration clauses unless it can be shown that
the arbitration agreement does not comply with fundamental fairness or is
found to be oppressive or highly unreasonable.108 In fact, unlike the EU, the
Federal Arbitration Act in the US is often interpreted in a manner in which
doubts about arbitrability are often resolved in favour of arbitration.109 Dra-
hozal and Friel observed that particular legal circumstances, such as the
greater availability of civil jury trials, class actions and punitive damages in
the US give their businesses more incentives to oppose regulation that
excludes pre-dispute agreements.110 However, they suggested that currently
in the US lobbying from consumer groups and trial lawyers is increasing the
demand for restrictions in arbitration clauses, which may result in a greater
convergence with EU regulation.
In the EU, as a rule, pre-dispute agreements are considered unfair and void.
However, some commentators have argued that EU law would be compatible
with an arbitration clause that mandates all disputes to be resolved through a
procedure which is proven to be fair and easily accessible for consumers.111
Online arbitration could fulfil these requirements. Under the current word-
ing of the proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights such interpretation is
no longer possible, unless it is statutory arbitration.112 In the next few years
we might see contractual clauses referring to mandatory ODR providers;
nonetheless, it will be first and foremost necessary to ensure that these pro-
viders comply with minimum due process standards set by a legal frame-
work.113 In the mean time it appears that this is not so easily achieved and, as
a result, online businesses frequently include different dispute resolution
clauses depending on the consumer’s jurisdiction.
3.3.2.2 Enforcement of arbitral awards: The New York Convention
When one party refuses to comply with an arbitral award, there may be
difficulties in enforcing the award. For this reason consumer arbitration is
currently working mainly at domestic level as enforcement is easier and less
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costly than at international level, particularly when small amounts of money
are at stake. At international level the two most relevant set of rules in
relation to arbitration are ‘pre-internet age’: the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration 1985 and the New York Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958.
Katsh and Rifkin consider that the New York Convention appears to
validate online arbitration provided that it complies with certain rules related
to the agreement to arbitrate, the process of arbitration and the arbitral
award.114 First, the contractual agreement to validate must be in writing;
under most national legislations, electronic writing is considered equivalent
to traditional writing. Secondly, the process of arbitration must comply with
the express approval of the parties using electronic forms. In addition, the
methods used must be secure, confidential and comply with basic due process
principles.115 Ultimately, in order to enforce an arbitral decision in the courts,
the majority of experts recommend printing a copy and having it signed
by the arbitrators.116 In fact, most laws require an original written (or duly
certified copy thereof ) and signed award.117
Under the New York Convention a court may refuse to enforce an arbitral
award when the award is contrary to the public policy of the country.118 Some
countries may consider B2C arbitration as non-arbitrable subject matters
and, in this sense, contrary to public policy.119 This last exception has been
criticised for being too general in scope and should be interpreted in a narrow
sense.120 The New York Convention was created with B2B cases in mind;
thus, a clear distinction between B2B and B2C arbitration would be more
appropriate.
In 2007 UNCITRAL adopted the Convention on the Use of Electronic
Communications in International Contracts, which would reform the New
York Convention. The new Convention will no longer allow a narrow inter-
pretation of the written requirement, by permitting ODR methods.121 To
date, online arbitration awards have not been fully tested in the courts but
what could be expected is that the courts will review online awards using
similar standards applied to offline arbitration.122
By contrast, non-binding arbitration seeks neither recognition of its
agreements nor fixed standards of due process. However, these systems face an
obvious challenge: compliance with decisions. Self-enforcement mechanisms
and incentives, such as reputation systems, blacklists and escrows, are used to
persuade parties to comply.123
3.3.3 Domestic arbitral procedures: The Spanish Consumer
Arbitration Boards
The Spanish Act on the Services of the Information Society opens the possibil-
ity of using consumer arbitration and other ADR methods, either offline or
online.124 However, Spanish law consents only to the use of online consumer
arbitration under the national regulation.125 The formalism of the small
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claims procedure in Spain has probably influenced the design of an insti-
tutionalised consumer arbitration system to address consumer disputes. A
recent regulation (Real Decreto 231/2008) incorporates online consumer arbi-
tration.126 The new online procedure is promoted by the government and it is
expected to take place online, from start to finish.127 The new law regulates all
the necessary aspects for the functioning of the online service, such as the
determination of the competent Arbitration Board, the place of arbitration,
the use of electronic signatures and electronic notifications. At the time of
writing there were no publications on the implementation and performance
of the online process.
The Spanish Consumer Arbitration Boards (Juntas Arbitrales de Consumo)
provide a voluntary procedure characterised for being quick (a maximum
of four months), confidential, free, flexible (there is no economic limit and
parties choose if they want the arbitration to be based on law or equity), as
well as binding.128 Consumer arbitration cannot be used in those cases where
there is intoxication, injury, death or reasons to believe that there is a crime
involved in the dispute. The Spanish Consumer Protection Act considers a
clause that refers consumers to arbitration different to the Public Consumer
Arbitration Scheme to be illegal, unless the arbitration institution had
been created by law for a specific sector.129 This excludes not only private
arbitration but also any international arbitration.130
The Spanish Consumer Arbitration Scheme is exclusively applicable to B2C
transactions. Only consumers can initiate the procedure by making a claim at
the Arbitration Board that is the closest to the consumer’s place of residence. In
order to use consumer arbitration, both parties must agree to participate in the
arbitration after the dispute arises. Also, Spanish businesses may already be
voluntarily registered in the Consumer Arbitration Scheme. The adherence of
the business is registered in a public list and businesses must display the
official trustmark, which is also available electronically. In cases involving
registered businesses it will only be required that the consumer accepts arbitra-
tion after the dispute arises. In this sense there is a pre-dispute arbitration
clause which is binding on the business, but not on the consumer.131
Once the application is submitted by the consumer, it will be forwarded to
the business which can accept it or reject it (only if it is not already registered)
in writing (also using electronic devices, if they are available) within 15 days.
If an agreement to use arbitration is reached, one or three arbitrators will be
appointed, depending on the value and complexity of the dispute.132 One
arbitrator will be appointed by the Arbitral Board, except when the parties
agree to the appointment of a particular arbitrator, when the dispute is not
complex and the value of the dispute is below 300.133 Disputes over this
economic threshold will be dealt with by three arbitrators.134 The chairman is
appointed from a pool of arbitrators with a law degree by the Arbitral Board,
except when the parties agree to a different arbitrator. The other two arbitra-
tors do not need to be legally qualified. They are appointed as follows: one
by consumer associations and the other by business associations. However,
Consumer adjudicative processes supported by technology 113
arbitrators will not defend the interests of the party who chooses them; on the
contrary, they must be impartial while reaching a fair outcome.
Under the new regulation, mediation is introduced as a prior step to take
before continuing to arbitration.135 Parties participate in mediation except if
one of them is expressly opposed to it.136 If the mediation fails, the arbitrators
listen to the parties at the hearing where parties present the evidence them-
selves. Hearings are private and the parties may participate with or without
legal representation, but the parties bear their own costs, unless the Arbitral
Board decides to appoint an impartial expert; in this event, the board would
pay the expert’s fees.
The arbitral process may take place with an oral hearing or by submitting
documents; however, in most cases it is carried out orally because the meeting
may assist the parties in achieving a settlement. In the event that an agree-
ment cannot be reached during the hearing, the arbitrators will resolve the
dispute based on equity, although exceptionally the parties may decide to
seek an arbitral award based on law. Decisions are binding and enforceable
but may be appealed in the Provincial Court (Audiencia Provincial) on a
number of grounds, such as violation of due process rules.
3.3.4 The UDRP: An international adjudicative process
similar to arbitration
3.3.4.1 Background of the UDRP
Domain names are an easy-to-remember translation of Internet Protocol (IP)
addresses, which identify websites that are physically located in computers
hosted by Internet Service Providers (ISPs).137 There are two types of domain
names: generic top level domain names (gTLDs) and country code top level
domain names (ccTLDs). On the one hand, ccTLDs correspond with a location
in a particular country, such as .ie in Ireland or .uk in the UK; national
authorities control ccTLDs applying their own domestic regulations. On
the other hand, gTLDs are regulated by the Internet Corporation of Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN). Some of these gTLDs do not have any restri-
ctions on their registration, such as .com, .net, .org, .info. By contrast, others
need certain requirements for their use, such as .edu (related to education) or
.biz (related to business). There are many political concerns about the creation
of new gTLDs. For instance, ICANN refused a proposal for the creation of a
new gTLD .xxx for pornographic websites on the grounds that it was
unworkable and would lead to ICANN being dragged into content regulation,
which is outside its remit.138 Another major reason is that existing domain
name holders, especially trade mark owners, are concerned that new gTLDs
would depreciate the value of their domain names and could contribute
towards increased confusion among their customers. More recently, ICANN
has proposed allowing anyone to create any gTLD on the payment of a fee of
US$185,000.139
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The existence of domains without specific requirements for registration has
led to a policy of ‘first come, first served’. This has created many disputes with
trade mark owners owing to the fact that, since the early 1990s, many specu-
lators registered domain names in order to resell them for a much higher price
to trade mark owners and new businesses. Problems arose with trade mark
owners because of their entitlements to IP rights, leading them to believe that
they had been taken advantage of financially by this new practice of ‘cyber-
squatting’. Currently, in most cases anyone who wishes to register a domain
which is trade-marked for the first time can do so; any objections from trade
mark owners will be dealt with at a later stage. However, more recently, when
new gTLDs have been launched, trade mark owners were given priority rights
for a certain period of time to register their brands. However, the cost of
registering domain names during this so-called ‘sunrise’ period tends to be
significantly higher than the cost of registration during the subsequent ‘land
rush’ period (first come, first served), although it is still cheaper than the costs
of disputing ownership of the domain name in the courts.
In 1998 the US Government ordered the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) to undertake an extensive international consultation
process in order to design an efficient online procedure – quickly and cost-
effectively – to stop the most outrageous trade mark violations.140 WIPO
opted to recommend the use of a mandatory administrative procedure limited
to fight cybersquatting, which was universally condemned throughout the
consultation process. The WIPO proposal was the blueprint for the Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) implemented by ICANN
on 1 December 1999. The implementation of UDRP has a retrospective appli-
cation and is hence applicable to all domains, including those registered before
the UDRP came into effect.141 However, this provision was limited by a US
court which held that the UDRP binds only those domain name registrants
who had entered into the registration agreement with the UDRP clause.142
The creation of the UDRP had a dual purpose: first, to deal efficiently with
the most blatant violations of trade mark law (cybersquatting); and, secondly,
it was created to protect the registry (ICANN) and the registrars from trade
mark litigation.143 The UDRP is legally a mandatory administrative pro-
cedure that resembles a document-only arbitration. However, it does not
follow the arbitration laws; panels are unaccountable and decisions are not
legally binding, allowing parties to initiate a legal action any time during the
UDRP procedure. Parties adhere to the UDRP through a clause in their
contract, which is formed between the registry (ICANN) and the registrar
(ISP) and between the registrar and the registrant (domain name holder).144
The contractual clause states that certain trade mark disputes (cybersquatting
disputes) will be resolved by one of the ICANN’s approved dispute resolution
providers. Currently, there are four approved providers:
1 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Arbitration and
Mediation Centre145
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2 National Arbitration Forum (NAF)146
3 Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre (ADNRC)147
4 Czech Arbitration Court (CAC).148
The CAC is the newest UDRP service provider. In its application the CAC
made a number of innovative suggestions with the aim of delivering a fairer
process, such as allowing class complaints149 and the right to refuse com-
plaints from parties found guilty of three or more offences of ‘reverse domain
name hijacking’. In addition, it has also proposed the use of a ‘quasi-appeal
mechanism’ against UDRP decisions made by single panels.150 These initia-
tives reflect the need for reform within the UDRP. Most commentators,
however, rightly consider that all the CAC’s proposals are inconsistent with
the existing UDRP Rules and Policy, which do not contemplate such possi-
bilities.151 More recently, the CAC has proposed more conservative proposals,
namely: a simplified way of sending signed hard copies of complaints and
responses to the provider; and the service of delivery of signed hard copies.152
WIPO has also made similar proposals, from which the paperless and fully
online procedure has been recently accepted by ICANN and its use became
mandatory for all UDRP providers from March 2010.153
In the ODR context, the most important initiative of the CAC is the
service that, for the first time, provides a full online UDRP process, using a
unique ‘chess card’ (ie a coded card) to authenticate the parties and their
submitted documents. The new online process completed a pilot period and
was approved by the ICANN on 21 May 2009. A few months later, on
30 October 2009, the ICANN board amended the UDRP rules to allow
a paperless procedure. The new fully online WIPO service commenced on
14 December 2009.154
The UDRP is divided into two main parts, namely the policy and the
rules. The policy section deals with the substantive law, including the
grounds for filing a complaint, defences, remedies etc. The rules deal with
the procedural provisions such as communications, time limits, appointment
of panels etc. Dispute resolution providers have also included a third set
of rules (Supplemental Rules), which contain procedural details that are
exclusively applicable to the specific dispute resolution provider.
The UDRP has created a form of global trade mark law which mimics the
minimum standards existing in national trade mark laws and co-existing
with the national laws.155 According to David Post, the UDRP can be
regarded as an independent legal system, because despite its private law-
making origin, it complies with three main features of a legal system: it has
an independent regulation, an autonomous procedure and it issues enforce-
able decisions.156 In Post’s view the missing element of this private law-
making is the democratic legitimacy. He proposes the use of juries in the
UDRP proceedings to democratise the ‘aristocratic management of cyber-
space’.157 However, it is suggested that the democratisation of ICANN law
should come not only from those who apply the UDRP (dispute resolution
116 Online Dispute Resolution for Consumers in the European Union
providers and panellists) but also from those who create the policy and the
rules (ICANN and WIPO). A more democratic composition in ICANN
would therefore contribute to strengthening the legitimacy of the UDRP.
3.3.4.2 The UDRP procedure
The procedure can be divided into five stages:
1 the submission of the complaint
2 the response
3 the appointment of the panel
4 the delivery of the decision and
5 the enforcement of the decision.
3.3.4.2.1 SUBMISSION OF THE COMPLAINT
The procedure commences with the submission of the complaint together with
the appropriate fee paid to any of the ICANN approved dispute resolution
providers. The complaint does not have to follow a particular model, although
it is possible to download a standard claim form from any of the providers.158
As from 1 March 2010 the complaint must be submitted electronically.159
The complainant must give evidence proving that the respondent’s regis-
tration violates its trade mark rights in three respects. First, the registered
domain name must be identical or confusingly similar to a trade mark or ser-
vice mark in which the complainant has rights. Secondly, the registrant has
no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name. Thirdly, the
domain name has been registered by the respondent and is being used in
bad faith.160
In addition, the complainant must state the remedy sought which may be
either the cancellation or the transfer of the disputed domain. Once the
dispute resolution provider has checked that the complaint complies with
the UDRP rules, it has three days to forward it to the registrar (ISP) and to
the registrant (domain name holder). The registrar, although not a party
to this procedure, must co-operate with the dispute resolution provider by
three means: sharing all information that may be required; not allowing the
transfer of the domain name to a third party until a decision is reached; and
enforcing the decision.
One particular concern is the burden of proof. Under the UDRP, the onus
of the burden of proof is on the compainant; however, in certain circum-
stances, for instance when the complainant does not have access to the rele-
vant information, the panel may shift the onus onto the respondent.161 As a
result, it is not always clear where the burden of proof lies. This will ultim-
ately be determined at the sole discretion of the panel.162 It is arguable
whether this discretion, without any regulatory restrictions, might violate
the respondent’s rights.
Consumer adjudicative processes supported by technology 117
3.3.4.2.2 RESPONSE
The registrant is generally informed by e-mail and has the obligation under
the registration contract to answer the complaint.163 The respondent has
20 days from when the complaint was sent to produce an answer.164 To that
end, the respondent may complete a standard answer obtainable from the
dispute resolution provider. If he fails to respond, it will not result directly in
a decision in favour of the complainant, who will still have to show evidence
to support his claim; this is done without prejudice to the negative inferences
that the lack of response may imply to the panel. If the answer is submitted
late the panel will continue with the procedure using the belated information
at its discretion. In addition, panellists may decide at their discretion to
accept unsolicited supplemental filings from either party, bearing in mind
the other party’s rights. Currently, NAF is the only dispute resolution
provider that has distinguished itself from its competitors by specifically
regulating in its supplementary rules the possibility of applying for a time
extension to submit the response, and even allowing new submissions after
the response, prior to the payment of a fee.165 This evidences the consequences
of dealing with for-profit dispute resolution providers.
3.3.4.2.3 APPOINTMENT OF THE PANEL
Panels may be composed of one or three members, although single-member
panels are more common.166 The dispute resolution provider appoints the
single member panels.167 This competence and lack of transparency has
created much criticism, from accusing the panel of forum shopping to
using a biased procedure financially supported by trade mark owners. The
two first major studies reporting grounds of bias to the UDRP were the
statistical analyses of Mueller and Geist.168 These reports raised signifi-
cant concerns about the impartiality and independence of the UDRP
proceedings.
When a party requests a three member panel, each party may select one
panellist by proposing three candidates from the provider’s roster. The third
panellist will be appointed by the provider from a list of five candidates
proposed by the provider to the parties, where parties can again express their
preferences.169 Appointed panellists must be independent and unbiased,
which obliges them to disclose any circumstance that may affect this condi-
tion. Unfortunately, the UDRP does not provide the grounds for disqualifica-
tion and there is not a procedure whereby the parties may recuse either the
appointment of panels or the dispute resolution providers. This aspect is also
worthwhile considering when reviewing the UDRP.
3.3.4.2.4 DELIVERY OF THE DECISION
Decisions are issued between 40 and 50 days from the submission of the
complaint, which must be within 14 days after the appointment of the
118 Online Dispute Resolution for Consumers in the European Union
panel.170 If one of the parties decides to proceed, the panel has the discretion
to decide whether or not to continue with the procedure.171 Parties may also
reach an agreement before a decision is attained, automatically terminating
the proceedings.172 A reform in the UDRP proceedings might allow UDRP
providers to be complemented with consensual ODR processes, such as
assisted negotiation and online mediation, provided the parties voluntarily
agree to their use.173 This has been successfully used by Nominet, the national
ODR provider for the .uk ccTLDs, which employs mediation prior to the
issue of the decision.174
The administrative proceeding may conclude by reaching one of three
possible decisions: first, the panel may decide to transfer the domain name to
the complainant; secondly, it may order the cancellation (or modification)
of the domain name; and, thirdly, it may deny the complaint. In this last case,
the panel may find that the complaint was submitted in bad faith with the
deliberate purpose of acquiring a domain name to which the claimant has no
right. This is called ‘reverse domain name hijacking’ (RDNH) and the panel
will state this, if proved. In practice, it appears that most panels are reluctant
in upholding RDNH claims because the UDRP does not provide appropriate
grounds on which to do so.175 In this regard, it has been argued that the lack
of uniformity of decisions and the low cost of the UDRP proceedings may
encourage frivolous complaints hiding the RDNH.176 The current sanction
(the RDNH statement) is insufficient to discourage abuses. An additional
criticism of the UDRP is that in spite of being designed to deal exclusively
with clear cases of cybersquatting, some decisions are related to other issues
not expressly included within the UDRP’s scope, such as common law trade
marks,177 and its application to famous personal names178 and geographical
names.179 The UDRP needs to clarify these issues, which have provoked
conflicting interpretations among different panels.
The UDRP has developed a transparent dispute resolution procedure
where UDRP decisions are published online in their entirety by the providers,
unless under very exceptional circumstances the panel decides otherwise.180
However, complainants’ and respondents’ submissions are not published.
Arguably, such publications (respecting personal and financial data) might
increase transparency and would further inform future litigants, particularly
weaker parties who are often respondents.
3.3.4.2.5 ENFORCEMENT
Registrars are compelled to enforce UDRP decisions, which in cases of cancel-
lation or transfer will take place 10 days after the decisions have been pub-
lished. All that is needed to enforce the outcome of a decision is for ICANN
to change an entry in its master database. There is only one exception to this
rule; if a legal proceeding is initiated by the respondent enforcement will not
occur until the judicial proceeding concludes.181 The jurisdiction competent
to hear the case will be the ‘mutual jurisdiction’ to which the complainant
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had originally agreed when filing the complaint. The UDRP rules states that
the mutual jurisdiction is either that of the registrar or the registrant.182 The
registrar’s jurisdiction is the domicile of the principal office, and the domain
holder’s jurisdiction is the domicile stated in the ‘WHOIS’ database. In
practice, however, court actions are extremely rare, unless the case is related to
a number of issues.183 This may be owing to a number of reasons, such as the
high cost of litigation, low chances of redress for cybersquatters, or because
the 10 day period to bring a court action may be too short to prepare a
demand. Thus, as a matter of fact the vast majority of UDRP decisions are
final.184 Nevertheless, the UDRP should extend the existing time limits. It is
suggested that the 10 day limit may be far too short, and what seems to be
the same rule for both parties certainly favours the complainant because the
latter would not have changed his status quo, neither the lack of domain
name, nor the type of claim where he is still the claimant.185
3.3.4.3 Grounds for the cancellation or transfer of domain names
The grounds that a complainant must prove to succeed can be seen in the
light of published decisions, which allow an analysis of the interpretation of
the UDRP. This analysis will focus on the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation
Centre (WIPO) decisions since it is the main provider of the UDPR having
administrated over 16,000 disputes. WIPO has published a report with the
consensual views of panels on selected issues.186 The evaluation often shows a
lack of unanimous consensus in the interpretation of the UDRP, which may
be for a number of reasons, such as the lack of an appellate review and panels
composed by members from a multitude of jurisdictions and informed by
different legal traditions.
This analysis is divided into the three circumstances that the complainant
must prove to the panel: (1) similarity of the domain name to the trade or
service mark; (2) lack of rights or legitimate interest in the registered domain
name; and (3) bad faith in the registration and use of the domain name.
3.3.4.3.1 DOMAIN NAME IDENTICAL OR CONFUSINGLY SIMILAR TO THE
TRADE MARK OR SERVICE MARK
The UDRP does not offer any guidance in these circumstances and, as a
result, there are divergent opinions over the concept of ‘confusingly similar’.
Within WIPO there is a consensus that the content of a website is only
relevant if the disputed domain is confusingly similar to a trade mark or a
trade name.187 It is generally agreed that geographic indications are not
regarded as trade marks under the UDRP.188 In addition, there is a consensus
that trade marks rights are protected without prejudice to their location.
However, those trade marks that have automatic registration procedures – ie
US state registration as opposed to US federal registration – may have fewer
protections.189
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It appears that a domain name partly translated into another language may
be considered confusingly similar.190 It has been controversial whether a
domain name composed of a trade mark and a negative term is confusingly
similar to the trade mark, ie the so called ‘sucks’ cases: ‘[trade mark] sucks.com’
or ‘f**k [trade mark].com’.191 Panels have frequently found these registrations
abusive for a number of reasons, including that the domain name may be
confused with the trade mark for not being recognised as negative or because
it might be seen by non-fluent English speakers who may be misled into
thinking that the domain name holder is the trade mark owner etc.192 By
contrast, there are an increasing number of new cases allowing parody
and ‘gripe’ sites, holding that the likelihood of confusion between the trade
mark and the domain name were not high since they had non-commercial
purposes.193
Donahey finds two different doctrinal approaches to ascertain whether a
domain name is confusingly similar to a trade mark.194 On the one hand,
part of the doctrine uses the objective test: if a trade mark is part of a domain
name – regardless of added letters or words – the confusion exists. On the
other hand, some panellists use a subjective test: actual likelihood of confu-
sion between the trade mark and the domain name, eg ‘typosquatting’.195
This second test seems to be the most sensible and fair because it analyses the
specific circumstances and the intention of the user to confuse the domain
name with the trade mark. Nevertheless, the problem with this test is that it
often raises divergent opinions.196 Donahey proposes the use of the objective
test since the subjective approach is already used during the evaluation of
the next two circumstances. However, Donahey’s objective approach must be
qualified by the approach taken by most national courts in considering
whether a reasonable consumer or internet user would believe that the trade
mark owner has sponsored the domain name.197
3.3.4.3.2 DOMAIN NAME HOLDER LACKING RIGHTS OR A LEGITIMATE
INTEREST IN THE REGISTERED DOMAIN NAME
The most common defence for the registrant is to show evidence that there is
a legitimate interest in the use of the domain name; in order to do so, the
UDRP provides three grounds that prove rights or a legitimate interest for
the current domain name holder:
(i) before any notice to you of the dispute, your use of, or demonstrable
preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the
domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or
services; or
(ii) you (as an individual, business, or other organisation) have been
commonly known by the domain name, even if you have acquired
no trade mark or service mark rights; or
(iii) you are making a legitimate non commercial or fair use of the
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domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly
divert consumers or to tarnish the trade mark or service mark at
issue.198
These three grounds are not exhaustive; registrants can put forward other
scenarios that may prove ‘rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain
name’. In practice, however, it seems that respondents have been unsuccessful
in finding new circumstances.199
It has been very controversial whether the use of domain names for criticis-
ing trade marks is a legitimate use or, by contrast, tarnishes the trade marks.
Panels have expressed different views. On the one hand, it has been decided
that the right to criticise does not include the right to register a domain
confusingly similar to a trade mark. On the other hand, it has also been
decided that since the domain name is merely an internet address, different
from a trade mark, the use of free speech without a commercial gain is
legitimate, even when it tarnishes or dilutes a trade mark.200 This last
approach has been more prevalent among US panellists, referring to the First
Amendment of the US Constitution.201 Donahey states that mixed websites,
often with criticism and minimum commercial activities, eg the use of
Google ads, may strip away registrant protection in ‘making a legitimate
non-commercial or fair use of the domain name’.202 However, solicitations of
donations and advertisements for another criticism website have not been
considered as commercial use.203
Notwithstanding, when the domain name lures internet users who are
looking for the trademark to its own site, then regardless of the legitimacy of
its critics, it will be considered contrary to the UDRP.204 Overall, it is not
clear whether the use of a domain name to criticise a trade mark will be
permited under the UDRP, unless a clear non-commercial intention is shown.
Furthermore, when dealing with freedom of speech issues panels seem to be at
least cautious, transferring only those where there are patent intentions of
extortion or blackmail from registrants.205
Another type of controversial domains are fan sites that are active but do
not pursue a commercial interest. In some cases panellists found that there is a
legitimate interest in their use, even when using the complainant’s trade
mark; in other cases panellists stated that respondents were misrepresenting
themselves by pretending to be the official website.206 Nevertheless, in a
number of cases UDRP panels have held that personal names can be protected
when they are being used as a common law trade mark.207
It has also been much debated whether authorised distributors, licensees,
franchisees and resellers have legitimacy in using the trade mark in their
domain name. On these issues the cases differ significantly. The majority of
cases allow the use of the disputed domain when the registrant – mainly or
exclusively – deals with trade mark products.208
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3.3.4.3.3 COMPLAINANTS MUST PROVE THAT THERE IS BAD FAITH IN THE
REGISTRATION AND IN THE USE OF THE DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The UDRP does not define the meaning of bad faith but it sets a number of
non-exhaustive circumstances that if found by the panel will be sufficient to
prove bad faith in the use and registration of the disputed domain name:
(i) circumstances indicating that you have registered or you have
acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, rent-
ing, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the
complainant who is the owner of the trade mark or service mark or
to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in
excess of your documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the
domain name; or
(ii) you have registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner
of the trade mark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a
corresponding domain name, provided that you have engaged in a
pattern of such conduct; or
(iii) you have registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of
disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, you have intentionally attempted to
attract, for commercial gain, internet users to your web site or
other online location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the
complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or
endorsement of your web site or location or of a product or service on
your web site or location.209
Several of these factors indicating bad faith overlap with the first two elem-
ents. The burden of proof is on the complainant, although some panels have
shifted the onus to the respondent.210 When the registration of a domain
name is established before the trade mark right, it will be considered as prima
facie evidence of good faith. Under these circumstances the complainant may
prove otherwise, for instance in the expectation of a merger between two
companies proved bad faith registration.211 In the case of an inactive website,
it does not usually prove lack of bad faith ‘use’, or the existence of bad faith,
but it can be counted as a factor to determine bad faith.212 Other factors can
be the resemblance to a well-known trade mark, having former abusive regis-
trations, the use of a false identity during the registration, lack of response to
the complaint etc.213
WIPO has noted that cybersquatting is growing rapidly through the use
of ‘domain parking sites’ on which pay-per-click links are listed.214 Bulk
domain names are registered, taking advantage of the five day grace period
(free of charge), which is re-registered automatically under a different regis-
trant. It was also found that the failure to conduct prior checks for third
party rights in certain circumstances would represent bad faith under
the UDRP.215
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In other cases it may suffice as evidence of an offer to sell the domain name
when there is a clear intention of extortion.216 The majority of panels admit
the offer to sell from the respondent as a proof of bad faith, yet a minority
considers that the mere offering, without more, does not indicate circum-
stances suggesting the respondent ‘registered the domain name primarily for
the purpose of selling’ it.217
3.3.4.4 Assessment
3.3.4.4.1 UDRP ACCUSATIONS OF BIAS
The UDRP has been accused of forum shopping and of using a bias procedure
financially supported by trade mark owners. The two first major studies
reporting grounds of bias to the UDRP were the statistical analyses of
Mueller and Geist.218 These reports raised significant concerns about the
impartiality and independence of the UDRP proceedings. They will now be
discussed in the light of the published rebuttals.
Biased ODR providers: Mueller’s analysis Mueller’s study was the first stat-
istical study to raise concerns about forum shopping by the two main dispute
resolution providers. The study criticises WIPO and NAF for being biased
in favour of claimants. Mueller’s principal contention is that WIPO and NAF
have obtained the majority of the market share (61 per cent and 31 per cent
respectively) by deciding more often in favour of trade mark interests (com-
plainants win 82 per cent with WIPO and 81 per cent with NAF).219 This
market share is contrasted with the now out of business eResolution, which
despite charging cheaper fees, obtained a smaller market share (7 per cent)
because it resolved disputes in a less complainant friendly way (complainants
won in 51 per cent of cases). These circumstances have not changed in
recent years.220
The above findings may explain why the Canadian company eResolution
went bankrupt after only two years in business. Its former president, Karim
Benyekhlef, stated that the lower complainant win rate with eResolution
diverted many cases to other dispute resolution providers who were more
complainant friendly.221 Benyekhlef argued that this situation was so obvious
that even the Canadian Government selected the more expensive and foreign
WIPO rather than the national and cheaper service of eResolution in order
to assure a more convenient outcome.222 Froomkin has suggested that the bias
goes further than mere forum shopping because the future of dispute reso-
lution providers and the income of the panellists depend mainly on the
complainants’ lawyers’ views of which dispute resolution provider would
benefit them most.223
Mueller’s statistical analysis has received much criticism. One of the most
contentious critiques was from the International Trade Mark Association
(INTA), which declared that the study undermines the UDRP’s achievement
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in creating a cost-effective procedure to combat cybersquatting.224 INTA
argues that the selection of dispute resolution providers is not based mainly
on their decisions (favouring claimants) but rather on their international
reputation.225 It also reports that Mueller’s presumption that a non-biased
procedure would have a 50/50 result is mistaken since the UDRP was
designed for cases involving abuse.226 Finally, it is stressed that respondents
can always seek redress through the courts, but as Mueller rightly noted
this is often a useless resource for respondents with inferior economic
means.
Mueller proposes that in order to avoid the existing forum shopping, regis-
trars, instead of claimants, should be responsible for selecting the dispute
resolution provider, owing to the fact that registrars’ incentives are more
balanced than litigants’ incentives. It is arguable whether registrars would be
as effective as complainants in maintaining competent fees among all the
providers, because registrars could also be biased; for example, a registrar may
attempt to attract cybersquatters by selecting the most expensive dispute
resolution providers or the most respondent friendly provider.
Biased appointment of panellists: Geist’s analysis Geist found that a handful
of panellists have resolved a significant number of those cases with a very
high complainant success rate.227 INTA justified this finding by stating
that panellists have busy schedules, making it difficult to ensure panellists
have an even case load. Geist proposes the use of a minimum and maximum
case load system for each panellist in order to avoid case allocation to com-
plainant friendly panellists.228 Geist’s report found that in single panel cases
(appointed by the provider) complainants win more often than in three mem-
ber panel cases (appointed equally by the parties’ preferences). In those cases
where respondents voluntarily pay part of the fees (for a three member panel)
it may be because they have adequate economic means and a stronger case.
Geist argues that this is also due to respondents with a stronger desire to
avoid potentially biased panellists.229 In order to change this situation, he
proposes compulsory three member panels for all contested (as opposed to
default) decisions, which must be paid only by the complainant.
Geist indicated that there are fewer default cases in three member panels
than in the single panels.230 Thus, the different rate of complainants’ chances
of being successful may not stem exclusively from biased single member
panels but also from a higher number of default cases in single panels.231 This
becomes clearer when taking into account that complainant success expect-
ations in default cases was 94 per cent.232
It could be argued that before changing to compulsory three member
panels, and consequently increasing considerably the price of the UDRP, it
would be necessary to prove that single member panels are biased with some-
thing more than merely comparing the results of decisions. INTA rightly
stated that statistical analysis in dispute resolution cannot evaluate fairness,
indicating that bias can only be asserted by the merits of the cases decided
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by the panellists.233 An appellate review may be more appropriate to monitor
unjust decisions.
It has been suggested that it may not be an intentional or direct bias but
that it may be an indirect bias; from reading the publicly available CVs
of panellists it appears that most of them are practising intellectual property
lawyers.234 Froomkin suggests that UDRP providers’ lists should also include
people from other legal backgrounds, such as civil liberty lawyers.235 Fur-
thermore, in order to provide independent panellists it would be necessary
for the UDRP rules explicitly to prevent panellists from representing other
parties in UDRP proceedings.236
Default cases Geist reported that 54 per cent of all UDRP cases were default
cases and that a large majority of these decisions were in favour of claimants
(94 per cent).237 It is not surprising that there is a high rate of successful
default claims since when the defendant does not respond ‘panels find in
favour of the complainant because of the presumption afforded to complain-
ant’s factual allegations’.238 As for the lack of responses there may be many
possible reasons for this high rate of default cases. On the one hand, trade
mark and UDRP advocates assert that a significant group of cybersquatters do
not participate in the procedure because they can foresee very little chance of
succeeding and thus decide not to waste their time in defending themselves.
On the other hand, it can be argued that a procedure managed by trade mark
lawyers with a high complainant success rate may intimidate domain name
holders – who may not be fully aware of their rights – from participating.
According to Froomkin, the main reason for high default rates may be that
the time limit of 20 days for respondents is too short a time to give the
respondent a fair chance of preparing a proper defence.239
It is interesting to note that Nominet, the UK body in charge of internet
domains, has amended its policy to allow the delivery of summary awards
with a reduced fee for default cases.240 A similar initiative has recently been
proposed by WIPO.241 Under Nominet proceedings when a case is being
disputed by the domain name holder, parties are allocated to a mediation
process which takes place over the phone and generally lasts for two weeks.242
3.3.4.4.2 OTHER PROCEDURAL SHORTCOMINGS
Language issues The language of the proceedings must be the one used in
the registration contract, unless the parties agree a different language.243
However, the panel may change the language taking into account relevant
circumstances, such as the nationality of the parties, the language of the
documentation etc.244 Panels may also require parties to translate the docu-
ments that are not in the language of the procedure.
The UDRP has not been officially translated from English into any other
language and all the existing unofficial translations have been done by
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dispute resolution providers and registrars. This lack of official translation has
been denounced for violating many national laws that require that all infor-
mation forming part of a consumer contract must be translated into the
consumer’s local language in order to be valid.245 Consumer law thus requires
ICANN to carry out official translations of the UDRP policy and rules.
Costs issues For trade mark owners the UDRP has been a great success
because they do not have to rely on multi-jurisdictional litigation, thus
reducing costs in terms of time and money. This has also been achieved given
the simplicity of the proceedings where each party only makes a single
written submission on which the panel delivers its decision.
The complainant always pays the fee unless the complainant applies for one
panellist and the defendant applies for three; in these circumstances the par-
ties split the fee. This fee varies according to the number of domain names
involved, the dispute resolution provider and the number of panellists
involved. In very exceptional circumstances, the panel in its discretion may
require hearings, including teleconference, video conference and internet con-
ference; in such cases the parties will have to cover their expenses over and
above the regular fee.246
In addition, the various dispute resolution providers have set competitive
fees in order to attract complainants. This cannot be confused with forum
shopping, as the latter is understood as unfair competition where there is a
bias to attract claimants to the detriment of defendants’ rights. This raises
questions as to why one of the most expensive dispute resolution providers
(WIPO) has the biggest share in the dispute resolution market. It may be
for two reasons. First, when all the legal costs of a UDRP action are taken
into account, the fee difference among providers may not be very relevant.247
Secondly, Geist and Mueller maintain that the higher complainant friendly
rates are a major aspect and the fee is an unimportant element among trade
mark owners because they have economic power.248 Also, INTA has ensured
that factors such as international reputation are very important in selecting
providers.
Under the UDRP it is not possible to order financial compensation or to
impose the payment of legal costs; to recover these, it would be necessary
to claim through the courts.249 This issue was debated during the WIPO
consultations but it was decided to exclude the allocation of legal costs in the
UDRP because these legal costs could intimidate the registration of new
domains. Furthermore, it would be difficult and expensive to recover small
costs, particularly from registrants.
Time limits One of the main objectives of the UDRP was to accomplish an
expedited procedure, whilst avoiding the potential problem that a fast pro-
cedure may overlook due process issues. In the UDRP this is noticeable
through the imposition of strict word limits, only one plea being permitted,
limiting evidence and hearings and establishing short time limits. These
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limits may be justified provided they are applied equally to both parties.
Since the UDRP proceeding is not a judicial procedure but an administrative
procedure where decisions are not legally enforceable by any court, the UDRP
should not be expected to deliver the same legal standards as those expected
in a judicial system. Nonetheless, the time limitation has been strongly
criticised for favouring the complainant rather than the respondent because
complainants have no time limit for initiating a UDRP complaint.250 As
mentioned above, Froomkin proposes that the period for responding should
be at least 60 days, and that this period should only commence once the
complaint has been received by the registrant.251 However, the increased
response time should not apply to default claims where the respondent does
not participate; otherwise, it may delay the process unnecessarily.
In relation to the enforcement of decisions the same reasoning should
be applied: the 10 day limit may be far too short for contested claims, and
despite there being apparently the same rule for both parties, it certainly
favours the complainant because the latter would have not changed his status
quo – neither the lack of domain name that the complainant claims, nor the
type of claim where he is still the claimant.252 The UDRP attempted to
balance this by favouring respondents with mutual jurisdictions, either the
respondents’ or the registrars’ jurisdiction.253 Despite this, the present time
limits are too short for preparing a legal action.
Need for legal advice for respondents It may be possible that a certain number of
registrants may not defend their domain in their best interests, or even not
defend it at all if they are not familiar with the procedure. Even though the
UDRP proceeding is rather simple for a lawyer, it may appear confusing for
registrants without legal training. This may be particularly burdensome for
respondents who are not companies but individuals who may not easily find
legal advice on the UDRP procedure.
The legitimacy of the UDRP has been questioned given the existing imbal-
ance of power between the parties in the UDRP procedure, which is noticeable
from the initial contract entered into by the registrant.254 This imbalance is
apparent throughout the proceeding; where there are a high number of default
cases, respondents tend not to be represented and the time limits are particu-
larly short for them. It does not appear that, in 20 days and even if promptly
notified, respondents will have sufficient time to draft legal responses (ie of up
to 5000 words with WIPO) effectively proving a legitimate interest and good
faith in their domain names. Moreover, if it is assumed that complainants have
no time restrictions and more economic power, it might be expected that their
arguments will be better prepared than those of respondents, which creates a
new imbalance in the UDRP procedure. Thornburg has stated that ‘[t]hese
power disparities also illustrate that even technologically accessible processes
may not function equitably unless the system provides some kind of represen-
tative for the weaker party’.255 She proposes the assistance of an ombudsperson
who, as an expert, could advise the weaker party.256
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In order to balance the power between the parties, registrants could be
offered some type of free and accessible legal advice. This legal advice could
be offered by ICANN or the providers. If dispute resolution providers prefer
not to supply this service in order to avoid accusations of bias in favour of
respondents, they should at least refer respondents to institutions that can
offer this type of service. Experts could provide some type of personalised
information about previous cases, assist in finding panellists,257 answer
respondents’ enquiries and explain their entitlements. The aim is not to help
cybersquatters but, on the contrary, to assist those registrants who have a
lawful right to retain their domain names.
3.3.4.4.3 LACK OF UNIFORMITY
Abuse of the UDRP The UDRP regulates a very specific type of violation of
trade mark rights related to cases of abusive registrations. These cases are
purported to be very easy to prove in a fast cost-effective written proceeding
where certain procedural guarantees are excluded ie hearings, evidence etc. It
has been argued that some UDRP proceedings have illegitimately assumed
the role of the courts, thereby violating the procedural guarantees that can
only be provided by the courts.258 Froomkin observed that several panels
formed by trade mark lawyers have transferred domain names based on
grounds which were completely outside the scope of the UDRP.259 In this
respect Hedley pointed out that when registrants clearly breach trade mark
laws some panels (formed by IP lawyers) will find it very difficult to recognise
in them a legitimate interest or good faith in doing so.260 This misappropri-
ation is favoured by the high level of freedom given to panellists who can
decide many issues at their own discretion. This creates two main problems:
First, panellists do not use their discretion in the same way and consequently
decisions can be inconsistent. Secondly, as a result of the first reason, there is
a lack of legal certainty.
The lack of uniformity of decisions and the low cost of the UDRP proceed-
ings may encourage frivolous complaints hiding RDNH intentions.261 A mere
RDNH statement might not be enough to discourage claimants from abusing
the UDRP. WIPO seems to be responsible for this situation. Froomkin has
observed: ‘As WIPO’s prime concern was the protection of trade marks, not
protection against trade marks abuse, it made no recommendation to address
this problem’.262 In order to stop this it has been suggested that frivolous
complaints should be penalised by the imposition of a fine in the event that a
panel finds RDNH, whereby the claimant would have to pay financial com-
pensation to the respondent.263 It could, however, be asked why the trade mark
owner should compensate the registrant for an attempt to RDNH while the
cybersquatter is not held responsible for extortion. The answer is clear: the
cybersquatter, unlike the trade mark owner accused of RDNH, does not abuse
the UDRP procedure in order to hijack a domain name.
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The role of precedent The UDRP, like arbitration, is informed by the adver-
sarial principle, but it does not follow a strict doctrine of precedent.264 Panels
nonetheless consider former decisions on similar facts in order to preserve
predictability and fairness. Thus, the persuasive nature of former decisions
is unquestionable, in particular when such decisions concern registrants who
already have a record of abusive registrations. Despite this, it is not surprising
that the lack of a strict doctrine of precedent, plus the lack of an appeal review
contribute to the creation of contradictory decisions and subsequent confusion.
It has been suggested that the use of more effective and organised search
engines will assure that parties and panellists will not miss reference to
significant cases.265 To date, domain name providers have compiled their own
decisions but without including the decisions of other providers.
An undeniable achievement of the UDRP is its transparency, which is
manifested from the policy and rules, easily accessible online, to all decisions
that are reasoned and published online. Transparent systems have many
benefits because they promote accountability and remain open to criticism
on how to improve them. However, transparency may have opposite con-
sequences: in an effective procedure it promotes confidence but in an unfair
procedure it produces the opposite effect to legal certainty, creating confusion
and unpredictability.
3.3.4.4.4 APPROACHES FOR INCREASING UNIFORMITY
Panellists from different countries with diverse legal values have produced
inconsistent interpretations of the UDRP.266 Since the UDRP does not fall
within the concept of arbitration and it is not subject to its laws, there is no
possibility of judicial review or appeals. Only the courts can reverse a UDRP
decision but even judicial review cannot be considered a means of unifying
the interpretation of the UDRP because cases are treated ex novo disregarding
UDRP decisions; furthermore, courts apply national trade mark laws and
not the UDRP.267 A welcome development in WIPO is the recent admission
of cases involving multiple complainants with one respondent holding a
number of disputed domain names.268
A more uniform approach in the interpretation of the UDRP could raise
legal certainty and greater predictability of outcome. This could be achieved
by writing guidelines, reforming the UDRP and creating an appellate review,
as follows:
(i) Creating new guidelines can be useful in inspiring uniformity but it may
not be enough to persuade those minority views with strong arguments,
as often seen in the three member panels.269 Additionally, the existing
public guidelines are directed to the parties and not to panellists. It
would be more persuasive if they were official guidelines, ie approved
by ICANN.
(ii) Reforming the UDRP to clarify those aspects that have caused different
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interpretation among the panellists: clarifying the discharge of the
claimants’ burden of proof; to spell out the meaning of ‘tarnish’ in rela-
tion to parody sites;270 defining trade mark and common law trade mark;
regulating the RDNH; grounds for recusal of panellists and dispute
resolution providers; banning complainants from using the UDRP more
than once against the same domains etc. In addition, the UDRP proceed-
ings should support the use of technology and consensual procedures
such as negotiation and mediation provided the parties voluntarily agree
their use.
(iii) An appellate review would be the best option in order to create prece-
dents and legal certainty. The aim of an appellate review is to correct
bad decisions and give uniformity and fairness to what is fast becoming
the ‘law’ of ICANN. The downside of an appellate review is that it
might benefit more trade mark owners, leaving registrants exposed to
two administrative procedures to defend their domains. It has been also
argued that an appeal review will increase costs and will delay the whole
procedure. Yet, the desire for minimum costs and speed should not
outweigh the fairness and predictability that should emanate from an
appeal process.271 Furthermore, appellate reviews have been implemented
successfully by national laws to resolve ccTLD disputes, such as in the
case of Nominet in the UK.
3.3.4.4.5 APPLYING UDRP TO CONSUMER DISPUTES
The UDRP proceeding is the most famous online ‘arbitration’ process. It is
not then surprising that the UDRP has been suggested as a model for other
consumer complaints in e-commerce.272 There is, however, some scepticism
about the application of this model,273 where the availability of several ODR
providers would give businesses and consumers the choice of which provider
to choose and would encourage future ODR development through competi-
tion and profit initiative. The UDRP somehow displays the promise and
the perils of privatised law and ODR.274 The main promise is to provide
an affordable and transparent procedure that would be self-enforceable.
The main peril is to create an inefficient procedure designed and funded
exclusively by businesses for their sole benefit.
Donahey has drafted an adaptation of the UDRP in order to address three
types of online consumer complaints related to goods and services: (a) that
do not comply with the description; or (b) that they were delivered late; or
(c) that were not delivered at all. In this proposal sellers would fund this
system by a small fee payable on each transaction and in turn they would
display a trustmark.275 Donahey proposes that in order to assure prompt
enforcement, each online seller would be required to maintain a monetary
deposit from which any decision will be satisfied.276
According to him, a successful complainant must prove one of the follow-
ing circumstances: (a) the seller misrepresented himself or the quality or
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condition of the goods or services received; (b) the goods or services were not
delivered in the reasonable time expected; (c) they were never delivered. And
sellers must prove one of the following: (a) there was no misrepresentation;
(b) the consumer refused to accept the delivery; (c) the consumer did not pay.
The proposed rules are very similar to the UDRP Rules, differing only in
two significant issues: (i) the consumer has the opportunity to meet the
assertions of the seller after the latter has answered the complaint; and (ii) all
decisions are issued by a majority of a three member panel, which is
appointed one for each party and the third member by the ODR provider. In
addition, one of the most significant and positive aspects of the UDRP is that
it allows the disputants to initiate de novo legal actions in court. This rule
could be applied to online consumer arbitration, at least for a period of time,
until online consumer arbitration has won wider acceptance.277
A challenge in transposing the UDRP to mainstream B2C is that the
resolution of most of these disputes may not be cost-effective, except for high
value transactions (eg new cars), particularly if they are linked to specific
markets (eg car dealerships). Since the UDRP is still quite legalistic, a trans-
position of this process to B2C would require legal representation. For low
value disputes other methods, such as the highly automatic procedures and
more inquisitorial procedures, may be more appropriate. Also the interven-
tion of a single panellist may be a more cost-effective option. Perhaps, three
member panels could be retained for an appellate review. In addition, it must
be noted that many types of consumer complaints may be difficult to prove in
a written only procedure. This could be avoided to some extent by the use of
consensual ODR methods, such as negotiation and mediation tools as used by
Nominet, which can be very effective when appropriate incentives are used
to attract businesses’ participation.
3.3.4.5 Evaluation
ICANN, together with the UDRP, has succeeded in developing a transparent
global ODR procedure based on contract law that allows trade mark owners
to fight cybersquatting efficiently. This is a positive accomplishment for the
development of e-commerce because it favours consumers’ confidence in the
internet by reducing the number of fraudulent registered domain names. This
success, particularly among trade mark owners, has been attained by creating
a cost-effective procedure which has compulsory participation built in and a
self-enforcement mechanism.
The UDRP, however, has been harshly criticised for the use of proceedings
that are seen in favour of complainants, further damaging the legitimacy of
ICANN. The main reason for this appears to be that interests of all parties are
not equally represented within the law maker (ICANN and WIPO) and those
who apply this law (UDRP dispute resolution service providers and panel-
lists). Since the creation of the UDRP up to the time of writing the UDRP
has not shown any intentions of reform despite all the existing critics. After a
132 Online Dispute Resolution for Consumers in the European Union
decade of experience, it appears clear that the UDRP needs to be reviewed if it
aims to provide, not only an efficient but a fair procedure.
This section has suggested that the UDRP should take steps towards the
following changes. First of all, the UDRP needs to clarify those issues which
have provoked dissented interpretations, eg burden of proof, parody websites
and the meaning of common law trade mark. Secondly, there is an imperative
need for designing an effective appeal system to contribute to legal certainty;
otherwise, it will be more the rule of the individual panellist rather than the
application of a ‘uniform’ policy. Thirdly, respondents need more assistance
and guidelines; accordingly they should be provided with free advice on their
rights. Fourthly, a more effective RDNH control should be put in place.
Fifthly, time limits need to be extended. Sixthly, the UDRP should mandate
transparent non-biased selection of single panellists, including the grounds
on which panels and dispute resolution providers can be recused. It should
expressly exclude panellists from representing other parties and complainants
from using the UDRP more than once on the same domains. Finally, UDRP
proceedings should support the use of technology and consensual procedures,
such as negotiation and mediation, whenever parties voluntarily agree to
its use.278
3.4 Conclusion
The greatest advantage of adjudicative procedures is that decisions are
reached regardless of the parties’ ability to attain an agreement. When the
dispute concerns a violation of the law, the more appropriate tool will often
be an adjudicative procedure because the aggrieved party does not need to
conciliate. In most cases, however, consumers cannot access traditional forms
of dispute resolution given the disproportionate cost of these procedures in
relation to the amount in dispute, particularly in cross-border disputes. This
chapter has argued that the assistance of ICT reduces the time and cost
associated with the resolution of consumer disputes, thereby improving the
effectiveness and accessibility of dispute resolution mechanisms. In the next
few years the development of ICT and the access to ICT within society is
expected to continue to increase, which in turn would augment the need for
workable adjudicative ODR models. This chapter has focused on the poten-
tial of two processes in resolving consumer disputes online: the ESCP and
the UDRP.
Within the EU much is expected of the ESCP, which in order to deliver a
cost-effective process will need to rely on ICT support. Public courts have the
tools to deliver a workable dispute resolution system for consumers because
they can deliver trust and due process guarantees.279
This will be a significant challenge, because unlike the UDRP – an ODR
system which deals with specific complaints – the ESCP deals with more
complex disputes that require not only parties who are comfortable with the
online environment, but also powerful and effective ODR resources (the
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fourth party). It is anticipated that the ESCP may be a successful tool in
dealing with EU cross-border disputes within a certain economic range, eg
between 500 and 2000. It will be particularly useful for dealing with
disputes where parties cannot reach consensus through any other ODR
method, especially when disparity of power exists between the parties.
This chapter has pointed out some criticisms as possible constraints that
could hinder the full potential of the ESCP. First, it has recommended that
the ESCP should be applied to domestic disputes, at least when the parties or
the Member States agree to it. Furthermore, the economic limit should be
increased, because the ESCP may not be cost-effective for all claims below
2000 when expert reports, translations and legal fees may be paid by one of
the parties. A significant challenge for the success of the ESCP is that judges
may be compelled to dismiss many claims related to B2C transactions owing
to the lack of proper evidence and other substantive or procedural defects.
This will be a challenge for many claimants, particularly those who lack legal
representation. Hence, this chapter has suggested that low value disputes
should first explore more informal procedures, ie the use of consensual ODR
and automated processes. The success of consensual and automated processes
will depend on the type of dispute and the capability of the third (and fourth)
neutral parties in evaluating the cases.
The ESCP has an obvious limitation: it can only be applied to disputes
arising from within the EU. Arbitration can be more effective than litigation
when dealing with cross-border disputes because arbitral awards overcome
jurisdictional problems more easily. However, B2C arbitration needs to
incorporate tools that guarantee fairness and compliance with due process
principles. It also needs to incorporate post-dispute agreements and effective
enforcement mechanisms, or non-binding arbitration with self-enforcement
mechanisms akin to the UDRP. Disputes outside the competence of the ESCP
can be suitable candidates for arbitration, as can disputes above the ESCP
economic limit because in these cases cross-border litigation may still not be
cost-effective. Arbitration is viewed as a voluntary adjudicative procedure but
different approaches are taken around the world. In the US the use of arbitra-
tion is compulsory when it is not unconscionable for consumers. In the EU
the voluntary standard is higher; consumers’ approval to participate in arbi-
tration is only valid when given after the dispute has arisen. Hence, consumer
arbitration should be promoted, particularly for specific disputes, eg domain
names, but it cannot offer a higher burden to consumers, ie it cannot be more
expensive than litigation or the small claims procedure. The UDRP has shown
how non-binding arbitration can be effective without the courts’ assistance,
with its own system of enforcement. Perhaps, this mechanism illustrates how
online arbitration will develop in the future.
This chapter has provided some examples of how ICT is an important
element to improve efficiency and access to justice in adjudicative processes.
Both the ESCP and the UDRP were designed by public authorities in order
to resolve special types of disputes which could not be resolved by traditional
134 Online Dispute Resolution for Consumers in the European Union
means based on offline mechanisms with jurisdictional difficulties. In order to
create cost-effective legal processes to resolve low cost disputes, adjudicative
methods will need to be assisted by ICT. It is too early to consider the success
of the ESCP but it does provide consumers with a new tool to overcome
disputes in the internal market. It is hoped that the ESCP will contribute in
assuring consumers that it is possible to participate in the EU market with
confidence, with the backing of effective and fair redress mechanisms.
In the case of the UDRP, ICANN also sought to provide a mechanism that
could resolve, in a cost-effective manner, disputes relating to cybersquatting,
without being sued by trade mark owners for allowing registration of domain
names that violate national trade mark laws. The UDRP, as well as other
arbitration programmes, such as the Spanish Arbitration Boards, have proven
that in order to promote the regular use of online arbitration, it is necessary
to obtain a commitment from businesses to use ODR prior to the dispute
arising.
However, the resolution of disputes (particularly those where one of the
parties is outside the EU) through adjudicative procedures would need simi-
lar laws and expectations. This is not always possible or achievable in a
multicultural society. Adjudication may not be the best solution for all
types of internet disputes, even for those arising out of e-commerce; in fact,
the search for a settlement could allow parties to save time, money and per-
sonal/business relationships. The next chapter examines the use of online
consensual methods and their potential for settling consumer disputes.
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Mediation is a good thing because it helps to engender settlement and only
a fool does not want to settle.1
4.1 Introduction
Mediation is the fastest growing dispute resolution method.2 It represents
an alternative to the ‘win-lose’ adjudicative processes. Mediation also offers a
particular benefit for litigants: it permits parties to resolve cross-border dis-
putes, circumventing many complex legal issues such as the conflict of laws.
The expansion of mediation is being supported by an increasing number of
judicial referrals, legislative efforts to encourage its use, and in some coun-
tries, such as the UK and the US, it has even been a priority for governments.3
This has impacted on mediation services. An example of this is the Chartered
Institute of Arbitrators, where 84 per cent of all its services with consumers
(between 2001 and 2006) concerned arbitration, yet it is expected that by
2010 consumer mediation will have taken the lead, reducing accordingly
the ratio for arbitration down to 20 per cent.4
Mediation is predominantly carried out on a face-to-face basis, but there
is an increasing interest in complementing mediation with ICT. Despite
the fact that online mediation is still in its infancy, some commentators
have expressed scepticism about its effective implementation.5 However, the
prospects of ODR seem optimistic; as new generations are increasingly inter-
acting online, they will in all likelihood embrace ODR technology.6
The aim of this chapter is to examine, from an EU perspective, the current
legal context of mediation in order to evaluate if the present rules and prac-
tices allow the use of consumer online mediation. The use of online mediation
is only possible if there is a need for it, technology permits it and the law
allows it.7 This chapter also evaluates the extent to which parties should be
encouraged or even compelled to use online mediation in the resolution of
their disputes.
This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part of this chapter (4.2)
analyses the transition from traditional mediation to online mediation. It
starts by defining the different stages of the mediation procedure and the
major types of mediation schools. The dynamics of computer mediated com-
munications are also reviewed by the illustration of two ODR service pro-
viders: SmartSettle and SquareTrade. Then, it moves to evaluate the benefits
and limitations of online mediation, and the appropriate cases for this dispute
resolution method. Lastly, this part considers several approaches used to build
trust amongst the users of online mediation.
Since mediation is mostly an unregulated field, self-regulatory initiatives
and industry practices have special importance in determining the procedural
requirements. The second part of the chapter (4.3) commences by looking
at how online mediation can balance certain paradoxical aspects, namely
procedural flexibility and legal certainty, on the one hand, and confidentiality
and transparency, on the other hand. The next section examines the need
of ensuring impartiality, fairness and the protection of the weaker party.
Additionally, the mediators’ status is surveyed from different ODR providers
and countries in order to assess the minimum requirements for online medi-
ators. Finally, as mediation is conducted on a case-by-case basis, there is the
danger that similar disputes will be handled differently or that errors will go
unrecognised, thus this section also considers the accountability of mediators.
The third part of the chapter (4.4) contemplates the interaction between
the courts and the mediation procedure. To that end, the purpose of regulat-
ing mediation is first discussed. Subsequently, this part focuses on three
regulatory aspects of mediation: the enforceability of mediation clauses;
the enforcement of mediated agreements; and the suspension of limitation
periods. The examination will focus on the Directive on Mediation.
The fourth part (4.5) considers the efforts of the judiciary and the govern-
ment at the domestic level to promote the use of mediation. First, it takes an
overview of mediation in the EU. Secondly, it discusses the rule of costs in
England and Wales, which encourages parties to engage in mediation by
directing litigants to participate in mediation and relayinging the payment of
legal costs onto the party who has unreasonably refused to engage in medi-
ation. The legal authority in this area, the Halsey ruling, is evaluated in order
to address its validity with the benefit of hindsight.
4.2 From offline mediation to online mediation
4.2.1 The difference between online and offline mediation
Online mediation is generally considered as a broad concept, which includes
everything from automated blind-bidding procedures and e-mediators to
online mediation platforms with a human facilitator and case management
programmes.8 In online mediation the role of the mediator remains the same
but the selection of techniques differs. ODR platforms are designed to facili-
tate negotiation among their users by encouraging the discovery of positive
common points that may result in agreements. In fact, the flexibility afforded
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by the mediation procedure makes it particularly appropriate for being con-
ducted primarily online. Thus, online mediation is any dispute resolution
process that is directed by a neutral third party (generally a human mediator),
which does not impose the form of resolution but assists the parties in
resolving their dispute by communicating largely through the internet.
Online mediation is often carried out through written exchanges, which
lack the main factors of offline mediation, ie the face-to-face communications.
However, like offline mediation, the efficiency of online mediation depends to
a large extent on the skill of the mediator and the parties’ will to resolve their
disputes. In addition, an important component is added in online mediation,
the ODR software or fourth party, which may assist in delivering a smooth
mediation or, if badly designed, may hinder the mediation process.
4.2.2 Types of mediation
Mediation can be employed in a variety of settings, including court-annexed
or private, offline or online. The majority of mediations, however, follow a
similar procedural structure. Ponte and Cavenagh differentiate five stages in a
mediation process:9
1 the initial statement of the mediator describing the process and the role
of the parties and the mediator;
2 the parties’ opening statements describing the facts, the issues requiring
resolution and the desired outcomes;
3 the mediator assists the parties in articulating their cases, summarises
positions and sometimes may even suggest outcome approaches;
4 at some point, in most mediations, the mediator will hold one or more
caucuses with the parties to address those issues which are not suitable
for open discussion, such as strengths and weaknesses of the parties’
positions etc;
5 the parties draw the agreement or memorandum of understanding with
the assistance of the mediator.
The role of the mediator is to open the eyes of the parties to the merits of
the opponent’s case, the issues involved, the risk and costs of litigation
and the attractions of a settlement.10 There are several approaches by which
mediation can be conducted. There are, nonetheless, two main schools of
practice, as follows.
4.2.2.1 Problem solving approach
In this type of mediation the neutral third party is often highly directive in
his attempt to reach this goal, focusing on areas of consensus and ‘resolvable’
issues, while avoiding areas of disagreement where consensus is less likely.11
The role of the mediator may vary from merely assisting the parties to
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communicate (facilitative role) to being interventionist (or evaluative role).
In the latter case, according to Gibbons and others, the mediator may ‘give
advice, make assessments, state opinions – including opinions on the likely
court outcome, propose a fair or workable resolution to an issue or the dis-
pute, or press the parties to accept a particular resolution’.12
4.2.2.2 Transformative approach
Gibbons and others observe that the transformative approach ‘does not seek
the resolution of the immediate problem, but rather, seeks the empowerment
and mutual recognitions of the parties involved’,13 for empowerment and
recognition is understood to ‘strengthen one’s capacity to analyse situations
and make effective decisions while strengthening one’s capacity to see and
consider the perspective of others’.14 Therefore, it is not settlement driven but
rather based on supporting the parties through their own decision-making
process by giving them the tools to define their own issues and reach their
own agreements.15
Parties in a B2C dispute may take different approaches. For instance a
large corporation, which deals with many disputes, would want to resolve
disputes as efficiently as possible. By contrast, consumers may take disputes at
a more personal level, frequently expecting not just a quick and inexpensive
resolution but also some additional recognition.16 In those cases where
consumers feel that they have been wronged or cheated, they will seek a
sincere apology; thus a transformative approach in such event may be more
effective.17
The role of the mediators is to identify at the beginning of the mediation
which approach is the most appropriate for the type of dispute at stake. When
there is an imbalance of power between the parties (B2C) it appears that
some type of direction may be adequate but the situation may be different in
other cases (B2B or C2C). In the context of mainstream e-commerce disputes,
the mediators tend to use an evaluative approach, focusing on uncovering
the source of the problem and identifying conditions using fair standards
under which agreements could be completed, rather than in finding creative
solutions using brainstorming techniques that require more time and a
higher cost.18
4.2.3 Two ODR examples: SmartSettle and SquareTrade
4.2.3.1 Complex mediation: SmartSettle
SmartSettle is a privately owned company established in Canada offering
ODR services. It provides an online negotiation tool based on algorithm
analyses that assist parties to resolve complex disputes. This ODR service
supports face-to-face mediation and online mediation sessions.19 SmartSettle
acts as a mediator between the parties assisting them in the resolution of their
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conflicts. It first requires the parties to identify the issues in dispute and to rank
them in terms of priority by giving a nominal value to the different issues.
Then, the algorithm analysis suggests various proposals to help the parties
reach the most efficient resolution. SmartSettle applies some techniques
from game theory with the aim of producing an optimum outcome. Smart-
Settle uses a six-step process where parties, with the help of an independent
facilitator, express the value of their preferences.20 The six steps are:
1 Preparation: the ODR process is explained and parties agree to follow
SmartSettle guidelines.
2 Qualify interests: parties identify the issues of the dispute.
3 Quantity satisfaction: parties’ demands and their value are rated by both
parties.
4 Establish equity: the software makes settlement packages based on parties’
preferences.
5 Maximise benefits: the software keeps proposing new improved settlements
even over the initial minimum acceptable by the parties.
6 Secure commitment: parties sign the framework for agreement.
SmartSettle has been referred to as the bridge between online mediation
and software assistance because it is able to facilitate multi-party negotiation
cases with any number of quantitative or qualitative issues.21 However, this
method may be too complicated and time consuming for the majority of B2C
disputes, being more cost-efficient when resolving complex and high value
disputes (B2B). SmartSettle, on the one hand, has a great potential since it
delivers mathematically optimal solutions to the dispute but, on the other
hand, this ODR platform may initially be technically difficult to use. For this
reason SmartSettle advises disputants to work with a human mediator who
administers the programme. Therefore, this is not an insuperable obstacle.
Indeed, it is believed that in the near future, once this type of technology
becomes user friendly it will revolutionise the ODR market22 as it could
then be applied to mainstream consumer disputes.
4.2.3.2 Simple mediation: SquareTrade
To date SquareTrade has been the leading online mediation provider for B2C
disputes. It assisted eBay users to resolve their disputes. However, owing to
changes in the eBay feedback system in May 2008, SquareTrade decided to
stop resolving eBay feedback disputes from June 2008.23 It appears that the
remaining ODR services provided by SquareTrade have been taken over by
eBay, PayPal and their dispute resolution new partners, eg NetNeutral for
eBay Motors.24 This section will still examine SquareTrade as it operated
successfully for a number of years providing online mediation services.
SquareTrade resolved small value disputes using a process in which a media-
tor assisted disputants through asynchronous e-mail and web communications
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with the parties. SquareTrade employed around 200 mediators from over
15 different countries.25 The online mediator had a similar role to the offline
mediator: he managed the process, uncovered the parties’ underlying interests
and led them toward a mutually acceptable resolution.26 Once the disputants
reached an agreement, the mediator drafted the memorandum of under-
standing and both parties clicked ‘I accept’.27
SquareTrade ODR software was designed to resolve disputes arising out of
online transactions, particularly feedback disputes from eBay; thus, it was
designed ad hoc to deal with specific types of disputes. The advantage of eBay
disputes is that the vast majority of disputes arise over a limited number of
issues, eg the item bought on eBay arrived late, or it did not fit the descrip-
tion, and so on. An additional advantage is that eBay disputants have the
inherent incentives that encourage them to resolve their dispute as quickly
as possible, in that the buyer wants economic compensation and the seller
wants positive feedback. Furthermore, the majority of eBay disputes are niche
disputes, ie they could not be resolved offline.
It is, however, necessary to be aware of the limitations of SquareTrade. Its
main limitation was that SquareTrade relied on written communications that
were conducted with each party separately. SquareTrade did not use video
communications, which could bring another dimension to online mediation.
SquareTrade used a fairly limited vocabulary and resolved a fairly limited
range of disputes. Despite this, some credit should be given to SquareTrade,
which claimed a success rate of 80 per cent in online mediation with the
average dispute resolved in two weeks. SquareTrade mediation was available
in five languages and it resolved over 2 million disputes with parties situated
in over 120 different countries.28 It is arguable whether SquareTrade relied
on sophisticated ODR software or not. But what is beyond doubt is that
SquareTrade software used a precedent system that recognised patterns. This
assisted parties in resolving their disputes on the internet without imposing a
settlement against the will of one of the parties.29
4.2.4 Benefits and limitations in using online mediation
Online mediation enhances some of the benefits and difficulties of traditional
mediation. As with traditional mediation, online mediation allows the medi-
ator to adapt the process in order to address the particular needs of the
disputants.
The benefits of online mediation include the following:
• Online mediation is less costly, particularly when compared to the cost of
resolving a case in an offline setting.30 The benefit of saving travelling
expenses opens the use of online mediation for e-commerce and low value
disputes, which simply do not have an alternative option. Accordingly,
online mediation has the potential for increasing access to justice for
many disputants.
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• Internet communication increases the number of mediators available for
each dispute since within the internet there are no geographical limits.
In addition, it respects the anonymity of the parties, which is part of the
culture of the internet.
• Mediation processes are flexible and user-friendly. Individuals are
encouraged to resolve disputes themselves without recourse to lawyers.31
Flexibility is increased when using technology, because there is a vast array
of communication methods. Moreover, asynchronous communications
allow parties to participate in mediation at more convenient times. Also,
parties can work on their best communication, avoiding the immediate,
and often worst, responses that can take place in face-to-face mediation.
• Online mediation is time efficient: mediation usually takes place imme-
diately after the dispute arises, while litigation may take place months
or even years after the event, when the circumstances of the parties may
have changed. If online facilities are used, whether in total replacement
of face-to-face meetings or preparatory to such meetings, mediation can
commence immediately. This can be very advantageous if damage is
continuing or if a solution is urgently required. As a matter of fact, dis-
putes are frequently settled on the day of mediation or shortly thereafter.32
• In online mediation there is less perception of bias. A mediator from the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) stated that during mediations
he does not take notes for three reasons: first, to show that he is listening;
secondly, to give the impression that he is not paying more attention to
one of the parties; and, thirdly, so that the parties would perceive the
mediation as confidential.33 There is no need for doing this in an online
setting. Moreover, when dealing with cross-border disputes only a con-
sensual process may offer the parties a truly neutral forum, free of any
suggestion of bias by local laws.34
• It is a voluntary process, which allows for additional and more formal
dispute resolution mechanisms. If mediation fails, each party will still
have gained some significant expertise in how to deal with the dispute,
because usually the numbers of issues to be contested are narrowed down.
Furthermore, after mediation parties have a more accurate understanding
of the facts and evidence, becoming better equipped to engage in an
adversarial process.
• When parties control the resolution of the dispute, they are generally
more willing to comply with the agreed outcome than with an impera-
tive decision provided by an adjudicative body. In fact, mediation agree-
ments are voluntarily enforced in the majority of cases, while judgments
are not.
• Mediation facilitates settlements without damaging relationships. It
seeks win-win solutions, where all disputants are satisfied with the out-
come. There is a wider range of settlement options, ie not just monetary
compensation, whereas an adversarial procedure is generally restricted to
solutions fixed by the relevant law. Mediation does not have these
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restrictions, focusing more on the pragmatic aspects of commercial life,
the speedy and low-cost solutions that are most attractive to both of the
parties. Since mediators do not focus on legal entitlements but on amic-
able solutions, they take more of a ‘business’ approach rather than a ‘legal’
approach.
The limitations of online mediation include the following:
• Online mediation might be effective only with a limited range of dis-
putes.35 The efficacy of online mediation may be constrained by limited
amounts of time and economic resources. For transactions involving
goods of small value, even online mediation might be too costly.
• Online mediation is often conducted through text rather than orally.
This introduces a new challenge: the parties’ lack of body language and
physical interaction,36 which creates barriers for an open dialogue. This
challenge may nevertheless be mitigated to a certain extent with the
use of ICT tools that replicate face-to-face interactions, such as video-
conferencing.
• Voluntariness can be an advantage but also a disadvantage. Among the
main reasons why online mediation is not used is the lack of consent of at
least one party. Online B2C disputes often involve one-off transactions,
which hinders the interest in reaching an amicable agreement.
• There can be some technological problems, which are amplified when
disputants come from countries with different levels of technological
skills.37 However, it has been observed by online mediators that ‘com-
munication barriers posed by technological problems, computer illiteracy,
or poor writing skills were insurmountable barriers in only a relatively
small minority of cases’.38 But when these problems appear they cannot
be ignored and must be dealt with fairly, even cancelling the online
mediation whenever deemed appropriate by the mediator.
• When adjudicative methods treat similar cases alike (stare decisis) they
then provide with a high degree of legal certainty which will ultimately
prevent future disputes.39 This feature is not present in mediation.
• When mediation is used there is not a decision from a competent body
setting out the parties’ rights.40 However, the assumption that there is
one single fair result of every dispute, which only an adjudicative body
can deliver. is not always correct.41
• There is no possibility of appeal. It is only possible to strike out a medi-
ated agreement in court if it is proven that such agreement was created
under fraud, duress or some other legal defence under contract law.
4.2.5 Appropriate cases for online mediation
In order to assess the type of cases that would be suitable for online mediation
it is simpler to start by referring to those which are unsuitable for online
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mediation. These are cases involving criminal matters (at least when the
victim so decides), disputes where an important legal precedent is sought or
where there is a matter of policy which needs to be addressed. In addition, a
major difficulty is to mediate with someone who does not want to be in the
mediation process.42 Online mediation is more appropriate when the dispar-
ity of power between the parties is not great, ie B2B, C2C, B2C (with small
and medium sized enterprises (SMEs)). By contrast, online mediation is the
best method of resolving those disputes where parties ‘want’ to resolve the
dispute but the parties are unable or reluctant to meet the other party, as in
many cases involving e-commerce disputes.
Mediation is well established with insurance disputes, construction dis-
putes, employment disputes, personal injury claims, medical negligence
claims and family disputes. Furthermore, mediation is now expanding to
new fields, such as financial services, competition disputes, small claims and
e-commerce disputes.43 Conducting mediations wholly online provides the
opportunity to extend the benefits of mediation to many disputes that other-
wise would not be able to be resolved, particularly disputes between parties
who are geographically distant and disputes where the value of the dispute is
not sufficiently high to justify face-to-face meetings. For instance, under the
Spanish Mediation Bill all disputes below 300 must take place online, except
when online access is not available to one of the parties.44 Disputes where par-
ticular conduct may not reflect well on an individual or business may be better
addressed through mediation – eg B2C – where the business wants to avoid
publicity or where it involves sensitive material. In those cases where there is
a potential ongoing business or personal relationship, a consensual method will
offer a solution without disrupting a relationship. Mediation is appropriate
when both parties actively sought an agreement through negotiations but
they failed to find one. Mediation will be also appropriate to deal with those
disputes where parties need an expeditious settlement since adjudicative pro-
cedures, in particular litigation, are generally slower in resolving disputes.
4.2.6 Building trust in online mediation
The first challenge when using mediation is to convince both parties to par-
ticipate in the mediation process. It appears that parties’ decision not to
engage in mediation is generally a disbelief in a successful settlement, which
may often be owing to the lack of understanding of mediation. In order to
have effective mediation, parties must be well informed about what mediation
has to offer. Once parties agree to engage in mediation, the next step is for the
mediator and the ODR platform to encourage the parties to tackle the dispute
appropriately.45 At the start of an online mediation process, parties often
express a higher level of anger, their orientation is usually win-lose and they
are anxious to have the mediator on their side to force the other party into
action.46 Mediators start by establishing communication boundaries between
the parties, for example, allowing communications through the mediator
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only, compelling parties to check their messages and respond to them within
24 hours, not allowing e-shouting (to write with capital letters) etc.
According to Rule, when communicating online it is easier to lie; hence,
parties are more sceptical about facts, assertions and apologies.47 Mediators and
technology also have an important role to play in order to compensate for this
lack of trust. On the one hand, technology enables the parties to research
online; verification of facts during the dispute resolution process can help to
build confidence. On the other hand, the role of the mediator is to assist the
parties to put aside their personal feelings and focus on problem solving. Fisher
and Ury affirm that this is achieved through mutual understanding (without
necessarily agreeing) of the point of view of each disputant and reflecting on
possible solutions based on objective criteria, such as law, tradition, market
value etc.48 Further, they maintain that in order to obtain a productive negoti-
ation it is important to begin discussing the issues which both parties may
agree upon, regardless of how meaningful they might be.49 Research regarding
electronic communications during the resolution of disputes has shown that
when there is some rapport established between the parties, they behaved more
co-operatively and reached more efficient arrangements.50 A possible strategy
would be to encourage and provide the text exchange of some personal infor-
mation. Alternatively, this could be carried out at the initial stage of the
mediation by video-conference or by telephone conference, where the mediator
may briefly explain to the parties what mediation is about and request some
basic neutral information from the parties with the aim of setting the parties in
a positive and co-operative frame of mind.
When parties come from different backgrounds, as often happens in the
online context, they may have different expectations when engaging in an
ODR process. For instance, one party may enter into negotiation from a
competitive perspective, while the other party may enter with a more col-
laborative approach.51 In these cases, if parties are not well guided, they will
quickly become disappointed and may drop out of the discussion. It is not
surprising then that empirical research has demonstrated that the two main
factors in obtaining a settlement were the skill of the mediator and the
attitude of the parties.52
4.2.7 Dynamics of computer mediated communications
Eisen observed that the online medium increases the chances of miscom-
munication, which makes it impractical for mediation.53 This is because online
mediation does not allow face-to-face interactions in the same way as offline
mediation. However, online mediation has the power of the fourth party which
is manifested in the screen or interface which may be used in communicating
with an equivalent meaning to verbal communication. For this reason Katsh
and Rifkin affirm that a key aspect is the design of the ODR software that
appears on the screen.54 The design of the screen can add authority, quality and
trust to the online mediation process. Consequently, good use of the screen will
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enhance the chances for settlement and add value to the expertise of the
mediator.55 By contrast, bad use of the screen will have the opposite effect.
Another peculiarity of online mediation is that it often relies on asyn-
chronous communication, which introduces a cooling-off period where parties
may think about how to resolve their dispute, which is a key aspect of
mediation. In this regard, asynchronous communications may have a positive
effect on the parties, avoiding the heat of face-to-face communications.56
It has been said that in online mediation the neutral third party has insuffi-
cient control over the parties since the mediator lacks physical presence.57
However, the mediator has a new set of tools, such as the opportunity to
channel information and reframe communications. This is because computer
mediated communications may censure inflammatory statements and facili-
tate caucusing in a more effective manner than is feasible with face-to-face
communications.58
In the offline world, resolving disputes where there are many individuals
involved can be very complicated. ICT resources can be very helpful in organ-
ising information and giving the impression to all the individuals that they
are offered a personal treatment (essential in mediation), by for example
sending them personalised communications with little effort. Computer
mediated communications allow parties to use many tools, such as track
changes, which is particularly useful for written communications when draft-
ing agreements.59
ODR software allows providers to improve their service by studying previ-
ous cases. For example, SquareTrade gathered a substantial database from all
the procedures, which remained accessible to SquareTrade, the mediator and
the parties for up to a year.60 These analyses were key factors for the company
to improve its services. For instance, SquareTrade became aware that some of
its website’s content was unclear or complicated and caused users to drop
out.61 It also discovered that some users expected the mediator to render
binding decisions. Furthermore, throughout the free-text boxes SquareTrade
noticed that they very frequently had feedback rating disputes, so they
incorporated feedback disputes in their automatic negotiation stage.62
Mediators must consider the impact of the technology on the process.
Technology is not neutral in the sense that when computer mediated technol-
ogy is compared with face-to-face communications; the former emphasises
some aspects of communications and minimises or eliminates others.63 The
behaviour of the parties when interacting online follows specific patterns that
can be identified (eg emoticons or use of capital letters) and analysed in order
to create effective ODR technology to address consumer disputes.64
4.3 Self-regulation and soft law: Procedural aspects
of mediation
Mediation is generally not a regulated field. The scarce existing regulation,
such as the EC Directive on Mediation, also encourages self-regulatory
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measures. In addition, soft law initiatives give guidelines on self-regulation.
In the EU the two most significant initiatives are the EC Recommendation
2001 and the 2004 European Code of Conduct for Mediators. These initia-
tives were developed by the European Commission setting out a number of
principles to which individual mediators in civil, commercial and consumer
matters can voluntarily decide to commit. Organisations providing medi-
ation services can also make such a commitment, by asking mediators
acting under the auspices of their organisation to respect these principles.65
Adherence to these principles is without prejudice to national legislation
regulating individual professions, such as the rules of consumer associations
or bar associations.
This part of the chapter examines the main self-regulatory procedural
principles of online mediation. First, it balances necessary principles for effec-
tive online mediation: flexibility, legal certainty, confidentiality and trans-
parency. Secondly, it examines the adequate approach to ensure impartiality,
fairness and the protection of the weaker party. Thirdly, the mediator’s status
is surveyed from different ODR providers and countries. Lastly, this part
considers the accountability of mediators.
4.3.1 Flexibility, legal certainty, confidentiality
and transparency
One of the core features of mediation is the flexibility of the proceedings,
which not only lowers costs for disputants in comparison with litigation but
also has the potential to answer the emotional needs of disputants. Mediation
does not need to rely on lawyers, giving parties greater control over the
dispute and its resolution. As a result, mediation delivers agreements that are
more satisfying and voluntarily enforceable.66 At the same time these self-
regulatory principles may be complemented with regulation, such as the
Mediation Directive, which ensures minimum compliance with due process
(eg confidentiality) and legal certainty by guaranteeing the enforceability of
mediated settlements.67
Another key feature is the principle of confidentiality, which encourages
parties’ honesty in expressing their arguments, assuring them that anything
they say will not be published or used against them in a public judicial
process.68 Nevertheless, in the e-commerce context parties may have fewer
concerns with confidentiality issues. In consumer mediation, where there is an
imbalance of power between the parties, the principle of confidentiality must
be balanced with the principle of transparency in order to identify possible
abuses from businesses, which generally are the stronger parties in the dispute.
In this context, publicity is necessary to monitor the quality of mediation as
well as to identify business malpractice.69 Publicity becomes more important
when the ODR provider relies on public funding.70 By contrast, it has been
suggested that the publication of agreements may not be practical because
that would remove one of the main appealing factors of mediation.71
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Further, it appears that confidentiality and flexibility of online mediation
may hinder transparency.72 Hörnle suggested that there is a clear conflict
of interest which the EU could alleviate by introducing minimum standards
in this area.73 To some extent this has been already introduced with the
Mediation Directive. During the mediation parties are encouraged to partici-
pate fully in what is considered a confidential procedure; thus, if that con-
fidentiality is broken against the will of one of the parties, it may undermine
the mediation. According to the UK Court of Appeal in Halsey v Milton it is
important that confidentiality of the process is respected, so that the court
should not know and should not investigate why the process failed to result in
an agreement.74
It is worth noting here that the confidentiality principle is not an absolute
principle. Thus, mediators may testify in court when both parties require it in
order to improve the court’s ability to reach a fair decision. This view has been
transposed in the EU by the EC Mediation Directive as an exception to
confidentiality but only when the mediator and the parties agree to it.75
Otherwise, information about the mediation may not be given as evidence in
a civil court proceeding unless it is judged necessary to implement or enforce
a settlement or owing to reasons of public policy.
Finally, it must be noted that consumer disputes in e-commerce are
generally monetary disputes over low value transactions. These disputes
tend to be less emotionally charged and disputants tend to be relatively
indifferent to confidentiality.76 Overall, confidentiality should be constrained
in favour of transparency in B2C mediations. The publication of agreements,
withholding the personal details of the parties whenever this is deemed neces-
sary, may also help future participants to understand the functioning of
mediation.
4.3.2 Independence, fairness and protection of the weaker party
Independence ensures that the appointment of the mediator is carried out in a
transparent manner and guarantees that the mediator does not have a conflict
of interest with the parties.77 To prevent a conflict of interest it must be taken
into account that the mediator or ODR service provider does not depend
financially on one of the parties in the dispute. It has been suggested that
an independent body should supervise these essential requirements.78 This
control is currently carried out exclusively through self-regulation.
Fairness comprises the obligation to provide information concerning the
procedure and giving equal opportunity to the parties to put forward their
case. Enforceability of mediated agreements poses no problem when the
agreement satisfies both parties but it may create difficulties when mediation
is perceived not to be fair or lacks compliance with due process issues.79 There
is a disagreement among practitioners and scholars as to whether mediators
should actively assist consumers to obtain a fair result80 and also whether
mediators should be held liable for their decisions. In the response to the
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Green Paper, the majority view maintained that ‘the third party could not be
held responsible for ensuring that the agreement is balanced’.81 However, this
view should be limited to those cases where there is no serious misconduct by
the mediator. Mediators should therefore have the duty of ensuring that the
parties reach a decision voluntarily and that such decision is not manifestly
unfair, particularly in B2C mediation where there is an imbalance of power
between the parties.82
4.3.3 The mediator’s status
The Green Paper on ADR opened a discussion about the need to regulate the
training and liability of mediators.83 In particular, the Green Paper raised two
important questions. First, should the EU create minimum standards on
these issues? And, secondly, what degree of responsibility will be expected
from neutral third parties? Ethical rules and minimum standards are certainly
necessary to deliver fair mediation within the EU. However, it may be too
early for developing binding regulations on these issues. The Green Paper
enquired about the use of European or national certificates to ensure that
mediators are competent. The responses proposed that ‘Member States should
be encouraged to set up a national professional body whose aim would be to
draw up these ethical rules and monitor their implementation’.84 Arguably,
this will be more effectively achieved if it is co-ordinated at the EU level, at
least initially, to deal with cross-border disputes. This could be done by
establishing a pan-European trustmark.85
The Mediation Directive does not establish a European accreditation body
for third parties, but encourages compliance with the voluntary European
Code of Conduct for mediators and the development of a system of certifica-
tion for national bodies offering training courses in mediation.86 The use of
quality and ethical standards will gain more importance as soon as online
mediation service providers have succeeded in satisfying an actual need of
offering ODR services to a significant number of consumers.
Liability of mediators is currently regulated under the civil liability law of
the Member States. When mediators belong to a regulated authority (eg the
legal bar) it might be easier to make them comply with professional stand-
ards. Problems may arise when third parties do not belong to professional
bodies, especially in those Member States that do not have provisions relating
to liability of mediators. In order to avoid this uncertainty, it has been sug-
gested that each ODR provider should implement its own code of ethics, so
that the location of the mediator in relation to the applicable code of ethics
would no longer be an issue.
There are new challenges when resolving cross-border disputes and these
difficulties derive from crossing cultures; thus, the design of ODR and the
training of the mediators must accommodate different social, legal and cul-
tural elements.87 Furthermore, ODR programmes require new skills to be
mastered by professionals. Special training should be required for online
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mediators, eg for the use of the ODR software, relying on templates and
precedents, interpreting texts rather than facial expressions, using caucus
mediation and so on.88 At present, most ODR providers have their own
internal training systems, although the intensity of these programmes varies.
For instance, the Better Business Bureau (BBB) provides five days’ training
in basic mediation skills, with an emphasis on an interest-based model of
mediation. SmartSettle’s facilitators are attorneys which have received a spe-
cial 20 hour online training course.89 The Mediation Room and the ADR
Group provide a course of 10 hour distance training on online mediation.90
Although standardisation of minimum training for online mediators may not
be appropriate at this early stage of development, a certain level of training
and monitoring is essential to provide quality online mediation.
4.3.4 Accountability
Accountability in online mediation entails the monitoring of the mediator
and the service provider by an authority which ensures that the ODR service
is delivered in a fair and effective manner following the pre-established rules.
It is not correct to dismiss accountability measures simply because mediation
is voluntary and any resolution reached is acceptable to all parties.91 It is
important to have accountability in order to avoid errors and ensure fairness
in mediation where parties may have different levels of bargaining power. The
role of the mediator is to change parties’ perceptions of a dispute in order to
facilitate the settlement. According to Rabinovich-Einy:
[P]rofessional mediators must be held accountable to parties, providers
that rely on their services, relevant regulatory authorities, and the general
public for the delivery of procedurally fair mediation services that meet
accepted standards of mediation. A breach of these obligations should
result in legal, disciplinary, monetary, or reputational consequences.92
There are a number of difficulties in attaining accountability of mediators
supplying online services. First, it is difficult to evaluate the outcome of
a mediation process which is driven by party satisfaction and allows for trade-
offs, such as those between legal remedies and apologies.93 Hence, it cannot
always be expected that similar disputes will be resolved in similar ways.
Secondly, it is difficult because the confidentiality of the proceedings encour-
ages a case-by-case approach. This may cover problematic trends, particularly
in offline mediations as they are based on oral discussions. By contrast, when
using online mediation, it appears more convenient to require feedback from
the parties and it is also possible to study the interactions of the parties with
the ODR software. Thirdly, most online mediation providers only release
partial data, when it is beneficial to them, such as resolution rates and party
satisfaction surveys, both of which are of limited use in evaluating mediator
performance.94
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4.4 Regulatory approach in the EU:
The Mediation Directive
4.4.1 The purpose of regulating mediation in the EU
Since mediation is an informal process, it is necessary first of all to consider
why and to what extent mediation needs to be regulated. In the field of
dispute resolution, one of the functions of the law is to ensure compliance
with the fundamental procedural principles, such as confidentiality, trans-
parency, impartiality and fairness. In addition, regulation has the role of
promoting and legitimising mediation, particularly when judicial enforce-
ment of mediation clauses and settlements proves to be sporadic or elusive.95
Nonetheless, regulation may also have a negative effect on the flexibility
of mediation, especially if it incorporates strict rules. Accordingly, any
regulation on mediation needs to balance two aspects, namely due process
and procedural flexibility. Within the EU there are a number of laws govern-
ing mediation and issues related to B2C mediation, such as civil procedures
and consumer protection laws. The EU has as an objective to harmonise,
whenever necessary, the laws of the Member States in the area of dispute
resolution with the purpose of improving competition within the internal
market.
The Mediation Directive is applied in civil and commercial mediations
where parties are domiciled in different Member States (with the exception of
Denmark).96 For consumer mediation the directive refers to the principles set
out in the EC Recommendation for consensual resolution of consumer dis-
putes.97 The recommendation does not apply to pre-contractual negotiations,
consumer complaint schemes or processes where the third party issues a
decision, recommendation or evaluation, whether or not such outcome is
legally binding. The Mediation Directive excludes from its application civil
and commercial matters where parties do not have disposal of their rights
under their national law, eg matters related to family law, employment law
and other important public policy issues.98
Although the directive applies exclusively to cross-border agreements, its
application is also recommended for domestic cases.99 In sensu stricto, the
directive will not have a broad impact, since the majority of mediations
presently deal with domestic disputes. It must be noted that the directive
does ensure that online mediation may take place, although its application
does not bind national mediation laws. In this regard, recital 9 of the direct-
ive encourages the use of ICT, stating that:
This Directive should not in any way prevent the use of modern com-
munication technologies in the mediation process.100
The directive mandates Member States to introduce legal reform whenever
necessary in order to implement a number of its provisions. The directive sets
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out when mediators can be called upon to give evidence to explain the basis of
the parties’ agreement.101 It reinforces the principle of confidentiality, the
limits of which were not very clear in some Member States.102 The directive
enables parties to obtain an agreement with similar status to that of a court
judgment.103 Accordingly, accredited agreements will be recognised and
enforced throughout the EU under the same conditions as those for court
judgments and arbitral awards. This provision also ensures that the court
will not consider a mediation agreement inadmissible as a confidential com-
munication. It is expected that online agreements will have the same treat-
ment, at least when they derive from bodies approved by the Member
States.104 It is still unclear what procedural form this recognition will take,
although it seems that judicial approval or notarial certification would be
sufficient to allow such agreements to be enforceable in court or by another
public body.105 The European Commission will make available information
on the competent courts and authorities to enforce mediated agreements by
November 2010.106
The Mediation Directive requires Member States to allow courts to rec-
ommend the use of mediation or to invite the parties to attend an information
session on the use of mediation.107 Some commentators have observed that the
directive does not go far enough, because it should be more explicit by giving
national courts the duty to inform parties of the availability of mediation.108
It seems that the court’s power to refer cases to mediation may be effective in
convincing disputants that mediation will assist them in settling their dis-
pute.109 However, more research is needed to evaluate whether the above
statement is true and, if so, to what degree.110
A stable and predictable legal framework would contribute towards setting
mediation on an equal footing with judicial proceedings. But to what extent
does the Mediation Directive achieve this? The directive points out the
advantages of using a means of resolving conflicts that is more economical and
simpler than judicial or quasi-judicial remedies. The directive was created
with the aim of promoting the use of mediation and of increasing legal
certainty about the way courts in all EU Member States deal with issues
arising out of mediation. There is a mandate in the directive which requires
Member States to ‘ensure that information is available to citizens, in parti-
cular on internet sites, on how to contact mediators and organisations pro-
viding mediation services’.111 This information should contain data on the
experience of mediators; this would make it easier for parties to choose their
mediator, eg similar to the way this is done by the UDRP approved dispute
resolution service providers. Research found that when parties select the
mediator, they are more likely to settle than when the mediator is selected
otherwise.112
Additionally, it is argued that the obligation to inform should be extended
to legal practitioners and it should also be imposed on the law societies. This
is particularly necessary in those Member States that face a crisis in their
judicial systems.113 Awareness could also be raised through different channels
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such as universities and European bodies, eg the European Judicial Network,
Eurochambers and the European Consumer Centres.114
4.4.2 Mandatory mediation
Mediation is a consensual process whereby the parties voluntarily agree to
participate. However, mediation may also take place when so ordered by a
court or when parties introduce a clause in their contract agreeing to use
mediation. Thus, contracts may include an ODR clause which requires par-
ties to attempt to settle their disputes arising out of the contract. The purpose
of such a clause would be to increase the chances of settling a dispute before
the parties resort to adjudicative methods.
It must be noted that in the EU a contractual clause cannot oust the
jurisdiction of the court by inserting a consensual clause but, in certain
circumstances, particularly in B2B disputes with detailed mediation clauses,
the court may stay proceedings to allow parties to honour their agreement to
mediate.115 In any event, a party’s right to seek injunctive or declaratory relief
and to avoid the prescription of a cause of action is always preserved.
The legal force of these clauses and whether such agreement or court
mandate could be enforced against the will of one of the parties is debat-
able.116 In general terms, mandatory mediation is considered less problematic
than mandatory arbitration given the fact that access to the courts is only
temporarily suspended and that parties cannot be forced into an agreement.117
For this reason mandatory mediation would not contradict Article 6 of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) or Article 47 of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (ie the right to a fair trial).
In fact, the directive opted for allowing mandatory mediation, although
Member States may restrict its use.118 Consequently, the directive requires
Member States to grant parties the possibility of initiating judicial proceed-
ings or arbitration in relation to their dispute by the expiry of limitation or
prescription periods during the mediation process.119
Even though in theory when a mediation clause is mandatory a party can
be obliged to start the mediation procedure, thus far in practice this has
not been very common, as mediation in those circumstances may encounter
difficulties in succeeding, given the unwillingness of one of the parties.120
Despite this, a number of Member States, including Spain and Italy, are
currently implementing in their national law mandatory mediation.121 In
addition the directive states that the court may invite the parties to use
mediation or, whenever it is available, to attend an information session on the
use of mediation.122 In these scenarios consumers should only be obliged to
participate when the session is free of charge. The American Arbitration
Association (AAA) states that the courts should only be allowed to impose
mandatory mediation when the cost of mediation is publicly funded and the
mediation is of high quality.123
In England the Court of Appeal in Halsey stated that ‘forcing people to go
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to mediation before a trial is a recipe for a mediation disaster’.124 This state-
ment has not yet been fully explored. Katz observed that the approach to
mediation should be process-orientated, rather than a means of ensuring a
settlement.125 According to Katz, ‘[n]othing about ADR requires that the
parties be willing or eager to settle. The process is designed to facilitate
settlement precisely when disagreement is strongest’.126 Furthermore, research
has shown that when parties are informed in court that they have the option
of using mediation, they often decide to opt out.127 However, when parties are
compelled to use mediation, the results are not dissimilar to those who
engage in mediation voluntarily.128
In some cases the refusal to participate in mediation could be interpreted as a
violation of the obligation of good faith.129 However, if it is clear that negoti-
ation would be useless, would the denial of access to the courts be unfair? This
control could only be examined on a case-by-case analysis, either by the courts
or by a public supervisory body.130 A pilot project on mediation for small
claims in the English courts demonstrated that the administrative costs of
letting parties litigate on whether or not it is appropriate to mediate was not
cost-effective.131 It appears to be more cost-effective to have an ex post analysis,
deciding on the appropriateness of mediation when determining the costs.132
The European Parliament has pronounced in favour of the legality of man-
datory mediation clauses, but only when the appointed ADR bodies have
been approved by the Commission.133 On the other hand, the Commission
decided not to require Member States to allow mandatory mediation for the
following reasons. First, it considered that validating mandatory mediation
clauses could create disparities with the constitutions of some Member States.
Furthermore, it was argued that in the light the Unfair Contract Terms
Directive 1993 and of Article 6 of the ECHR, a mandatory mediation clause
could deprive consumers of their right to go to court. This approach is
contentious. As explained above, mediation clauses do not deny access to
courts but only a temporary delay, which would probably be a short one when
using ODR schemes.134 Moreover, in most cases mandatory mediation allows
parties to initiate parallel legal proceedings at any stage.135
The Commission maintained in 2003 that mediation was not sufficiently
developed at the time as to make its use compulsory.136 There are a number of
issues related to mandatory mediation that remain to be explored. According
to Jeff Rifleman:
[M]andatory mediation as opposed to traditional voluntary mediation
raises additional ethical concerns including good faith participation,
privacy and confidentiality, and enforceability of any attained agree-
ments, and presents perhaps the ultimate question – do the benefits of
mandatory mediation outweigh the costs?137
A mediation clause should not be enforced when mediation might be a burden
to consumer access to justice. To date, the legality of mandatory consensual
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ODR clauses in B2C contracts has not been fully tested in the courts since
analogies with ADR may not be valid.138 These clauses should be enforceable
provided they do not reduce the capacity of the consumer to access justice by
introducing new barriers, ie unreasonable costs, geographic barriers and
linguistic limitations.139 Therefore, mandatory mediation should not create
new barriers to consumer redress, eg it should not be more expensive than the
small claims procedure or exclude consumers from taking class actions140
since this might be considered unfair under the forthcoming Directive on
Consumer Rights.
As a matter of policy, legal harmonisation should recognise the enforce-
ability of mediation clauses provided that the clauses are drafted in good faith
and they do not obstruct later access to courts.141 It is regrettable that the
Mediation Directive did not take the opportunity to clarify what constitutes
equitable mandatory clauses in consumer contracts.142
4.4.3 Enforcement of settlements
It is expected that when parties reach a voluntary settlement they will be
willing to comply with its terms. But what happens when someone is acting
in bad faith or simply refuses to comply with the settlement? In order to
make a private agreement enforceable it may be necessary to go to court.
When dealing with cross-border disputes this is not always an easy option, as
there may be high costs, delays and possibly a number of jurisdictions and
laws that are potentially applicable.
The location of online mediation is legally significant because its jurisdic-
tion will determine which laws will govern the mediation, the existence or
not of professional standards, immunity or limited liability of mediators,
the level of confidentiality of the mediation, whether the mediator has the
capacity to assess the party’s chance of success should the case proceed to
litigation etc.143 This is decided, as in arbitral procedures, based on the place
where the consumer is based, or where the mediator receives and sends
communications.144 In order to avoid these legal uncertainties it would be
advisable to enter into an agreement at the start of the procedure establishing
the competent court and law for the enforcement of the decision. Thus,
parties and the mediator must select a jurisdiction whose laws best support
the mediation process.
Article 6 of the directive states that upon request of the parties, settlement
agreements must be confirmed by a public authority and enforced across the
EU.145 The directive does not provide an enforcement procedure, leaving
the Member States to decide on procedural matters.146 The Green Paper
suggested that courts, public notaries or even Chambers of Commerce, can
undertake this role.147 Hence, in order to seek an effective enforcement mech-
anism, it would be necessary to refer to the civil procedural laws of the
Member States, which will determine whether a judicial act or an administra-
tive act will suffice to make the agreement enforceable.148 According to the
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Spanish Mediation Bill, when a mediated agreement has been reached with
the assistance of an accredited mediator, such agreement will be directly
enforceable in court and will have the status of res judicata.149 The use of a
simplified enforcement procedure would make more effective the use of
mediation, especially for small claims and consumer cases.150
It is expected that national courts will enforce online agreements drafted
by ODR providers that have been approved by the Member States.151
Mediation agreements should be assimilated, under certain conditions, with
other documents liable to a swift enforcement, which could benefit from the
simplified exequatur mechanism provided by the Brussels I Regulation, ie
with the same enforceability qualities as those given to arbitral awards.152
4.4.4 Suspension of limitation periods
The Green Paper considered whether the limitation period for initiating a
court action should be suspended whilst the parties attempt to resolve their
disputes by mediation. The current situation varies among Member States.
Hörnle has put forward arguments in favour and against the suspension of
limitation periods. With regard to the arguments against, she first argued
that mediation sessions are short and that parties are permitted to initiate
legal proceedings at the same time as they negotiate.153 The situation is
however different when the national law requires the parties to attempt
mediation prior to the commencement of a legal action, such as the case of
Spain for monetary claims (excluding consumer claims) where under the
Mediation Bill time limits are suspended.154 By contrast, she argued in support
for the suspension of limitation periods by noting that the suspension would
encourage the use of mediation, and that in some countries the period of time
for commencing legal proceedings can be very short. This view also protects
those unaware of the limitation periods for commencing legal proceedings,
thereby protecting the weaker party, ie the consumer.155
Most respondents to the Green Paper considered the suspension of the
limitation periods essential with a view to encouraging the use of mediation.
Conversely, other respondents stated that regulation on this point is not
justified.156 The directive requires Member States to ensure that parties who
choose mediation are not prevented from initiating judicial proceedings
or arbitration in relation to their dispute by the expiry of limitation or
prescription periods during the mediation process.157 In order to imple-
ment this provision it will be necessary to amend the national procedural
rules of some Member States. Hence, this provision requires the suspension
of limitation periods during the mediation, thus ensuring that parties
will not be prevented from going to court as a result of the time spent in
mediation.
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4.5 Regulatory approach at the domestic level,
particularly in England and Wales
4.5.1 Mediation under national law
Mediation is encouraged in many different ways in each jurisdiction; for
instance, mediation may be recommended during an arbitral procedure. In
Spain, the institutionalised consumer arbitration programme has a mediation
stage before the oral hearing of the arbitration.158 However, mediation, includ-
ing the online process, only takes place with a professional mediator, who must
be a different person than the arbitrator, when the parties have voluntarily
agreed to it (ie it is non-mandatory). Accordingly, if one of the parties refuses
to participate, the arbitral tribunal will not impose a sanction. However, once
an agreement is reached it will have the force of an arbitral award. The
agreement is legally binding and the courts cannot review it provided there is
no legal flaw in it or a violation of the due process principles.
Mediation referrals may also come from the courts. In Portugal, magis-
trates’ courts encourage parties during the pre-trial stage to use in-court
mediation when they consider it appropriate.159 Also, in Germany the
courts recommend the use of mediation and judges take the role of media-
tors. In England and Wales, where family disputes benefit from public
funding, parties are requested to attend a compulsory information session on
mediation.
Private or public initiatives may promote the use of online mediation.
In France, Mediateur du Net has settled more than 4000 B2C disputes between
September 2004 and December 2006.160 Despite the fact that a French
statute explicitly included mandatory clauses in the indicative list of abusive
consumer clauses,161 the French Supreme Court has enforced contractual
mediation clauses, provided they do not impede a contracting party from
bringing an action before the courts when mediation fails.162
This tendency, although not uniform, may also be appreciated in the US.163
In the recent case of Advanced Bodycare v Thione, the 11th Circuit held that a
mediation clause (as well as a clause that requires the parties to mediate ‘or’
arbitrate) does not fall within the meaning of the Federal Arbitration Act
and, therefore, the court cannot stay litigation and compel the parties to
mediate.164 However, according to McLean and Wilson, this case would
not apply to Med-Arb clauses, ie where mediation is a precondition to the
arbitration process.165
The debate in the US has been focused on good faith mediation. Its critics,
on the one hand, argue that the good faith requirement leads to coerced
settlements and it places at risk the principle of confidentiality in mediation.
On the other hand, its advocates argue that the good faith requirement is
necessary for obtaining effective mediation where parties may not abuse its
process.166 Lande observes that claims for costs or other relief have been based
on failure to attend mediation sessions, failure to send a representative with
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settlement authority and failure to participate substantively in the medi-
ation.167 Similarly, in England and Wales the Civil Procedural Rules (CPRs)
and a number of court rulings have opened the debate on how mediation
should be encouraged.
The CPRs in England and Wales give powers to the courts to encourage
litigants to use mediation.168 This trend has also been noted in other common
law jurisdictions; for instance, section 651(b) of the US Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 1998 requires federal district courts to recommend to
litigants in civil litigation that they consider the use of ADR, subject to some
restrictions, such as where the discussion on the merits includes consti-
tutional rights.169
There are other measures that encourage the use of mediation. For instance,
in England and Wales Part 36 of the CPRs provides that one party may make
an offer to settle with cost consequences; thus, if the offer of settlement is
refused, and if the judgment is not better than the offer to settle, then the
judge will be informed at the time of determining the costs about the previ-
ous offer and will impose all the legal costs on the party who refused the
earlier offer to settle.170 Ireland applies a similar rule through lodgments
in court under Order 22 of the Superior Court Rules.171 Also, in the US this
practice is effected through a procedure known as an offer of judgment,
which is regulated under Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Comparable rules have been adopted by most states in the US. These rules,
however, are rarely applied in arbitration and are unknown in continental
Europe where Member States seem less keen to encourage settlements
amongst litigants.
4.5.2 The approach to mandatory mediation in
England and Wales
In England there have been cases where courts have enforced a mediation
agreement, even against the will of one of the parties. This occurred in
Cable & Wireless v IBM United Kingdom, where the court decided to stay
proceedings until the parties had referred all their disputes to the CEDR
mediation procedure.172 In this case, the High Court held that had the
clause only provided vaguely for an attempt in good faith to resolve any
dispute by mediation, it would have been unenforceable. It must be noted
that this case was B2B and it would be unlikely to apply to B2C; however, it
evidences punctual support by the court in using mediation. Currently, these
practices are not common since more often than not judges do not stay
proceedings in order to enforce mediation agreements.173 In such event, it is
more likely that at the end of the litigation the court would impose the legal
costs on the party who had unreasonably refused to mediate.174 This in itself
is also rare.
In some cases, it would seem justified for the court to press in favour of
mediation, taking into account the cost of litigation. For instance, in Egan v
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Motor Services (Bath) Ltd the Court of Appeal dealt with a consumer claim
where the claimant was unsatisfied with his new car and the defendant car
dealer refused to refund the full price of the car.175 The parties fought the case
through litigation and spent a disproportionate amount in legal costs. In his
ruling, Ward LJ delivered the following comments:
What I have found profoundly unsatisfactory, and made my views clear
in the course of argument, is the fact that the parties have between them
spent in the region of £100,000 arguing over a claim which is worth
about £6,000. In the florid language of the argument, I regarded them,
one or other, if not both, of them, as completely cuckoo to have engaged
in such expensive litigation with so little at stake [. . .] This case cries out
for mediation.176
Under the law in England and Wales costs ‘follow the event’, ie the loser pays
the winner’s legal costs, which often makes the losing party’s detriment
‘immeasurably greater than the benefit of winning’.177 Disproportionate legal
costs are not unusual, particularly when claims are appealed and conditional
fees are involved. A grossly disproportionate case was Campbell v MGN Ltd,
where the House of Lords ordered the Daily Mirror newspaper to pay £3500
in damages to Naomi Campbell for the publication of pictures of her leaving
a rehabilitation centre (ie this violated her right to privacy) and over £1 million
in legal costs.178 The disproportionality between legal costs and amounts in
dispute invites English mediators to encourage parties to be co-operative
during the mediation process; thus, many mediators strategically commence
the first meeting considering the amount of money that disputants have
already spent on the dispute and the amount of money they would have to
spend if the dispute escalated to be resolved in the courts.179
The CPRs, similar to the Mediation Directive, state that the court has the
role of ‘encouraging the parties to use an alternative dispute resolution pro-
cedure if the court considers that appropriate’.180 It is not clear in which
circumstances the courts would require the parties to participate in mediation
but it appears that the chances of success and a cost analysis will be key
elements for a court’s decision.181 The CEDR has gone so far as to suggest that
parties should not be allowed to proceed to trial, save in exceptional circum-
stances, without having previously attempted mediation.182 Furthermore,
the CEDR has observed that mediation is underused and that courts should
make more use of the pre-action protocol requiring litigants to attempt
mediation.
The CPRs provide that a party who refuses to consider whether a case is
suitable for mediation may be at risk of having to pay the legal costs of the
other party, particularly where the court has made an order requiring the
parties to consider mediation.183 In several judgments the English courts have
recommended legal practitioners to consider mediation. In Burchell v Bullard,
Ward LJ stated:
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[t]he court has given its stamp of approval to mediation, and it is now the
legal profession which must become fully aware of and acknowledge its
value. The profession can no longer with impunity shrug aside reasonable
requests to mediate.184
Obviously, mediation may not be appropriate for all cases. The most authori-
tative precedent guidance on when it is unreasonable to refuse to mediate is
Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust.185 In this case the claim arose from
the allegedly negligent treatment of a hospital patient, who might have died
because the tube from which he was being fed was incorrectly fitted and
instead of going to his stomach it directed food to his left lung. The claimant
proposed mediation a number of times but the defendant refused it on the
grounds that there was no negligence in this case since it claimed that the
food got into the lung when the patient inhaled his own vomit. The court
assessed whether this refusal to mediate was or was not unreasonable. In the
end, the Court of Appeal dismissed the case, finding the refusal to mediate
reasonable. The Halsey ruling set a non-exhaustive checklist for deciding
when the refusal to mediate is unreasonable:186
• The nature of the dispute and its inherent suitability for mediation. For
instance, a reasonable refusal would be in a dispute where the parties
want the court to set a binding precedent on a point of law. However, in
the view of the Court of Appeal, most cases are not by their very nature
unsuitable for mediation.
• The merits of the case and the parties’ reasonable belief that they have a
strong case.
• Whether other settlement methods have previously been made but
rejected.
• Whether the cost of mediation would be disproportionately high. This is
a factor of particular importance where there is little money at stake.
Hence, unless mediation is publicly funded, it would be difficult to find
an affordable mediation service that would be cheaper than the Small
Claims Court.
• Whether the mediation will result in an unacceptable delay to the trial.
This would be in the event when the mediation is suggested just before
the hearing or when an injunction is required.187
• Whether mediation would have reasonable prospects of success. This is
an important factor, but not the only one to be taken into account.
It must be noted that this is not a numerus clausus list. In Halsey, and in
subsequent cases such as P4 Limited v United Integrated Solutions plc, an import-
ant factor in considering the refusal as reasonable or not was the fact that the
request for mediation seemed more tactical than a genuine desire to resolve
the dispute in question.188
The Court of Appeal in Halsey stated that ‘the court’s role is to encourage,
168 Online Dispute Resolution for Consumers in the European Union
no to compel [mediation]. The form of encouragement may be robust’.189 The
Court of Appeal created two new rules with regards to mediation:
(i) The court held that if a litigant is ordered to proceed to mediation
against his will, this would be regarded as an unacceptable constraint on
the right of access to the courts and, therefore, a breach of Article 6 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, which protects the right to a
fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law.
(ii) The court stated that a litigant who seeks the imposition of costs on his
opponent on the ground that the latter refused to give mediation a
chance has the burden of proving that the refusal was unreasonable.
In relation to the first rule, as argued above, it seems that requiring parties to
go to mediation could barely, if at all, delay litigation. Hence, to consider
mandatory mediation as a restriction to the right of access to justice, ie as an
infringement of human rights, is mistaken.190 According to Lightman LJ:
In respect of Article 6, the reasons are twofold. First, the Court of Appeal
appears to have confused an order for mediation with an order for arbitra-
tion or some other order that places a permanent stay on proceedings
[. . .] Secondly, the appeal court appears to have been unaware that order-
ing parties to proceed to mediation regardless of their wishes happens
elsewhere.191
Indeed, Article 5 of the Mediation Directive and more recently the European
Court of Justice allow for the use of mandatory mediation provided it does
not deny the parties access to the court after an unsuccessful mediation.192 Also
in England this happens when parties pursuant to a divorce with public
funding are required to participate in an information session on mediation.193
In addition, the county courts in England carried out pilot projects whereby
disputes were automatically sent to mediation. However, it has been argued
that the Automatic Referral to Mediation project failed largely as a result of
the Halsey decision.194
In Halsey, the Court of Appeal relied on the decision of the European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Deweer v Belgium.195 In this case a Belgian
butcher was facing criminal prosecution for over-charging for pork. The
Belgian authorities threatened a provisional closure of his premises until the
conclusion of the criminal proceedings unless the butcher agreed to a finan-
cial settlement. The butcher agreed but brought a successful legal action in
the ECtHR for violation of his Article 6 rights. The ruling of the ECtHR
acknowledged that waiving the right to a fair trial may be compatible with
Article 6 but it warned that caution was required when that right is waived in
proceedings substituting the court, ie in arbitration proceedings.196 It seems
that an arbitration agreement or a coerced settlement may violate Article 6
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but not mandatory mediation. According to Lord Phillips, President of the
UK Supreme Court, this could only happen in extreme cases, such as finding
a party in contempt for not following a court order to participate in medi-
ation or striking down a legal action for not having recourse to mediation.197
The same could not be applied by a mere sanction of facing legal costs. Clarke
MR observed that ‘there may well be grounds for suggesting that Halsey was
wrong on the Article 6’.198 Equally, Lord Phillips stated that there is a need
for ‘legislation to alter the effect of the decision in Halsey’.199
After Halsey there have been subsequent court interpretations considering
mandatory mediation as contrary to Article 6, eg Hickman v Blake Lapthorn.200
Notwithstanding, according to Clarke MR and Phillips LJ the comments in
Halsey on mandatory mediation were obiter dicta since the question before
the court was not whether mandatory mediation is appropriate, but whether
costs could be imposed on a successful litigant for refusing to engage in
mediation.201 Hence, it appears that the English courts still retain the power
of compelling parties to participate in mediation.
With regard to the second issue ruled in Halsey, the onus of proof of
reasonableness, the Court of Appeal held that it rests on the party seeking
legal costs relief. Lightman LJ strongly disagreed with this view. According
to him, the onus imposed a hurdle in access to justice; thus, he exhorts the
judiciary to reverse the current burden of proof.
While the benefits of mediation may be apparent, it is necessary to explore
how to balance the costs of those who do not reach a settlement in mediation
with those who do.202 In fact, many complain about the costs of unsuccessful
mediation. Clarke MR proposes a general principle whereby the costs of
mediation will be treated as ordinary costs and thus the party with the
stronger case who succeeds in court will be protected against the costs of a
failed mediation.203
According to Genn and others, ‘Facilitation and encouragement together
with selective and appropriate pressure are likely to be more effective and
possibly more efficient than blanket coercion to mediate’.204 Perhaps less
effort should be put into pressuring unwilling parties to mediate and more
into identifying which cases are suitable for mediation and how to encourage
parties to use mediation. Therefore, in certain circumstances the judiciary
should compel parties to participate in mediation, although some limits and
opt outs must be established, particularly when dealing with low value dis-
putes and amongst parties with unequal bargaining power. In these cases, as
well as when mediation becomes mandatory, it is generally understood that
regulation is needed to set boundaries, legal standards and a public monitor-
ing system.205
In general terms, mediation should not be mandatory unless the refusal of
mediation by one of the parties would cause a barrier to access to justice for
the other party, who could not afford the risks and costs of cross-border
litigation. In other cases the reasonableness of refusing mediation in civil
and commercial cases may be examined ex post, ie the judge must take the
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refusal of mediation into account when deciding where to allocate legal costs.
Moreover, the parties and the judge should consider the use of mediation, not
just at early stages of proceedings, since this may not be the best time for
using it, but also at later stages of proceedings.206 This is because lawyers are
often apprehensive about showing weakness by proposing or accepting medi-
ation at an early stage of the legal proceedings. Also, disputants are frequently
hostile to the idea of compromise, particularly in the early stages of litiga-
tion.207 This occurs despite the fact that over 90 per cent of civil cases are
settled by agreement between the disputants,208 although these agreements
rarely occur at an early stage of the litigation process, when mediation may be
more useful.
4.5.3 The way forward
In the context of this book, it is important to question whether these judg-
ments could be applied to online mediation. It may be that, one day, when
consumers initiate cross-border legal actions in their domicile, under the
Brussels Regulation, e-businesses could require a temporary stay of the pro-
ceedings while attempting online negotiation or online mediation. There will
be greater possibilities of staying proceedings when there is an existing con-
tractual clause or when the judge advises the use of online mediation. In any
event, the referral to online mediation should only be ordered when mediators
are accredited by their national authorities and when the referral does not
create new barriers to consumers’ access to justice, eg increasing consumer
costs of redress. In March 2010 the European Court of Justice issued a
preliminary ruling which established that when mediation is only available
online and it is a prerequisite for the admissibility before the courts of actions,
it may hinder the right to effective judicial protection.209
While commentators argue that associating mediation with compulsion
could erode the legitimacy of mediation,210 the use of mandatory mediation
may contribute to changing the perception of people who may then consider
it as a legitimate process, equal to a court process.211 It is necessary for
disputants to be aware of the existence of mediation; furthermore, if medi-
ation is effective it would need to be accompanied by legal and practical
incentives. On balance, it must be noted that mediation is an interest based
dispute resolution rather than right based orientated; this allows parties to
reach original solutions outside of legal provisions but it also raises issues
when applied to B2C in relation to imbalance of power and accountability.
For online mediation to succeed it would also need to be supported by the
judiciary. The Ministry of Justice for England and Wales has run a pilot
project using The Mediation Room.com as a platform for online mediation
for cases awaiting final hearing from the Small Claims Court.212 ODR can be
used to carry out the mediation entirely online or as an extra support tool for
court mediators where the parties may clarify or narrow issues before or after
the mediation.
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There is a need to stress that there is a difference between, on the one
hand, compelling or robustly encouraging parties to go to mediation and,
on the other hand, requiring their continued attendance or requiring them
to settle.213 Moreover, when parties withdraw from mediation the con-
fidentiality of the process does not allow them to inform the judge about their
discussions.214
When considering online mediation as a mandatory step, it is important to
question whether consumers would settle for less than their entitlements and
whether the use of litigation is economically accessible for both parties. It is
necessary to develop policies that set the appropriate balance between self-
determination and persuasion for attending mediation. When dealing with
mandatory or persuasive online mediation it must be ensured that ODR
providers comply with legal minimum standards. For instance, parties may
receive some pressure from the mediator to settle their disputes.215 This
does not justify reaching a settlement through coercion or to allow the
misrepresentation of mediators by making parties believe that the judge
wants a settlement, to the extent that if one party refuses to reach a settle-
ment, the judge will be inclined to rule against the other party.216 This
should be avoided by informing the parties that they cannot be coerced to
settle, and that if this occurs, they may report such coercion to the relevant
authority.217 Irrespective of whether the mediation is carried out online or
offline the mediator’s code of ethics must expressly forbid not only duress
but also more informal pressures.
4.6 Conclusion
Online mediation has the potential to increase access to justice because it
bypasses conflicts of law, it is cheaper, quicker and less stressful than litiga-
tion and it does not remove the right to go to court as a last resort. Online
mediation seems particularly suitable for resolving B2C disputes between
consumers and SMEs where there is a genuine dispute and the power imbal-
ance is not insuperable. Some commentators remain sceptical about the
potential of online mediation but, as a matter of fact, mediation providers
are increasingly moving part of the mediation process to the online realm.218
This trend is not likely to diminish; on the contrary, as the increase of
e-commerce and cross-border disputes continues, the use of online mediation
will undoubtedly grow.
This begs the following question, if online mediation is so beneficial, why
is it not more extensively used? The answer is probably that the main chal-
lenge to mediation is attracting disputants. Before online mediation can gain
credibility, offline mediation must be better understood and valued by the
public.219 Indeed, the best indicator for success is the parties’ willingness to
enter into mediation and the provision of well-trained mediators. Persuasive
incentives may come from self-regulation, for instance trustmarks and feed-
back reviews, or from regulations, such as imposing legal costs.
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Mediation systems are still in their early years in the EU; however, they
project a promising future. To date governments have taken a hands-off
approach in order to promote the development and flexibility of mediation.
Nevertheless, on the one hand an effective regulation at the regional level
might harmonise national laws allowing and promoting the use of online
mediation. On the other hand, there is a concern that any attempt to regulate
mediation could stifle its development. The purpose of the Mediation
Directive has been to promote mediation and ensure the enforcement of
settlements.
This chapter has focused on the incentives that can be taken to encourage
parties to mediate those disputes that are better solved through online
mediation. The following incentives are suggested, as follows.
First, the many benefits of online mediation to resolve online B2C disputes
are strong arguments for legitimating mandatory mediation within clear
limits. This can be achieved through legislation, court rules and contractual
agreements. In this way mediation would truly become part of the litigation
system. However, if courts and lawyers are going to recommend the use of
mediation, it will first be necessary to raise awareness and increase educa-
tion about mediation. The same applies to online mediation. When court
attendance is not practical for the parties, eg for e-commerce disputes, online
mediation could be imposed as a preliminary and mandatory step. It is
unlikely that mandatory mediation violates the fundamental right to access
to a court. Voluntariness is an important aspect of mediation but it should not
be used as a veto for a dispute resolution process which is unknown by many.
The Halsey ruling is an attempt to draw the line on what is a reasonable
request to mediate but it has attracted too many criticisms and it is expected
that, in due course, it will be overruled with a new precedent or legislation.
A European legal framework could establish clear limits for mandatory medi-
ation, especially to mediate B2C disputes. For instance, parties might only be
compelled to participate in one information session, which must be free of
cost for the consumer. Also consumers might be allowed to opt out when a
small claim procedure is available to them.
Secondly, legal standards for online mediation are needed. To that effect
the existing directive should be complemented with the 2001 EC Recom-
mendation, which should be mandatory and supplemented with additional
provisions for online mediation. Furthermore, an accreditation EC body
should monitor compliance of these legal principles by those ODR providers
who are eligible for mandatory mediation. This can be delegated at a national
level. Courts should also contribute to this monitoring.
Thirdly, the courts and governments should encourage parties to use medi-
ation. Hence, mediation should become an integral part of litigation and not
just an ancillary element to it. In other words, it should be available for
everyone contemplating litigation.220 Accordingly, disputants must be well
informed about the different dispute resolution methods. The rules of courts
could follow the English example, allowing for a stay of legal proceedings and
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imposing legal costs when a party unreasonably refuses to participate in
mediation. However, the imposition of legal costs must be approached with
caution. In relation to ODR, we are still at an early stage but it appears that,
given the imbalance of power between consumers and businesses, it would be
more likely that businesses would be ordered to bear the legal costs for
unreasonable refusal rather than consumers. Katsh observed that when medi-
ation emerged in the late 1970s, its growth was accelerated by the recom-
mendation of its use by judges as well as its use in the courts. He suggested
that ODR may expect to follow a similar path in the near future.221
Fourthly, enforcement of mediated settlements must be ensured when
using mandatory mediation in order to avoid bad faith participation; this
could happen where one of the parties attends mediation with the intention
of not complying with a settlement, or attends only in order to obtain
information for use at the litigation stage. Under the Mediation Directive,
all Member States must ensure that cross-border agreements are directly
enforceable. It is expected that online agreements will receive the same
treatment, at least when they derive from bodies approved by the Member
States. It is still unclear what procedural form this recognition will take,
although it has been suggested that mediation agreements could be granted
the same enforceability as that given to arbitral awards.
This chapter has shown that the law in the EU certainly allows for the use
of online mediation. But allowance is not the same as ensuring its use under
national law, or promoting its use by introducing it as a valuable extension
to adjudicative dispute resolution methods, saving time and costs. Greater
research is needed to examine how the law can successfully promote online
mediation. In the next chapter I will explore a possible strategy for the
EU to promote ODR in a more effective manner.
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5 A legal framework to develop
consumer ODR in the EU
A proposal
Whether many disputes will be resolved online is not a matter of ‘If’, but of
‘When’ and ‘How’. The question of exactly when is not of great importance;
time will tell. The question of ‘How’ is what we should focus on.1
5.1 Introduction
The development of sustainable e-commerce requires ODR, given the limita-
tions of traditional court based dispute settlement mechanisms for resolving
online disputes. In the last few years there have been significant efforts to
encourage the use of ODR as a viable alternative to resolve consumer disputes,
in particular disputes arising from use of the internet. However, the develop-
ment of ODR to date seems to be quite modest; even publicly funded and free
of charge services, such as ECODIR, have failed to attract participants. There
is clearly a significant gap between the potential for ODR and its actual use.2
This final chapter examines what legislative role the EU should take in
order further to develop ODR. This chapter suggests that appropriate legal
provisions establishing minimum legal standards for ODR providers will
provide the required confidence in attracting ODR users. It is advocated that
if EU law ensures that private ODR providers are fair and efficient, then
ODR can compete even outside e-commerce on an equal footing with a
government-sponsored judicial system. Some writers challenge this assump-
tion by arguing that the role of law is not to impose legal standards but only
to allow enough room for ODR to develop from the industry.3 However, the
limits of the industry creating ODR standards and the difficulties for ODR
providers to enter into the market support the argument in favour of develop-
ing public ODR standards.
The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the critical question of this book:
whether a legal framework is needed to enhance consumer ODR. The chapter
explores the efficiency and sufficiency of the existing regulatory mechanisms
and the need for developing a European legal framework in the field of ODR
in order to promote the use of fair and effective ODR systems. It seems
obvious that there is a need to regulate consumer ODR, either through the
use of government regulation or industry self-regulation. Presently, the
regulatory strategy is principally being developed through self-regulatory
rather than governmental intervention. However, self-regulation is market
orientated, fulfils private interests and is fragmented.4 This chapter considers
what type of European initiative could contribute to the development of the
ODR market, thus preventing inconsistent standards and regulations arising
within the EU. Even though self-regulation for ODR will be criticised in
this chapter, it is apparent that legislation alone cannot fully regulate ODR.
Therefore, a legal framework in this field must give due consideration to the
need for appropriate legal structures and the importance of allowing party
autonomy and flexibility.
This chapter assesses those questions concerning ODR regulation from a
European perspective, in particular mandatory ODR clauses in electronic
contracts and the enforceability of binding awards reached through ODR
processes, which can only be answered through legislation and cannot be left
to self-regulation.5 This chapter proposes the classification of ODR into two
categories: non-accredited and accredited ODR. On the one hand, non-
accredited ODR will include the existing ODR providers that are developed
by the industry without the support or restrictions of regulation. The use of
accredited ODR, on the other hand, will refer to a new proposed category
of ODR providers that comply with the legal standards set by the EU. The
latter providers will display a pan-European trustmark assuring compliance
with the substantive law and procedural standards. In addition, the use of
accredited ODR will be mandatory and their decisions will be enforceable, if
necessary, by the courts of law.
5.2 The need for a regulatory balance in the field of ODR
5.2.1 Increasing access to justice through ODR
The previous chapter argued that if the legislature and judiciary were more
proactive in encouraging disputants to use ADR and ODR, its use would be
more extensive. As reviewed above, to date their efforts have been limited.
For instance, only in a handful of cases have English judges imposed legal
costs on the party who unreasonably refused to engage in ADR. On the
surface, the main reason for this is that courts are very cautious in denying
access to a legal procedure, particularly to consumers, taking into account
Article 6 of the ECHR and consumer protection laws. It is also possible
to argue that disputants may waive their rights to a fair trial only when the
ODR process is supported by minimum procedural guarantees or it is subject
to review in a body that grants compliance with the due process requirements
expected under Article 6 of the ECHR.6
This is, to some extent, due to the fact that there are no accredited ADR
or ODR mechanisms that provide disputants with similar rights and guaran-
tees as those provided by the judicial system. This can only be changed by
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amending the existing laws, thus requiring parties to participate in accredited
ADR and ODR when disputes are suitable for it, and provided there is no
violation of the right to access justice, ie the parties are forced to participate
in a procedure without due process guarantees or even in a more expensive or
less effective redress mechanism.
It is necessary to revise the concept of access to justice and ‘alternative’
dispute resolution methods. Increasingly, commentators and governments
are considering the new concept of ‘appropriate’ dispute resolution methods.7
Access to justice, as mentioned above, should not be considered as the exist-
ing concept of the right to participate in an adversarial legal procedure in the
public courts, but instead as the right to obtain redress through the most
appropriate dispute resolution mechanism, which with many disputes, par-
ticularly those arising out of electronic transactions, may well be ODR.8 If
ODR is used effectively, it may increase access to justice, making it possible
for consumers and businesses who previously could not take adequate legal
action to resolve their disputes.
The use of ODR is especially needed for the resolution of B2C and cross-
border disputes where face-to-face meetings are not feasible. It is believed
that ODR is particularly useful where the bargaining power of the parties is
not too disproportionate. According to Abernethy, ODR and trustmarks have
a great potential to boost e-commerce where there is a perception that SMEs
and private sellers cannot provide the same level of dispute resolution services
as large online businesses.9 If these disputes are fairly resolved by outsourced
and reputable ODR services, consumers’ confidence in SMEs will increase,
resulting in a more sustainable and competitive e-market.
5.2.2 Failed expectations in ODR
In spite of all the potential, to date ODR has not achieved a widespread
market implementation, save in certain notable exceptions such as Cyber-
Settle and ICANN’s UDRP dispute resolution providers.10 Indeed, many ODR
operators established in the last few years have ceased providing their services,
although some still continue under a different trade name, eg WeCanSettle
changed first to The Claim Room and is now called The Mediation Room.
Throughout this book and elsewhere the reasons that have contributed to the
failure of many ODR programmes have been discussed.11 Amongst the
reasons stated, it has been argued that the development of ODR has been
slowed by the challenge in designing software such that it is ‘complex, time
consuming and costly’.12 Also, the lack of enforceable mechanisms has
decreased the level of trust by disputants in ODR schemes. Consumer services
present further obstacles, including the lack of independent ODR providers
funded by business parties, inequality of bargaining power between the parties
and linguistic barriers.13 Moreover, there is a lack of confidence in the tech-
nology itself and in the law that governs it.14 It has been suggested that to a
large extent these difficulties could be reduced by appropriate technological
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developments and legal changes. This chapter focuses on the second element,
examining what aspects need to be regulated in order to provide awareness
and induce trust in the use of ODR.
5.2.3 Creating a balance between regulation and self-regulation
The legal maturity of ODR depends on a balance between regulation and self-
regulation. In other words, there is a need for legal certainty, quality and
impartiality on the one hand; and there is a need for flexibility and innovation
on the other hand.15 Accordingly, a legal framework for ODR may encourage
the appearance of quality ODR services as well as the creation of awareness
and the increment of trust amongst consumers. However, if a regulation is
too intrusive, it may hinder the progress of the ODR industry because the
law in this area could be technologically exclusive and could rapidly become
outdated.16
Hence, equilibrium between self-regulation and regulation seems to be the
key approach. Governments should carry out this role by implementing indus-
try best practices that take into consideration market and social policies.17
Some aspects such as the type of technology utilised and service charges should
be left open to self-regulation if it is not to curtail the growth of the ODR
industry, since it is plain that the law is very slow in responding to these issues.
A regulatory legitimisation for ODR is also necessary because consumers and
businesses alike would only use ODR schemes if they comply with accepted
socio-legal standards. Furthermore, the establishment of a framework with
legal standards in the ODR field for B2C disputes will increase legal certainty,
thereby facilitating the expansion of proficient and fair ODR methods.
5.2.4 Risks of self-regulation
5.2.4.1 The rise of lex informatica
A similar challenge to that faced today by disputes arising out of e-commerce
occurred in the Middle Ages. The Law Merchant reflected a move away from
jurisdictional law towards a dispute resolution process that applied uni-
versally; it was designed to meet the needs and interests of the individuals
who used it.18 It appeared in the Middle Ages to cover international trade
given the lack of international private law. This so-called lex mercatoria
(or leges mercatorum) did not depend on national laws but on the usages and
customs of international trade, which applied their own laws in ad hoc courts.
As a result, to this day customs and traditional practices represent an import-
ant source in international law,19 being employed by international arbitration
tribunals and public courts.
Cyberspace now faces a similar situation where new regulations are being
developed without the assistance of governments and parliaments. Self-
regulation, understood as market regulation, may take different forms; for
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instance, the online community is developing its own social norms in order to
co-exist in harmony, eg net-etiquette or the law of eBay. Some authors argue
that e-commerce has its own customs and usages which must shape the regu-
lation of ODR, and if ODR is left to the industry to develop, ODR providers
will compete with one another to supply consumers with efficient services.20
Take for example UDRP ODR providers; the law of ICANN is developing
as a legal body on domain names separate from the law of any country or any
international treaty. To some extent the UDRP (self-regulation) is contribut-
ing to harmonise the laws (regulation) regarding domain names. UDRP
panellists add to this process through their decisions and by referring to
previous decisions. It can be argued that, in the same manner that common
law was created from the rulings of the courts, ODR may develop its own
rules and legal precedents by delivering decisions. A similar path is taken by
eBay, which implements its own rules through its own consumer satisfaction
services or even using external dispute resolution mechanisms.21
These self-regulatory initiatives have created rules and standards that will
apply everywhere regardless of the jurisdictional issues. These emerging
self-regulations form part of a new independent legal system (lex informatica)
because they are considered as ‘an autonomous transnational legal system
with its own sources, rules, and dispute resolution methods’.22 Calliess argues
that the harmonisation and growth of ODR will come neither with inter-
national treaties nor with self-regulation but with the use of competitive
dispute resolution services that create their own norms, which Calliess refers
to as a ‘competitive legal pluralism’.23 This type of market regulation is
necessary because it contributes to legal harmonisation and it accelerates the
globalisation and development of ODR.
5.2.4.2 The limits of self-regulation
Self-regulation is thus necessary to develop a regulatory system. Indeed, creat-
ing new rules or transplanting offline rules to the online world without
taking into account industry and social practices cannot prove effective.24 The
flexibility of self-regulation is needed to allow the industry to adapt quickly
to technological and market changes. However, when there is inequality of
bargaining power, such as in the case of B2C disputes, a balance should be
reached between two aspects: fairness and effectiveness. This is not always an
easy task and it may require some type of trade-off.25 In this regard, there is a
clear clash between fairness, ie procedural quality to attain just decisions and
access to justice, ie cost-effective dispute resolution systems.26
Corporations generally defend market self-regulatory approaches, arguing
that the market will be able to create effective ODR services and that regula-
tion would be too slow to match the growth of technology. These liberal ideas
maintain that ‘by the time any law promoting or regulating ODR came into
effect, the e-commerce environment and technology would likely have
changed so much that the law would be irrelevant at best or an obstacle to
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progress at worst’.27 By contrast, consumers’ advocates have argued that if
left to self-regulation, the playing field will be seriously biased in favour of
corporations since they often pay the bills for ODR services, use them repeat-
edly and choose the providers.28 It is reasonable to fear that, if allowed, some
corporations could make ODR mandatory, thereby excluding consumers’
right to access court and consumer class actions.29 This is particularly alarm-
ing when there are concerns over the lack of impartiality and independence
of extrajudicial dispute resolution providers. Consumers’ representatives
also warn that ODR providers could require fees from consumers in order
to discourage them from using ODR, although businesses’ representatives
justified these charges as a means to discourage frivolous claims.30
5.2.4.3 The need for government intervention to set boundaries
The lack of regulation may create difficulties for consumers in finding quality
ODR services.31 Arguably, self-regulation in the ODR field may be regarded
as a biased type of regulation if it is designed by only some of the stakeholders
(businesses). Teitz observes that ‘the regulation of legal services, including
dispute resolution, need not be delegated wholly to the professional organiza-
tions that incorporate a degree of self-interest’.32 Without public control self-
regulatory functions may be subjugated to industry demands. Governments
therefore have the role of verifying the soundness of self-regulatory rules.33
Many commentators particularly from the US have expressed greater trust
in industry and in a competitive market in order to establish ODR standards,
even for tackling B2C disputes. According to Pearlstein:
[in the same manner that] consumer organizations can help balance
deceptive retailer behavior, and unions can help balance overbearing
employers, emergence of privately ordered dispute resolution will doubt-
less be accompanied by privately created protections. And the market
itself can help promote fairness and weed out those who attempt to take
advantage.34
Other authors are more sceptical about the suitability of the market alone for
developing ODR. Thornburg warns about the perils of self-regulation, stat-
ing that ‘faster is not always better. Cheap is not always fair or accurate.
Market power is not always used to achieve the public good. And the power
to make the rules is often the power to win the game’.35 Market abuses can
only be controlled by public laws. Katsh correctly observes that ‘[t]he emer-
gence of some standards overseen by the state is still quite conceivable’.36
Consumers International has also highlighted the need for developing inter-
national legal standards in the field of B2C ODR.37 It proposed the creation of
a universal third party accreditation system, the monitoring of providers and
the publication of ODR decisions.
Given the current standstill of ODR, the adoption of a self-regulatory
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approach is increasingly being questioned by some commentators who
suggest that ODR needs to be regulated. In this regard, Morek notes that the
ODR market is different:
[t]he hands-off approach . . . could be effective if the market had just
emerged and many new players were appearing. For a developed market,
this approach could be effective if clients derived benefits from real com-
petition between businesses. However, this is not the ODR market of
today. This is a market of insufficient information and limited client
choice. ODR providers experience difficulties getting new cases.38
According to Edwards, extrajudicial ODR carries serious public policy con-
cerns because it represents a form of private justice outside the sphere of
public law.39 Furthermore, Trans Atlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD) does
not believe that the voluntarily-led market alone is sufficient to address the
problems arising from e-commerce.40 TACD urges the EU and the US to
ensure that private dispute resolution services meet certain standards set by
governments.41 It appears plain that ODR is not a typical service and certain
procedural aspects need to be regulated in order to deliver fair resolutions and
increase trust amongst potential users.42
5.2.5 The objective of regulating ODR
Schultz observes that it is a misconception that the internet developed with-
out regulation and that because ODR takes place on the internet then ODR
does not need regulation in order to function appropriately.43 The internet
depends mainly on self-regulation but, following the bursting of the dot-com
bubble at the dawn of the new millennium, governments have started seeking
greater control over the internet in an effort to uphold their national laws
and priorities.44 This is increasingly happening in other spheres related to
e-commerce, including online gambling, taxation, privacy, child protection,
pornography, money laundering and terrorism.45
Regulation, in my view, must as a minimum allow the use of ODR but it
should go further and encourage the use of quality ODR by giving incentives
to appropriate disputants and providing suitable enforcement mechanisms.
However, it has been observed that if ODR is regulated by national laws it
may only benefit national ODR providers and users while at the same time
creating obstacles for foreign providers and users.46 The ideal approach is to
co-regulate between governments, pursuing common standards but leaving
the implementation of some of these standards to the national authorities.
The EU works in this manner through directives (establishing and co-
supervising common goals but letting Member States decide how to achieve
the goals) and regulations (establishing legal provisions common for all
Member States that are believed to be necessary for the development of the
internal market).
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Regulation and self-regulation have the same objective in creating norms
and standards for ODR, ie ensuring fairness, increasing trust, providing legal
certainty etc. The mechanisms for enforcing these standards, however, vary.
Regulation, on the one hand, corrects non-compliance through public
entities which are accountable. In addition, these public entities are often
trusted and they can use public enforcement resources, ie the courts. Self-
regulation, on the other hand, leaves it to the market to correct the breach of
standards but without political accountability.
Currently, self-regulation and government intervention have different
weights, depending on the jurisdiction. For instance, self-regulation is
shaping ODR in the US and the EU, although there have been some regula-
tory initiatives promoting ADR and ODR in the EU, such as the Mediation
Directive, which do not have a counterpart in the US.47 It is a question of
time before governments and courts in both countries develop a set of
bottom-line principles. According to Schultz, ‘[t]he best regulation for ODR
is, in my view, minimal regulation which is strictly and publicly enforced; it
provides for trust and at the same time it leaves room for development’.48
5.2.6 International initiatives
There is currently no general legal framework for ADR at either the inter-
national or regional, or even national level. The creation of a general legal
framework on ADR might be a positive step forward; this is particularly
urgent in less developed countries, where the use of ADR may have very little
public support.49 The same legal lacuna appears in the ODR field where there
is no clear uniform regulation.50 There are, however, numerous specific initia-
tives from private industry and there is a tendency to proceed towards
increased regulation and institutionalisation. In a report from the OECD it
was stated that:
Despite the diversity of mechanisms and legal cultures that exist in
Member countries, a consensus exists on the need for common princi-
ples setting out the main characteristics of effective consumer dispute
resolution and redress systems.51
So why do we need legal standards for ODR? According to Rule, a need for
ODR standards is based on six factors:52
(i) There is a clear need for redress in B2C transactions in order to boost
e-commerce, particularly, cross-border trade.
(ii) It is difficult for consumers to get information about ODR.
(iii) The existing legal infrastructure is not completely well adapted to deal
with B2C transactions.
(iv) ODR is often related to legal rights, ie right to trial and due process.
(v) There is an imbalance of power between consumers and businesses.
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(vi) There is a potential for abuse of ODR by stronger parties in the dispute,
ie businesses.
According to Kaufmann-Kohler and Schultz, the main ODR stakeholders
(ie governments, business organisations, consumer organisations and institu-
tions of dispute resolution) want to promote ODR, but they have different
views on what the objectives of ODR should be.53 They argue that govern-
ments want to increase consumer access to justice by providing ODR, thus
decreasing court congestion and contributing a boost to e-commerce. Business
organisations are interested in developing ODR to resolve disputes quickly,
increase confidence and, consequently, to augment revenues. Consumer orga-
nisations want to achieve consumer redress, particularly for those disputes that
cannot be resolved through another dispute resolution method. Lastly, dispute
resolution providers would like to offer cutting edge ODR services in order to
compete against other providers. As a result, all of the above stakeholders
contribute to the development of ODR policy, based on their own priorities.
During the past decade a number of recommendations and guidelines
were issued with the objective of promoting ADR and ODR participation.
Governments overall have largely come out in favour of ODR in the B2C
context and they have recognised that ODR should be the default means of
redress for B2C disputes arising out of e-commerce. Among the existing
initiatives from international governmental bodies the most influential is the
OECD’s Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the Context of Electronic
Commerce and the subsequent report on Consumer Dispute Resolution in
the Global Market Place.54 These guidelines were complemented in July
2007 by a recommendation on B2C dispute resolution.55 The OECD has
consistently encouraged the promotion of ODR, and it has suggested that the
main obstacle for the development of ODR is national differences in existing
legal frameworks on ADR, such as differences as to the validity of ADR
clauses, enforceability of settlements, procedural principles and so on.56 The
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) is
also working on uniform legal provisions for ADR in commercial matters
and it is recently considering the development of ODR standards for the
resolution of B2B and B2C e-commerce disputes.57
In addition, business organisations have taken initiatives in this area with
the aim of promoting e-commerce and shielding themselves from liability
and court procedures.58 The most relevant initiatives were issued by the
Alliance for Global Business,59 the Global Business Dialogue on Electronic
Commerce60 and the International Chamber of Commerce.61 Consumer
organisations have also contributed to the development of ODR policies,
notably the Trans-Atlantic Consumer Dialogue,62 Consumers International63
and the International Consumer Protection and Enforcement Network.64
Finally, dispute resolution providers have contributed to the development of
ODR standards, eg the American Bar Association Taskforce on E-Commerce
and ADR Recommended Best Practices for ODR Providers.65 This chapter
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does not intend to discuss these initiatives since they have already been
discussed elsewhere;66 moreover, the majority of these provisions are reflected
in the EC recommendations, which are examined below in this chapter.
5.2.7 Regional regulatory initiatives
At a regional level the EU has produced a number of legal instruments
harmonising ADR/ODR and highlighting their potential for resolving con-
sumer disputes. The legal basis rests on Article 81 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU, which replaces Article 65(a) of
the EC Treaty) that states that ADR procedures must be effective and
developed. It also states that Member States have the obligation to co-operate
in judicial matters, ie in the enforcement of ADR decisions within the EC.67
The first major initiative to improve consumer access to justice came in
November 1993 with the Green Paper which surveyed national measures,
addressed the particular problems of cross-border disputes and suggested a
number of strategies for improving dispute resolution in the internal mar-
ket.68 Thereafter, the 1996 Action Plan on consumer access to justice and the
settlement of consumer disputes in the internal market stated the intention
to establish minimum criteria applicable to the handling of cross-border
disputes and the networking of out of court procedures.69 There are also a
number of directives that encourage the use of ADR for resolving consumer
disputes.70 With the introduction of the E-Commerce Directive, the EU
acknowledged the growth of ADR and ODR, giving indications to the
Member States to support their use for the resolution of consumer disputes.
Article 17 of the directive states that:
[Member States must ensure that their national] . . . legislation does not
hamper the use of out-of-court schemes, available under national law, for
dispute settlement, including appropriate electronic means [. . .] Member
States shall encourage bodies responsible for the out-of-court settlement
of, in particular, consumer disputes to operate in a way which provides
adequate procedural guarantees for the parties concerned. [Emphasis added]
This paragraph begs the following question: what are those ‘adequate pro-
cedural guarantees’ referred to in the directive? It could be suggested
that the directive requires the development of due process standards for
ODR. In the EU the closest measures to those standards are two non-binding
recommendations issued by the European Commission with the intention of
guiding industry and governments in creating harmonised rules for ADR
and ODR.71 First, the EC 1998 Recommendation sets out a body of prin-
ciples for the correct use of adjudicative processes where a neutral third
party makes a decision, evaluation or recommendation to resolve consumer
disputes. This recommendation includes those ODR providers who issue
decisions that are not binding or are only binding as a contract and not as
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an arbitral award. Secondly, the EC 2001 Recommendation was issued to
set minimum legal standards on consensual processes dealing with consumer
disputes, where the neutral third party does not venture a decision, evaluation
or recommendation.72 This recommendation has been complemented by
additional initiatives. Of particular significance is the Green Paper of
19 April 2002 that opened a broad discussion on consensual ADR and ODR
in civil and commercial matters.73 This document has been the basis for
consultation on the main issues related to consensual ADR and ODR in
order to establish common standards within the EU, thus promoting the
development of a uniform legislation by all Member States. In the Green
Paper the Commission referred to the development of ADR and ODR as a
‘political priority’.74 The result of this consultation formed the blueprint for
the Mediation Directive.75
Currently, under EU law, provisions referring to ADR also include ODR;
this questions the fitness of the law, particularly when these standards
were developed by using existing ADR law and practices without offering a
thorough and interdisciplinary study on the special nature of ODR.76 More-
over, the EU initiatives are in their majority soft laws which complement
neutral third parties’ professional codes of conduct and the internal rules of
ODR providers. In summary, the existing regulation on ODR has similar
problems to the self-regulatory approach: it is scattered, patchy, non-binding
and sets confusing procedural standards that apply to ODR as well as ADR.77
The next section argues that these problems may be addressed by drafting a
regulation in the specific field of ODR.
5.3 Proposal for a regulation in the field of ODR
5.3.1 The purpose of regulating ODR at the EU level
Member States may enter into negotiations with each other with a view to
securing the simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition
of extra-judicial processes, including ODR.78 In fact, Article 81 of the TFEU
states that:
The Union shall develop judicial cooperation in civil matters having
cross-border implications, based on the principle of mutual recognition
of judgments and of decisions in extrajudicial cases. Such cooperation
may include the adoption of measures for the approximation of the laws
and regulations of the Member States.79
Accordingly, the European Parliament and Council must introduce regula-
tory measures not only to ensure the mutual recognition of ODR decisions
but also to achieve a greater co-operation with the cross-border service of
documents and to promote ‘the development of alternative methods of
dispute settlement’.80
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The need for uniform legal standards is not new. Back in 2003 the
European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs and Internal Markets
acknowledged the importance of flexibility in ADR but recognised that
‘there is a need for coherence, common procedural guarantees and common
quality standards in order to protect consumers and avoid a proliferation of
differing systems as between the Member States’.81 Nevertheless, legal provi-
sions should not be too detailed since this could constrain the functioning
of ODR providers. These principles, in my view, should only be binding on
those providers who rely on public accreditation. The committee also recom-
mended the issuing of soft laws, including the ‘issuance of guidelines and
codes of conduct, and through the promotion of best practice’.82
According to Stipanowich, ‘the very notion of a “law of ADR”, however
well-intended, strikes some as oxymoronic. When it comes to ADR, the
implementing law is not an end in itself, but only a means to be prudently
employed within the narrow bounds of necessity’.83 According to him, any
type of broad regulation in the field of ADR presents a great challenge to
legislators who face this task, because of the large degree of flexibility and the
range of ADR processes.84 The same of course would apply in ODR schemes.
For this reason, he argues, legislatures have focused on specific process tax-
onomies, particularly with arbitration and mediation. He proposes for the US
the compilation of principles in the form of restatements, setting legal prin-
ciples to identify and promote the most effective legal standards in three
different forms of dispute resolution, namely binding arbitration, mediation
and non-binding third party decision-making. In his view this should ‘include
grounds for and scope of enforcement, judicial appointment of interveners,
immunity of interveners, confidentiality, the legal effect of awards or other
“results” of procedures, and grounds for judicial review or vacatur, if any’.85
The situation in the EU is quite different, particularly when dealing with
B2C disputes. In the EU there is a greater integration than in the US in terms
of consumer protection. As a matter of fact the European Commission is keen
to encourage the use of ADR methods and monitor their compliance with the
existing recommendations.86 However, it is here proposed that the European
Commission should take a step forward by developing a regulation with
legal standards for extra-judicial ODR. The existing procedural standards
(eg Recommendations 1998/257/EC and 2001/310/EC and the Mediation
Directive) as well as industry initiatives in the field of ODR could form the
blueprint for this proposal. An EC legal instrument could require accredited
ODR bodies to comply with the existing consumer law and the established
procedural requirements. If this is carried out appropriately, it will assist
consumers in identifying reliable ODR providers, it will encourage the use
of ODR methods and it will assist in the enforcement of decisions from
accredited ODR bodies. A legal framework on ODR should be technologic-
ally neutral at the same time as being broad enough in order to survive
technological changes. This is not an easy challenge because if the law is too
broad and imprecise it may not fulfil its regulatory role.87
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A European regulation seems to be the best approach to ensure a uniform
compliance with minimum standards across the EU. The regulation must be
drafted as far as possible with the consensus amongst all the stakeholders, in
particular businesses and consumers. Before the creation of this regulation it
might be advisable to issue a green paper to open an interdisciplinary discus-
sion with the main stakeholders, primarily involving the participation of
consumer associations, chambers of commerce and dispute resolution service
providers. The Green Paper should be a follow-up to the one issued in 2002
but it should be more extensive and it should differentiate between ODR and
ADR, as well as between consensual and binding adjudicative processes.
Some Member States have already introduced regulations which constrain
the development of ODR by regulating ADR and introducing consumer
protection policies based on the minimum standards approach taken by the
EU. As a result, there are divergent positions within the EU.88 The regulation
should therefore contribute towards restricting a regulatory spiral from the
Member States that could prematurely over-regulate or restrict the use
of ODR.
5.3.2 The need to increase awareness of ODR
A challenge faced by consumers is to identify ODR providers. The European
Commission has built a database with the links of the national ADR and
ODR providers that comply with the two recommendations mentioned
above.89 It is worth reiterating that all the approved services are ADR institu-
tions and only a number of them also provide ODR services.90 However, a
recent independent report for the EU has noted that not all the approved
national ADR and ODR services comply with the recommendations.91 This
shows that monitoring and regulating minimum standards are essential tools
to ensure that ODR complies with due process principles. Currently, there is
no body charged with the responsibility of assuring compliance. This could
be done at the national level by the European Consumer Centres (ECCs) and
Eurochambers, with the co-ordination of a single European entity, such as the
European Commission or the European Judicial Network (EJN). The same
strategy could take place through equivalent bodies in other regions. For
example the Better Business Bureau (BBB) could play a similar role in the
US, while the International Consumer Advisory Network (ICA-Net) could
provide such a role in Asia and the Pacific Region.
The parties, businesses and consumer representatives, or other indepen-
dent institutions, including online market places, government agencies and
trustmark providers, may refer cases to accredited ODR providers. In addi-
tion intermediaries, such as lawyers, consumer organisations and chambers of
commerce, may influence the type of dispute resolution sought by the par-
ties.92 When the referral is done through the website the main method used is
the affiliation to trustmarks.93 However, the proliferation of trustmarks has
unfortunately introduced some confusion. The EU has the necessary resources
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to set up a public trustmark, thus ensuring the recognition and uniformity of
a pan-European trustmark.
5.3.2.1 The aim of accreditation
Most commentators agree that trust is an essential ingredient for the devel-
opment of ODR. Part of this trust enhancement would come by creating
perceptions of reliability through accrediting ODR providers and practi-
tioners.94 With regard to the accreditation of practitioners, neutral third
parties should meet ‘certain levels of education, training, or performance’.95
Currently, in the EU there are many different standards and codes of conduct
in the field of ADR, which are also applied in ODR, eg the European Code
of Conduct for Mediation. However, none of them is compulsory or ensures
compliance. According to Conley Tyler and Bornstein’s research, ‘[m]ost ODR
sites have formal policies and procedures, including dispute management
protocols, standards of conduct, codes of practice, and explicit policies on
privacy’.96 Furthermore, ODR service providers apply the ‘more favourable
rights’ provision when dealing with B2C disputes. For instance, the Chartered
Institute of Arbitrators has a provision whereby B2C disputes resolved using
online arbitration will apply the set of rules (applicable law or code of con-
duct) that is the most favourable to the consumer.97
Conley Tyler and Bornstein observe that, on the one hand, there are several
factors in favour of accrediting ODR neutrals, such as increasing credibility
of services, ensuring consumer protection, obtaining similar level of skills
among neutrals and so on.98 On the other hand, they observe that there are
also issues against accreditation, such as imposing education over natural
skills and experience, inhibiting the development of innovative programmes,
and legal or practical difficulties in accrediting at a cross-border level.99
There are two ways of accrediting neutrals, either through an ODR service
provider, or through an external accrediting agency. The two options are valid
provided there is always an external control, such as an agency accrediting
ODR service providers.100 It appears that for most ADR providers it would
be feasible to add ODR services and to give the initial neutral training at a
low cost.101 What is less clear is whether an ADR provider will go online to
resolve B2C disputes without previously being assured of strong connections
with e-commerce stakeholders.
With regard to the accreditation of ODR providers, consumers need to be
informed when entering into a dispute about which ODR provider will
be more suitable for resolving their disputes.102 Schultz proposes a regulatory
framework establishing an accreditation service by a trusted public institu-
tion. In addition, according to him, this public institution could offer access
to accredited providers; thus, if a provider does not comply with the reg-
ulatory requirements, it will be removed from the list of service providers,
which would reduce the ODR’s chances of referrals.103 He observes that ‘[a]n
accreditation system induces trust because it provides an assessment of the
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providers’.104 The accreditation institution could grant a trustmark to ODR
providers that comply with procedural and substantive rules, such as due pro-
cess principles and consumer protection laws. The procedural aspects could
be set in the proposed regulation based on the EC Recommendations, the
Mediation Directive and industry best practices, while substantive issues are
being codified in the forthcoming Directive on Consumer Rights.105
As stated above, this is currently being effected in an informal manner
by the European Commission, which publishes a list of those providers
that have been approved by the Member States. However, the existing struc-
ture is rather limited, since providers have to comply only with unsupervised
recommendations and do not display a trustmark.
Bordone has adapted Sander’s initiative of a multi-door court house.106 He
has proposed the creation of a gateway entry point with experts who would
help disputants assess the nature of a dispute and would recommend a menu
of possible ODR options.107 He suggests building a strong feedback and
evaluation system to assess areas of weakness where further changes are neces-
sary. Schultz also proposes the use of clearing houses, which would control
access to ODR providers.108 Therefore, in addition to offering a trustmark, it
would be the portal to such providers. Moreover, clearing houses can help
the claimant to choose the most appropriate provider and assist consumers
filling in the forms.109 Although, there have been previous failed attempts, a
successful initiative would be worth pursuing.110
According to Schultz, a clearing house ought to have a reputation system
built in, where ODR users rate their satisfaction with each of the ODR
providers.111 However, it can be argued that this suggestion may not be
effective when using adjudicative procedures, owing to the fact that unsuc-
cessful parties will rarely give positive feedback. In adjudicative methods,
fairness and trust may be assured by the publication of decisions. By contrast,
when using consensual methods or highly automated procedures, feedback
may be essential in increasing effectiveness in the system.
5.3.2.2 The Internet Ombudsman
Once cross-border B2C disputes arise in the EU, consumers will first attempt
to resolve them directly with the business. If unsuccessful, consumers may
approach the European Consumer Centre (ECC) in their country, which will
try to resolve their disputes by advising them of their rights and then trying
to resolve their disputes by contacting the businesses (with the assistance, if
necessary, of the national ECC where businesses reside). The ECC has proven
to be quite efficient, with a rate of 70 per cent of resolved cases,112 although
the number of complaints is proportionately small when compared with the
size of the internal market.113 However, in the remaining 30 per cent it is very
difficult to persuade businesses to use ODR,114 especially when it is recom-
mended by the ECC, an entity that represents consumers’ interests. The only
alternative left is to seek a resolution in the court, which when dealing with
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cross-border disputes is not always a feasible option. Part of the efforts of the
ECC is to find a suitable ODR service that could be used as an additional
filter before recourse to the court, because the majority of disputants with
cross-border disputes will not be able to access the courts. In this context The
Internet Ombudsman (TIO) pilot project was born.
In Ireland and the UK, the national ECCs have started to work as clearing
houses for B2C disputes between UK web traders and Irish consumers, and
vice versa.115 The ECC recommended the use of ODR once the ECC  failed in
resolving the dispute on behalf of the consumer. TIO operated on a six month
pilot phase with the ECC. It was a free ODR provider for B2C disputes,
excluding airline travel disputes. TIO is powered by The Mediation Room
and offers disputants online mediation.116 ECC (UK and Ireland) also assisted
consumers with their technical and legal questions. If during the mediation
process the parties did not succeed in reaching an agreement, a decision was
taken through an adjudicatory process by an ombudsman who assessed the
joint discussions, except those caucuses conducted in private areas (to which
one of the parties did not have access). The decision was not binding on the
consumer; however, it was binding on the business when the business had
previously agreed to be bound by the decision.
The TIO procedure was operational from January to June 2008. Its main
challenge was finding cases because businesses were reluctant to participate
owing to a lack of trust in these new services. Graham Ross, CEO of TIO,
stated that TIO approached businesses by informing them that ODR is
cheaper than the Small Claims Court where, even if they win a case, busi-
nesses cannot recover most of their legal costs.117 However, in most cases
businesses know that consumers will not take legal action if the value of the
claim is small, bearing in mind the costs of the small claims track. In order to
overcome this difficulty, it is necessary to devise a system where the use of
independent ODR is mandatory.
5.3.2.3 Proposal for a European trustmark
Trust is essential for the development of ODR and e-commerce.118 Trust-
marks were designed to boost consumer confidence but to date they have not
achieved their expected potential. Existing ODR providers have a varying
degree of reliance on trustmarks; for example, SmartSettle has no trustmark,
CyberSettle has several and SquareTrade used to offer its own trustmark.
The numerous existing trustmarks and the lack of a predominant marketing
campaign have led to some confusion amongst consumers.119 Arguably,
trustmarks need to be addressed at a national or regional level by public
authorities in order to eradicate the existing confusion amongst internet
users. Currently, the various trustmarks may even be giving the opposite
signal, that of distrust, since there are too many trustmarks and too little
knowledge of their existence and credibility.120 There is a need for uniformity
that could then be used to accredit businesses and ODR providers alike. In
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my view, a pan-European trustmark, if complemented with public accredita-
tion, will boost the development of ODR by increasing awareness, overcoming
the deficiencies in self-regulation, providing uniform standards and ensuring
quality ODR services.
This idea of a public trustmark is not new; for instance, the Spanish
Government created a trustmark (Confianza En Linea) that is issued by the
National Consumer Association. It assures impartiality and a complaint
process free of cost.121 Public accreditation of ODR providers could then
certify their compliance with standards of due process. At the EU level a
supervisory body could monitor the compliance of certified ODR providers to
ensure that they comply with a regulation. This would avoid potential
providers certifying themselves unfairly in order to attract more users.122 It is
suggested, as mentioned above, that there should be a division of extra-
judicial ODR providers into accredited and non-accredited ODR providers,
who would be distinguished by the inclusion or exclusion of a pan-European
trustmark. This would allow for the establishment of private ODR providers.
The EU has actively encouraged the use of trustmarks since the 1999
eEurope initiative of the European Commission.123 The European Trustmark
Requirements were set in 2000 with the e-confidence initiative. A number of
trustmarks and international codes emerged from this initiative: GBDe
guidelines, Eurolabel, Trusted Shops, Global Trustmark Alliance and Web-
Trader. Euro-Label, for instance, offers ODR to assist in the resolution of
cross-border disputes.124 Euro-Label is currently run by six national registra-
tion offices in Austria, France, Italy, Germany, Poland and Spain. However,
Euro-Label has not been able to achieve enough users to become recognised
within the EU. A likely reason for this is that Euro-Label has received limited
economic support from the EU. Public bodies, such as the ECC, could con-
tribute in the promotion of the proposed pan-European trustmark and must
absorb as many existing trustmarks as possible. This effort could also be
carried out at an international level by reaching a compromise to overcome
the failed attempt with the Global Trustmark Alliance (GTA).
According to the European Commission, in the creation of most of the
existing trustmarks the involvement of consumers’ input was minimal.125 Ini-
tially, the European Trustmark Requirements were to be to certify with a single
European logo those providers as long as they complied with a European Code
of Conduct. The view of the European Commission was that such a scheme
would be backed financially by industry, but this was not achieved.126 The lack
of success in achieving market implementation suggests that a regulatory ini-
tiative would be more successful. Public funding and control of the trustmark
seems more appropriate.127 An obvious body to carry out this role is the ECC,
which already links consumers with 400 ADR bodies across the EU.128
Thus, the European Trustmark Requirements could be the blueprint for
the new pan-European Trustmark. Those online businesses and ODR pro-
viders that adhere to it will have to comply with EU legislation. Accredited
online businesses will have the responsibility to provide online access to an
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in-house complaints system and information on a chosen accredited ODR.
Accredited providers will then be able to deliver legally enforceable agree-
ments that may rely on public enforcement. Therefore, the reference of a
public pan-European system will flag accredited ODR providers that abide
by pre-established legal standards.
5.3.3 Mandatory ODR clauses
There is a need to enhance the use of ODR for cross-border B2C disputes
arising out of internet trading. A good way to increase its use would be
through mandatory ODR clauses, which would need to be addressed in legis-
lation.129 Currently, under EU law, parties in B2C disputes must agree on
using ODR after the dispute has arisen, which is very difficult given the
existing lack of trust between the parties once disputes have arisen. However,
it has been argued that ODR is not sufficiently developed to be mandatory
and that if imposed on consumers it might undermine their confidence.130 As
a result, most mandatory ODR providers employing adjudicative methods
have integrated self-enforcement mechanisms and allow parties to commence
legal proceedings, eg through the UDRP.
In relation to consensual methods, the Directive on Mediation encourages
the use of consensual ODR. As discussed in the previous chapter, an effective
way of encouraging parties to consider the use of consensual ADR has been
timidly adopted by the English civil procedure, which informs litigants that
they should consider the use of ADR, to the extent that if its consideration
is refused unreasonably by one party, the judge has discretion to impose
legal fees on that party regardless of whether the party is successful in the
legal proceedings.131 This situation raises a number of issues that were dis-
cussed in Chapter 4. The greatest difficulty, is to establish when mediation is
appropriate. Research in this area would be relevant, particularly if it delivers
some type of guidelines assisting the judiciary and the legislature in
appropriately encouraging litigants to settle their disputes in a speedy and
consensual manner.
With respect to adjudicative processes, such as arbitration, their use should
be restricted when the purpose is to circumvent the enforcement of con-
sumers’ rights in the courts.132 Hence, if pre-dispute arbitration is allowed in
consumer disputes, it ought to comply with consumer law.
Mandatory clauses must have limits, especially when businesses as repeated
players have the advantages of selecting the ODR providers. In addition, it is
not surprising that consumer advocates maintain that consumers should not
be required to waive their legal rights or be restricted from resorting to other
means of recourse if they are dissatisfied with an arbitral award.133 Although
this might appear safer while ODR is developing, it has its own limitations,
as many businesses will not be willing to engage in a process that may only
delay a final resolution. In my view, decisions from accredited ODR providers
should be enforceable but online appeals should also be allowed. If these
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providers comply with due process principles, why not treat them as such, ie
akin to judicial decisions? This is something that would need support from
the legislature. A regulation could establish the limits where consumers may
have to waive their legal rights in accessing the courts, but only when the
accredited ODR service facilitates parties’ access to justice, in other words,
when it is more cost-efficient for the parties to access an accredited ODR than
the competent court.
There are a number of bills in the US legislature that aim to stop abuses
of arbitration. The most notable ones are the Arbitration Fairness Act and
the Fair Arbitration Act. Of these, the former requires agreements to arbitrate
consumer and employment disputes to be entered after the dispute has
arisen.134 In addition, the validity or enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate
will be determined by the courts and not by an arbitrator. Conversely, the
Fair Arbitration Act grants several specific due process rights to all consumers
in arbitration proceedings.135 Under this bill, in order to be enforceable an
arbitration clause must have a printed heading in bold capital letters entitled
‘arbitration clause’.136 It must provide notice that consumers could opt for
the small claims court procedure if the claim does not exceed US$50,000.137
The bill gives the consumer the right to have the arbitrator governed by the
law that would apply under the conflict of laws principles applicable in the
consumer’s forum.138 This would avoid the evasion of judicial scrutiny and
circumvent consumer protection statutes. Other rights provided by the Act
include the right to be legally represented, the right to a fair hearing (even to
conduct discovery) and the right to a written resolution. The bill also requires
a timely arbitral award; to that end, where the defendant must file an answer
within 30 days, the arbitrator must hold a hearing (using electronic means if
deemed necessary) within 90 days, and where the final reasoned decision must
be rendered within 30 days after the hearing.139 Some lessons could be learned
from this bill and be applied in the EU law context to the proposal for a
regulation in the field of ODR.
Consequently, as discussed in Chapter 3, some arbitration services in the
US offer consumers the choice of opting out from arbitration when they prefer
to pursue the matter in the small claims court, regardless of any contractual
clause.140 Similarly, the England and Wales Arbitration Act 1996 and the
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulation 1999 also allow pre-dispute
consumer arbitration clauses but only when the amount at stake is more
than £5000, ie the economic threshold for the small claims track.141 The
Office of Fair Trading has consistently required businesses to delete pre-
dispute binding arbitration clauses below this threshold. Accordingly, the
Ford and ABTA business members of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators
only use post-dispute agreements for consumers and pre-dispute agreements
for businesses.142
Overall, arbitration clauses should be enforceable provided they do not
intend to reduce the capacity of the consumer to access to justice by intro-
ducing new barriers, such as unreasonable costs or geographic barriers. For
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instance, as suggested by the law in the US and in the UK, if an ODR clause
mandates that parties participate in an ODR procedure that is more expen-
sive than the small claims procedure, then that clause should be invalidated.
Another limitation that must not be allowed is when the contractual clause
impedes consumers from taking class actions, which might already be
considered unfair under Directive 13/93. Therefore, clearer guidelines must
be given to explain what constitutes equitable ODR clauses in consumer
contracts,143 rather than having a blank ban on all clauses as it currently states
in the proposed Directive on Consumer Rights.144
5.3.4 Procedural legal standards for accredited ODR
5.3.4.1 Arbitration and other adjudicative processes
The EC Directive on Electronic Commerce allows contracts to be concluded
by electronic means.145 But does the directive include clauses that require the
parties to engage in an ODR process when disputes arise out of their elec-
tronic contracts? As discussed in Chapter 3 it appears that there may be
certain limits, particularly when using B2C online arbitration. Policy makers
in the EU are cautious not to replicate the abusive arbitral clauses in the US,
where statistics often show how consumer arbitration is not used for the
benefit of consumers; on the contrary, the majority of cases are brought by
businesses against consumers.146 It is not essential for governments to provide
these arbitration services, but what is essential is that governments authorise
and supervise these services. If the industry actively participates in the devel-
opment of ODR, it will favour competition between ODR providers to sup-
ply cost-effective services. Thus, private (including for profit) ODR providers
should be allowed, although minimum legal standards should be put in place
when mandatory adjudicative processes are imposed on consumers.
It is necessary to open a debate in the EU on this matter in order to
decide which aspects should be regulated and which aspects should be left
unregulated. Certain procedural aspects can be left to the parties to decide
but others need to be upheld by the law in order to ensure fair decisions.147
Naturally, binding arbitration processes would require more procedural
guarantees, especially when an imbalance of bargaining power exists. In this
context, online arbitration would need to be supervised either by govern-
mental bodies or monitored by the courts.
The most relevant legal instrument at the EU level is the 1998 Recom-
mendation,148 which identifies seven legal principles that must be followed in
consumer adjudicative processes and in those dispute resolution processes
where the neutral party plays an active role in making a decision or a recom-
mendation. It has been proposed above that this recommendation be adapted
to ODR and become binding in the form of a regulation for those ODR
providers that are accredited with the pan-European trustmark. This does not
mean that soft laws are unnecessary; on the contrary, this change should
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also be complemented by soft laws, both public and private.149 It is worth
examining the seven principles stated in the Recommendation, and how
they could be applied to ODR processes.
(i) The principle of independence for ODR arbitrators must be equivalent
to the standard expected from offline neutral third parties; hence, they
must not have either an interest in the dispute or a professional or per-
sonal connection with one of the parties. ODR providers must create a
fair redress environment, unbiased towards any individual participant in
the process. Software algorithms must similarly be designed to offer
no systemic benefit to one party over another. In addition, the regulation
herewith proposed must address liability of ODR neutral third parties
and providers. A provision establishing immunity for arbitrators must
require their impartiality and shield them from undue influence in mak-
ing decisions but, unlike the neutral expert, the online arbitrator should
be immune from legal actions for negligence.
(ii) The principle of transparency sets the information that parties have to be
aware of when participating in arbitration, ie procedural and substantive
provisions. This principle includes transparency with regard to funding
systems, which should not create a bias in favour of any of the parties
involved. Public funding and monitoring could ensure the delivery of a
fair and effective ODR service for B2C disputes. Presently it is difficult to
obtain accurate information about ODR providers and their source of
funding. Although most providers disclose information on the services
they offer, insufficient information is given on their governing structure,
funding models, fees, officials, shareholders, users and results. Accredited
ODR providers should increase accountability and trust by disclosing the
above information, especially when allowing private (for profit) entities
to carry out the arbitral processes.150
(iii) The adversarial principle guarantees that parties can present their argu-
ments fairly in addition to the necessary experts’ statements. In this
regard, the arbitrator must employ special care so that disputants can use
the available ODR technology competently. Another issue that needs
to be dealt with is the allocation of the burden of proof. An obvious
concern is the vulnerability of electronic documents when used as evi-
dence. Electronic signatures and cryptography may assure authenticity,
although often at a high cost. It is necessary to find equilibrium between
security, as part of due process, and cost-efficiency.
(iv) The principle of effectiveness states that dispute resolution processes
must be fast and cost-effective. Effectiveness must be balanced with
the need for maintaining credibility in terms of accuracy of decisions
and perceived justice.151 Many commentators and initiatives are in favour
of delivering a service free of cost for consumers. Arguably, this does
not have to be a requirement, but extra-judicial ODR should not be
more costly than litigation when consumers are involved. The use of
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electronic communication services generally may reduce time and costs.
Legal representation should not be required as it is hoped that these pro-
cesses are consumer friendly. In practice, however, adjudicative processes
involving substantial amounts of money may require legal representation.
(v) The principle of legality implies that adjudicative ODR must comply
with the national law of the consumer’s habitual residence. Despite this,
arbitrators are presently not required to have any particular qualifica-
tions. Moreover, ODR does not need to be grounded exclusively on
regulation but it could also rely on self-regulation, eg the law of eBay
or the general customs of netiquette, which contributes to achieving
consistent decisions across different jurisdictions.
(vi) The principle of liberty means that the consumer must agree to arbitra-
tion freely. This principle was previously discussed in relation to
mandatory clauses. It must be emphasised that under this proposal for
a regulation, the business could only include a mandatory clause for the
use of accredited ODR services, which should be sufficiently highlighted
so as to make the consumer aware of it before the contract is signed.
(vii)The principle of legal representation states that parties cannot be deprived
of their right to be legally assisted; however, as mentioned above, parties
should not be compelled to use legal representation. There should be a
specific mandate for parties in ODR to disclose whether they are legally
represented.
In addition, in the context of ODR an important principle is accessibility.
The application of this principle is twofold: on the one hand ODR must be
easy to find and access but on the other hand ODR must be accessible in the
sense that it addresses cultural and language barriers. Furthermore, when
possible, ODR systems should strive to become media neutral in order to
encourage the widest access.152
5.3.4.2 Mediation and consensual processes
The Mediation Directive introduces some legal standards, such as con-
fidentiality, and it encourages Member States and mediation providers to
develop mediation training and the dissemination of effective mediation prac-
tices.153 The directive states that B2C mediations should take into account the
four principles enunciated in the 2001 Recommendation (impartiality, trans-
parency, effectiveness and fairness). Thus those ODR providers that comply
with the above principles as well as with some complementary best practices
could be accredited by an officially recognised monitoring entity. In addition:
(i) The principle of impartiality requires mediators not to have a conflict
of interest with either party. This principle is complemented by the
principle of transparency since impartiality can only be assured by requir-
ing mediators to disclose the relevant information that may affect their
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independence and impartiality. Also, the parties must be allowed to recuse
mediators if there is (or if it is perceived that there is) a conflict of interest.
This would be compatible with the immunity of mediators, which should
be considered separately from the immunity of arbitrators.154
(ii) The principle of transparency states that consumers must be informed
in simple terms about the mediation process. Essential information
would be the cost of the online mediation, the time involved and the
status of the settlement. It also recommends the publication of the
performance of the mediation process, such as the number of agreed
settlements, average time, compliance records, and so on. However,
generally, given the confidential nature of most of these processes, ODR
providers are reluctant to share these details, especially if this data may
not create positive publicity.
(iii) The principle of effectiveness requires accessibility to the process, which
includes offering electronic communications. In addition, it requires a
cost-effective process, where costs are proportional to the dispute at stake.
This can be difficult when disputes are of low value. Highly automated
processes, brief intervention of mediators and the lack of legal representa-
tion may reduce costs. ODR must be easy to find and easy to use. In other
words, there must be access to technology and appropriateness of ODR
tools for the dispute at stake. There should be a requirement for medi-
ators to guarantee that the use of technology does not inhibit one of the
parties from participating correctly in ODR.155 These principles must
be monitored by the mediators and ODR providers in each case. The
pan-European trustmark provider must ultimately monitor compliance
with the above principles. Furthermore, parties must be provided with a
mechanism to voice any complaints in this respect.
According to Menkel-Meadow, efficiency is one of the driving con-
cerns for encouraging the use of ADR in the US.156 The same can be said
in the EU where it is common knowledge that the majority of civil trials
terminate in settlement. This argument contributes to justify use of
mandatory online mediation. Yet, the law must protect parties from
coercion in settling disputes. One challenge will be to identify duress or
undue influence in an online mediation process that may be protected
with a confidentiality agreement. It will be the responsibility of the
courts to balance these two aspects, unnecessary publicity and illegitim-
ate coercion, taking into account when dealing with B2C disputes the
disparity in bargaining power between the two parties.157
(iv) The principle of fairness states that parties must be aware that they have
the right to withdraw at any stage of the process and the choice as to
whether or not to agree to a suggested solution. It also states that parties
should be allowed a reasonable period of time to consider any suggested
solution before an agreement is entered into. This approach may not be
the most desirable because, as mentioned in Chapter 4, it is often the
momentum of the mediation that helps parties to reach a compromise.158
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The standards of mediators today depend mainly on self-regulation and
soft laws. Some commentators have observed that it is vitally important to set
liability standards applicable to all ODR neutral third parties, because at
present any individual or business may offer ODR services without compli-
ance with any minimum training or experience.159 According to Gibbons a
code of conduct specifically on ODR is necessary to legitimate ODR and to
satisfy potential sceptical ODR users.160
A first step in this direction was taken with the European Code of Conduct
on mediation. This is just a soft law initiative; the European Commission
does not expressly acknowledge that those who claim to comply with the
Code of Conduct necessarily do so. The Commission has put together a list of
those organisations and mediators who are signatories to this code but
disclaims any verification of compliance.161 Under the current circumstances,
the code may have the opposite effect by misleading users to trust mediators
and service providers who claim compliance with the European Code of Con-
duct but who may not in fact so comply. An accreditation body, such as the
European Judicial Network (EJN) or ECC and Eurochambers, should moni-
tor, either themselves or through the Member States, compliance with the
European Code of Conduct.
5.3.5 Enforcement of ODR decisions
Arbitral awards with cross-border implications are normally easier to enforce
than judicial awards, owing to the existing international treaties.162 These
conventions require an original or an authenticated copy of the award, the
agreement to arbitrate and the necessary translations.163 The voluntary nature
of consensual ODR is not expected to present many problems at the enforce-
ment stage. Nevertheless, what cannot be ignored is the failure of the parties
to comply with the results of an ODR decision. Without voluntary compli-
ance, the parties can generally only enforce an ODR outcome by going
to court.164 This would bring a set of legal and economic obstacles, particu-
larly when dealing with cross-border disputes where offline enforcement
will defeat the purpose of ODR. For this reason, most commentators argue
that one of the greatest shortcomings of ODR is the lack of enforcement
mechanisms.165 As a consequence, to date ODR providers rely mostly on
self-enforcement mechanisms such as trustmarks, black lists, technological
enforcements, deposits and so on.
It has been suggested that self-enforcement mechanisms should be com-
plemented with a public enforcement safety net that would grant the
enforcement of ODR outcomes in the national courts of the signatory coun-
tries. This is particularly important for adjudicative processes because parties
will not participate unless they are assured that the awards will be legally
enforceable.166 The international community is taking steps towards this.
With regard to arbitration, UNCITRAL has adopted a draft convention that
would reform the 1958 New York Convention.167 The new convention will
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no longer permit a narrow interpretation of the written requirement of
arbitral awards, allowing online arbitration. UNCITRAL also issued a rec-
ommendation proposing that the New York Convention should incorporate
the changes introduced by its Model Law in electronic signatures and
electronic communications for international contracts.168
With regard to mediation in the EU, the Mediation Directive requires that
by 2011 all Member States must ensure that mediated agreements, including
those reached through ODR, are confirmed by the public authorities and
enforced across the EU, provided that such agreements are not contrary to
the law in the enforcing Member State.169 However, judicial enforcement
of online mediated decisions may be problematic if procedural compliance is
not clear. Hence, it is necessary to develop legal standards for ODR providers,
ie accredited ODR.
Hörnle observes that ‘extra-judicial ODR, like ADR, can only operate if
supported by a court system with the power to enforce settlements and with
the power to counteract deliberate wrongdoing such as fraud’.170 It is often
assumed that courts are not likely to be the primary entities to resolve most
online disputes because courts are too slow and expensive. However, courts can
contribute towards the increase of trust and the legitimation of ODR. Even if
the courts resolve only a small number of disputes, they will provide rules that
create legal certainty, which an extra-judicial ODR cannot provide.171 Schultz
suggests that online appeal processes could be run by public entities in order
to control unsatisfactory decisions from private ODR providers.172 Public
cybercourts are also the best forum to ensure compliance with Article 6 of the
ECHR by exercising a supervisory and enforcement function.173
Online appeals for adjudicative decisions could provide a second layer of
online proceedings that will improve the quality of decisions without remov-
ing the benefits of ODR.174 This mechanism will encourage transparency and
uniformity amongst accredited ODR providers in implementing procedural
and substantive legal provisions. Online appeal processes have already been
proposed for the UDRP, but these proposals faced criticisms based on per-
ceived delays, expenses, ease of abuse and lack of finality. But more import-
antly, an appeal process would insert trust in accredited ODR, thus increasing
predictability and uniformity, which in turn would contribute towards
creating a common law for e-commerce – the so-called lex informatica.
Within the EU, national courts could carry out this review through a
system akin to the European Small Claims Procedure (ESCP).175 In order
to avoid frivolous claims, the ESCP has a provision that gives the judge a
discretion to impose legal costs. A judge may impose the costs, including
reasonable and proportional legal fees, on the claimant in those cases where
the claimant fails to improve on the result given by the accredited ODR
provider. It would be advisable to establish a database where national courts
of each Member State could publish these judgments. This database could be
constructed from the previous work done by the Consumer Affairs Director-
ate and its European Database with Case Law Concerning Unfair Contract
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Terms (‘CLAB database’), which stopped being updated in 2001. This work
could be carried out by the European Commission in conjunction with the
ECC-Net and would contribute to the education of consumers as well as
promote legal certainty. It is to be expected that the courts will pro-
vide higher due process guarantees than private ODR providers and will
deliver legal precedents while interpreting consumer law, thereby contribut-
ing towards the harmonisation and development of ODR legal standards.
5.4 Conclusion
ODR has been under-used in spite of its potential for resolving B2C disputes.
The European legislature should take steps towards encouraging parties
to use ODR on a widespread basis; however, in order to ensure fair and
efficient ODR it will first be necessary to create public legal standards. The
unequal bargaining position of disputants creates a requirement for legal
provisions to uphold quality ODR processes that prevent weaker parties from
being abused.
Regulation is not the only or best means of addressing every problem in
ODR but it is a necessary tool without which ODR could not be efficiently
and fairly developed. This chapter contends that part of the lack of success
of ODR stems from a significant legal lacuna, which means that ODR as
a result suffers from a lack of legal certainty and public confidence. It appears
unrealistic to close the gap between the need for effective dispute resolution
mechanisms for online consumers and their actual use without introducing a
legal framework in the field of ODR.
The current self-regulatory approach has been unsuccessful. The market
cannot be left as the sole regulator of a fair ODR system. The lack of uniform
legal standards leaves ODR users and providers with little guidance. Thus, a
legal framework will boost the legitimacy of ODR by providing appropriate
information, awareness and trust. It is this author’s contention that the devel-
opment of ODR depends on creating legal standards that will serve as a
badge to enforce ODR agreements. If ODR is to be effective within the
EU, it will be worth reconsidering the use of mandatory ODR clauses and
enforceable ODR decisions of accredited ODR providers. In order to allow
this in a just manner, what is required is the regulation of procedural stand-
ards for ODR. These standards must take the form of a regulation that is
based on the existing Mediation Directive, EC Recommendations and best
practices that incorporate the special features of ODR, such as equal access
to technology and secure communications. In addition, the regulation
should create a pan-European trustmark programme, which will accredit
those ODR providers who comply with the regulation and whose decisions
are legally enforceable.
The number of ODR providers will increase over time. On the one
hand, this will clearly stand to benefit consumers by having greater access to
justice; on the other hand it poses the problem of forum shopping where
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businesses may seek the ODR provider that will benefit them the most.
Mandatory ODR must be exclusively used to resolve in a fair manner those
disputes that are suitable for it. The control of suitability must be carried
out through legislation and court supervision. Legislative inactivity with
the existing legal uncertainty of ODR legal standards will reflect the failure
of courts to articulate clear and harmonised approaches to ODR. The
role of the courts is not to legislate or make policy but to enforce the
existing law.
It is argued that a regulation in the field of ODR would continue to allow
the development of private and public ODR initiatives that rely on self-
regulation, but if ODR is to attain a wider market implementation, special
tools are needed. However, those tools should only be given to accredited
ODR providers who comply with legal standards while resolving disputes
that constrain the development of e-commerce.
Before this proposed regulation is designed, it would be advisable to issue a
broad consultation through a Green Paper discussing the following proposals.
First, accredited ODR providers should be obliged to comply with minimum
legal standards, ie procedural and substantive provisions. Secondly, a pan-
European trustmark will accredit ODR providers and online businesses who
voluntarily decide to join the proposed scheme. Thirdly, an EU institution
will be appointed to monitor the compliance of accredited ODR providers
with the regulatory standards. A major role could be played by ECC-Net, the
European Commission, Eurochambers and the EJN. Fourthly, pre-dispute
contractual clauses will be legally binding only when they refer to accredited
ODR providers. Fifthly, settlements from accredited ODR providers will be
enforced directly by the courts, following the modus operandi set out in the
Mediation Directive.
Finally, adjudicative decisions of accredited ODR providers could be
appealed in an online judicial process, such as the ESCP. This will increase
public trust in accredited ODR providers. In this manner, online decisions
will not be fully binding, but the use of ODR may be mandatory. A process
similar to the ESCP appears to be the most suitable judicial process for
national courts to deal with ODR appeals, particularly those with cross-
border claims. As a result, the ESCP will press for the creation of a uniform
interpretation of consumer protection policies through the publication of the
appeals in a freely accessible database. Accredited and non-accredited ODR
providers will render decisions based on a combination of customary law,
equity, consumer law and legal precedents. Precedents will not be binding
but will be persuasive in a similar manner to that taken in civil law
traditions.
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Conclusion
I see ODR as becoming the predominant form of dispute resolution in
e-commerce.1
Summary
In this era of e-commerce, the consuequential litigation is often expensive,
complicated and time-consuming.2 This book has examined online consumers’
access to justice within the EU when it is coupled with ADR and ICT, thus
lowering possible barriers facing consumers when enforcing their rights. In
addition, this book has evaluated the development of ODR in resolving small
value disputes arising out of e-commerce transactions and the need for
designing a regulatory model in order to realise its full potential in resolving
consumers’ disputes in the EU. A number of suggestions have been posed with
the objective of increasing the visibility of efficient and fair ODR providers
for resolving B2C disputes. This book concludes by proposing a regulation
in the field of ODR setting legal standards and limits to mandatory ODR.
However, before such measure is effectively implemented, it would first
require further research to outline clearly the various legal standards that
certified ODR providers should comply with.
This proposal will benefit from an EU-wide consultation to all ODR
stakeholders through a green paper. The blueprint of the new regulation
will be mainly composed of the procedural provisions set in the two EC
Recommendations (98/257/CE and 2001/310/EC), the Mediation Directive
(2008/52/EC) and industry best practices. The regulation will create a pan-
European trustmark which will be granted to those ODR service providers
who comply with its legal provisions. Compliance will be monitored by
co-operation between national and regional authorities through the European
Consumer Centres (ECC). The ECC and online business contracts would refer
national and cross-border disputes to accredited ODR providers. The regula-
tion will encourage the use of consensual ODR processes as a previous step to
the adjudicative processes for all accredited ODR providers. On the one hand,
settlements will be directly enforceable in the courts of all Member States by
the application of the Mediation Directive. On the other hand, decisions
emanating from adjudicative and accredited ODR bodies will also be directly
enforceable in the courts through an expeditious online process. However, the
latter decisions will not be immediately binding because they will be treated in
the same manner as judicial decisions from a first instance court, ie decisions
could still be reversed by the competent court. At the EU level, small value
disputes, including domestic or national disputes could be appealed by con-
sumers through the European Small Claims Procedure, which could follow
some of the ODR procedural features of the Uniform Domain Names Dispute
Resolution Policy, such as online submissions, written processes, standardised
forms, publicity of decisions etc. Judicial review of ODR decisions will legit-
imate and monitor accredited ODR services and it will also contribute towards
the establishment of uniform procedural and substantive legal standards in
the field of ODR. In other words, the interpretation of the procedural and
substantive provisions will be carried out by both ODR providers and the
public courts. Therefore, this proposal suggests a two-step process, beginning
with mandatory ODR where most disputes are expected to be resolved,
preferably by using consensual processes and escalating, if necessary, to a
judicial online process.
Findings
Chapter 1 considered consumer protection and access to justice from a
European perspective. This chapter has shown that public enforcement mech-
anisms are not sufficient to enforce consumers’ rights and thus alternative
methods such as ODR are necessary to give appropriate access to justice for
consumers. The chapter first considered the European consumer protection
policy, analysing what rights are applicable to consumers when they partici-
pate in e-commerce. Consumers must be aware of the fact that they have more
rights when buying online than when going to the local shops. Subsequently,
this chapter analysed how consumers can enforce these rights in courts.
Consumer accessibility to the courts was examined within the EU through
the small claims procedures in Ireland, Spain and the UK, where consumers
pursue damages individually, testing how successful these procedures were
in resolving B2C disputes. Particular attention was given to those processes
that were complemented with ICT, eg the Online Small Claims Procedure
in Ireland, which naturally seemed more suitable for dealing with online
disputes; yet, these processes may encounter difficulties in resolving cross-
border disputes.
This chapter also addressed how conflicts of laws are resolved. The Brussels
Regulation and the Rome Regulation were contrasted with US case law
on consumer choice of law and forum selection. Generally, the tendency in
the EU is to recognise consumers’ habitual residence as the competent forum
and consumers’ domestic law as the applicable law (ie the country of destin-
ation approach), even when there is a contractual clause stating otherwise.
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Consequently, if businesses are being sued in the consumers’ forum they may
be inclined to use post-dispute ODR. Conversely, in the US, the approach
is the opposite, where there is a preference to favour the country of origin
approach and to uphold pre-dispute contractual clauses. Nevertheless, none of
the above approaches seems to strike the right balance between the parties.
Furthermore, in most cases recourse to the courts may neither be feasible nor
desirable for one or both parties. Hence, public and private ODR initiatives
may be a solution for many B2C disputes.
Although it is often assumed that one of the major advantages of ODR
is that it avoids jurisdictional issues, it must be noted that ODR cannot
always rely on the co-operation of disputants; therefore, there is an urgent
need to harmonise the law in relation to applicable law and forum. Consumer
protection for e-commerce is meaningless unless effective enforcement mech-
anisms are provided. Finally, Chapter 1 discussed judicial enforcement of
consumers’ rights under EU legislation. It also looked at different options
to enforce consumers’ rights, individually and collectively, ie class actions
and government intervention. The general conclusion of this chapter was
that the existing mechanisms of the courts are not adequate to resolve the
vast majority of civil (as opposed to criminal) B2C disputes arising from
e-commerce; thus, in order to deliver adequate access to justice, new, effective
and inexpensive mechanisms supported by information technology are clearly
needed.
Chapter 2 considered ODR when used as a consumer redress strategy. This
chapter was divided into two principal sections, of which the first section
gave a general introduction to ODR and the second section evaluated the
main challenges for the development of ODR. The first section started by
defining ODR and related concepts, such as ADR and online ADR, and
looked at the recent development of ODR. The main advantages and dis-
advantages of ODR for resolving consumer disputes were also discussed. The
objective is to exploit the advantages and overcome the disadvantages with
appropriate technological improvements and legal support. Although dispute
avoidance mechanisms were not a major aspect of this research, various
mechanisms were briefly examined, such as internal complaint procedures,
escrows, online payment services, reputation systems and trustmarks. In con-
flict prevention, ODR offers added value to ADR as ODR technology could
be used by online businesses to avoid complaints escalating to disputes.
Dispute avoidance includes consumer empowerment, which in the context
of consumer protection is educating consumers about their rights, obliga-
tions, expectations and how to avoid disputes. It must provide mechanisms
to ensure that online businesses recognise and comply with their obligations.
Even when disputes arise, outsourced ODR providers should be used as the
last resort to resolve those disputes which cannot be resolved at an early stage
between the business and the consumer. This is well illustrated by eBay,
whose in-house ODR process resolves more than 14 million disputes a year,
while its previously preferred ODR provider, SquareTrade, resolved just over
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2 million disputes in its lifetime. ODR providers should assist online busi-
nesses in building effective internal complaint procedures, and disputes
should only be outsourced to external ODR providers in the most difficult
cases to ensure impartiality and create trust among the parties. In order to
promote dispute avoidance within the EU, it is suggested that the proposed
regulation in the field of ODR could mandate Member States to require
that online businesses have effective internal redress mechanisms. This legal
provision will also encourage online businesses to be attached to external
ODR providers.
The focus of this book was on the major dispute resolution methods used
to deal with consumer disputes. For ODR it was referred to more or less
informal dispute resolution schemes that are provided by independent entities,
rather than by one of the disputants. The most widespread ODR methods are
automated negotiation, assisted negotiation, mediation, arbitration and small
claims court procedures. Ultimately, this part looked at the most significant
European initiatives to promote the use of consumer ODR, namely the Con-
sumer Complaint Form, ECODIR and ECC-NET.
The second section of this chapter evaluated the challenges that hinder the
growth of ODR. Existing surveys on ODR sites showed that many ODR
providers have ceased operating, and many others have ceased updating their
websites. Among the difficulties faced by the ODR industry in the B2C field,
this chapter addressed how existing ODR projects are being funded and the
risks to impartiality that these sources of funding may cause. This may be
overcome using public funding, transparent private funding and appropriate
monitoring. Another major identified challenge to the growth of ODR is
attracting parties to utilise these services. It has been noted that two of the
most successful ODR providers to date (UDRP providers and SquareTrade)
appeared in a market where disputes were referred to them and where the
market administrator (ICANN and eBay) wanted to avoid being sued by
disputants, who in most cases could not access an offline dispute resolution
mechanism for a reasonable cost. Also CyberSettle targeted specific markets,
such as insurance companies and dispute suppliers, ie the City of New York
and the American Arbitration Association. More research needs to be carried
out on how to make ODR more appealing to consumers and businesses,
encouraging them to resolve their disputes online in a fast, fair and efficient
manner. It appears that public bodies, trustmarks and businesses and consumer
intermediaries, such as the legal profession, consumer bodies and business
associations could increase the awareness of ODR.
Due process requirements are at stake when a power imbalance exists with
B2C disputants. In this regard, key procedural issues were discussed, includ-
ing the need for impartiality, the selection of neutral third parties, legal
representation and supervising ODR providers. However, disputants must
accept the compromise that in order to develop a greater access to justice
through ODR, it may be necessary to reduce some degree of procedural qual-
ity in exchange for faster, less expensive and more effective ODR processes.
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Judicial enforcement and self-enforcement mechanisms were also con-
sidered as an important element in the success of ODR services. Lastly, in the
dispute resolution context, technology is not a neutral element because it can
affect the way people interact. This chapter concluded by evaluating the role
of technology in ODR processes by looking at the following matters: first,
the strengths and weaknesses of the different ICT techniques; secondly, the
security issues which are particularly relevant when large amounts of money
are involved; and, thirdly, the potential of the fourth party in assisting indi-
viduals to resolve their disputes.
Chapter 3 dealt with consumer adjudicative procedures supported by ICT,
ie online judicial processes and online arbitration. With regard to judicial
processes this chapter examined some examples of how national judicial
authorities are incorporating ICT into their processes, namely the Small
Claims Court Online in Ireland, Money Claim Online in England and the
eCourt initiative in Australia. The focus of this section, however, was on the
Regulation Establishing a European Small Claims Procedure (ESCP). Some
drawbacks were pointed out as possible constraints that could hinder its full
potential. First, the ESCP excludes domestic disputes, even those that may
require cross-border enforcement. In order to avoid this, judges should be
given the discretion to switch from the domestic procedure to the ESCP when
they deem it appropriate. Secondly, the economic limit may be too low as the
ESCP may not be cost-effective for many claims below 2000, especially
when translations and legal fees may end up being paid for by one of the
parties. It has been suggested that a monetary threshold of 5000 would be
more appropriate. For low value disputes, more informal processes, such as
consensual ODR and automated processes should be robustly encouraged
prior to turning to the ESCP.
It is regrettable that the ESCP Regulation missed the opportunity to
include a provision that directly encourages the courts to search for a com-
promise between the parties whenever this is possible. The pilot project in
Manchester and the registrar in Ireland have shown that an in-house civil
servant, with the role of encouraging agreements between the parties before
the hearing, is an effective strategy for resolving disputes without the need for
the judge’s intervention. A similar approach with the ESCP would be bene-
ficial. The difficulties in dealing with possible language barriers must also be
considered. This will be a significant challenge because, unlike the UDRP,
an ODR system that deals with specific complaints, the ESCP deals with a
variety of civil and commercial disputes. The best way of overcoming this
difficulty is by devising ODR technology that exploits the use of a standard-
ised process with agreed translations, creating a networking system among
the European national courts.
The objective of the ESCP is the creation of a cost efficient judicial pro-
cedure applicable to small value claims in cross-border disputes. This object-
ive can be best achieved by using a written procedure, assisted by electronic
forms, such as e-mails and video-conferencing as foreseen by the ESCP. The
Conclusion 217
regulation allows the use of new technologies in transferring information and
evidence between the courts of the different Member States. Perhaps in time,
within the EU, where we are concerned about the fairness of private pro-
cedures (eg restrictions in consumer arbitration) the ESCP may contribute
to increasing trust in adjudicative ODR processes.
It is to be expected that, in due course, electronic communications will be
utilised in every appropriate aspect of the judicial procedure to assist in the
resolution of online as well as offline B2C disputes. During this evolutionary
process it would be advisable neither to impose the use of technology nor
to discourage it, taking into consideration all types of individuals and their
needs. Users without internet access or with a limited knowledge of ICT
should not be discriminated against by being forced into using unfamiliar
electronic means. But neither should the law constrain those courts or liti-
gants who feel confident in using ICT tools and could then benefit from
them. Hence, it is regretted that the ESCP has missed the opportunity to
introduce the use of ICT into the legal procedure in a way that makes it more
efficient and accessible to the litigants. Its use should, however, be mandatory
only for the courts and not for litigants without ICT skills, as it could create
new barriers in access to justice.
With regard to online arbitration, this chapter first reviewed the regulation
of arbitral procedures and what the legal implications of complementing
arbitration with the use of ICT are. It appears that online arbitration is possible
under the existing law but the lack of specific regulation and accreditation
bodies creates some legal uncertainties, which are likely to be challenged in
court when parties require the enforcement of online arbitral decisions. A
national arbitration programme was also examined, namely the institutional-
ised Spanish arbitration system, which is currently moving towards the online
sphere with the implementation of the new Regulation (RD 231/2008) that
specifically regulates online arbitration. Lastly, but not least, this chapter
assessed in detail ICANN’s dispute resolution scheme: the UDRP.
The success of the UDRP in resolving domain name disputes through
online ‘arbitration’ reveals possibilities for ODR to work through inter-
national organisations. International co-operation is not just useful but in
many cases it is necessary. The UDRP is a good model for ODR providers
who target B2C disputes because, unlike traditional arbitration, it is not
intended to supplant court proceedings but merely to afford an additional
forum for dispute resolution, allowing parties to commence legal actions at
any stage. The success of the UDRP rests on getting disputants to use the
UDRP and its efficient self-enforcement mechanism. Parties do not sign an
arbitration agreement; they submit to the procedure separately: complainants
by filing their complaints and respondents by registering their domain
names. Nonetheless, the UDRP is far from perfect. This section proposed a
number of changes for the UDRP policy and rules in order to attain not only
an efficient but also a fairer ODR process. To that end, it would be necessary
to increase time limits and to clarify those issues which have provoked
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conflicting interpretations, such as the burden of proof, the use of parody web-
sites and the meaning of the common law trade marks. In addition, it was
suggested that greater ‘uniformity’ within the UDRP could be achieved by
the inclusion of an appeal system. This chapter addressed how this scheme
might be adapted to resolve consumer disputes arising from e-commerce.
Finally, the chapter concluded by making some recommendations as to
which ODR procedure, judicial or arbitral, is more suitable for each type of
online consumer dispute, suggesting that the success of adjudicative ODR
processes depends upon their self-enforcement mechanisms and mandatory
participation.
Chapter 4 discussed online mediation for consumers. The potential for
online mediation lies in the fact that it reduces barriers in accessing justice by
avoiding conflicts of laws, thus reducing costs and time. In mediation both
parties are often more satisfied with the outcome and consider the process
fairer than adjudicative processes. This chapter examined how online medi-
ation is presently used to resolve consumer disputes and what are the main
hindrances to its expansion. It appeared that the main challenge to mediation
is attracting users. Indeed, the best indicator for success is the parties’ will-
ingness to enter into mediation. SquareTrade and PayPal achieved this by
using incentives in the form of trustmarks and managing eBay feedback
reviews. This persuaded many eBay users to participate in the SquareTrade
online mediation scheme. Furthermore, SquareTrade offered other incentives
to its participants. First, it provided a fast and efficient ODR service, which
resolved over 80 per cent of disputes in an average of two weeks. Secondly, its
services were free (assisted negotiation) or of low costs (online mediation).
Thirdly, parties could escalate to more formal dispute resolution services,
ie starting with negotiation, moving to mediation, neutral third party evalu-
ation (by the online mediator) and leaving open the option even to go to
more formal dispute resolution services including, ultimately, the courts.
The use of offline mediation needs to be more widespread before online
mediation can become of greater support. If mediation is to have a real impact
in our society, education programmes and the promotion of its use need to be
pursued as a matter of public policy. Consequently, mediation is being regu-
lated at regional level and also promoted by national courts. The Directive
on Mediation, which is due to be fully implemented by May 2011, assures
the direct recognition and enforcement of cross-border settlements but not
of mediation clauses. Mandatory mediation appears to be banned by the Unfair
Contract Terms Directive, the ADR Recommendation and the Proposed
Directive on Consumer Rights, as mandatory ADR is considered to be a
procedure that denies or delays access to justice, currently understood as
access to a legal procedure. However, does the same reasoning apply when
access to the court is not economically feasible or simply less suitable?
In the UK, the Woolf reforms envisioned a new legal landscape where
disputants would be encouraged to start a legal action only as a last resort,
after using other, more appropriate means, ie ADR. This approach has not
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been fully implemented in the UK and it also remains a challenge in many
other EU jurisdictions.3 Hence, in today’s society the right to access to justice
must be construed as the right to access the most appropriate dispute redress
mechanism for each controversy. It is of paramount importance to persuade
the legal profession of this interpretation. The English courts have an under-
used discretion to refer cases to ADR as well as imposing legal costs when a
suitable ADR forum is unreasonably rejected by one of the parties. The same
rules could allow judges to encourage the use of ODR.
It is suggested that mandatory online mediation and, more generally,
consensual ODR methods, such as online conciliation, have the potential to
increase consumer access to justice. This could be achieved with greater public
awareness, increasing public funds, trained mediators and greater incentives
for disputants to participate in online mediation. However, mandatory online
mediation should have limits when employed for resolving B2C disputes. For
instance, it should be free or provided at a low cost. Participants should
be given the option to opt out after one meeting or information session, at
least when a small claims process is available. Conversely, if clear limits are
not defined, mandatory mediation could create new barriers for consumer
redress by encouraging them to settle for less than that recognised by their
legal rights. In order to avoid this, consumers should be empowered by being
clearly informed that they cannot be pressured to settle, ie they still have the
right to refuse an offer to settle. Finally, it was observed that the existing
regulation in the EU allows for the use of online mediation, but this allow-
ance is not the same as actively promoting its use. This led on to Chapter 5,
which explored a possible strategy for the executive and legislature to pro-
mote ODR.
Chapter 5 evaluated the critical question of whether a legal framework is
needed to enhance consumer ODR. This chapter proposed that a legal initia-
tive within the EU is required in order to close the existing gap between the
need for effective dispute resolution mechanisms for e-commerce and their
actual use. At present, the regulatory strategy is being developed through
self-regulation rather than legislative intervention. Yet some aspects, such as
the enforceability of ODR clauses in electronic contracts and the enforce-
ability of awards can only be achieved through legislation and cannot be left
to self-regulatory initiatives. Therefore, it is necessary to establish clear legal
standards in the ODR field.
In addition, Annex I of this book attempts to encapsulate some of the main
ideas of this chapter in the form of a proposal for a regulation in the field of
ODR. However, the writing of an optimal ODR regulatory framework is
beyond the scope and ambition of this book, which has aimed to discuss the
existing legal barriers, challenges and deficiencies that ODR faces in the EU.
Hence, the blueprint contained in Annex I is simply a model upon which
discussion could take place at EU level in order to evaluate the need for
regulating and accrediting ODR services.
There is an increasing tendency towards private dispute resolution, mainly
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in those countries such as the US where pre-dispute mandatory arbitration
is allowed under the national law. By contrast, the EU does not sanction that
private dispute resolution systems should decrease the level of consumer pro-
tection in the internal market. Chapter 5 proposed a co-ordinated action
within the EU to ensure that private ODR services meet the required legal
standards. This chapter submits that a European legal initiative, particularly
a regulation, would contribute towards developing the ODR market within
the EU, stopping inconsistent standards and regulations within the EU and
facilitating the expansion of the internal market. The regulation proposed
would create a pan-European trustmark that would accredit those ODR pro-
viders and online businesses who meet the legal standards set out in the
regulation. This strategy would ease the establishment of fair and efficient
ODR services that comply with quality standards within the EU. Accredited
ODR providers may be included in electronic contracts by online businesses
as an initial mandatory dispute resolution stage, before going to court.
Decisions and settlements reached through the accredited programmes would
be enforced in the courts.
Given the cross-border nature of e-commerce, in order to develop an effi-
cient ODR legal framework, it must be agreed at an international level with
the collaboration of all the e-commerce stakeholders (governments, industry
and the general public). It is only a matter of time before courts and legis-
latures will develop them. It will be, however, a step further to initiate the
harmonisation of minimum legal standards for ODR within the EU. An EC
regulation on minimum standards in the field of ODR will facilitate the
EU to speak with one voice in the global debate on how to incorporate ODR
into international law, wherein lies its greatest potential.
Tiered ODR systems
Certainly, there is not a single ODR method that could be suitable for all
consumer disputes. ODR methods should be tailored to the problem, in
particular when the ODR process is highly automated. Indeed, the success of
automated processes depends on the nature of the dispute, the accuracy of the
information provided and the capability of the software or the fourth party
utilised in assessing the dispute.
Consensual processes avoid conflicts of laws, so parties can focus on their
respective interests, rather than their rights under the law. The main chal-
lenge of these consensual processes is that both parties need to be motivated
in resolving their dispute. Online mediation may be suitable in low context
cultures, such as in e-commerce, if parties are motivated to resolve the dispute
and when the imbalance of power between the parties is not too great,
ie when consumers are dealing with small and medium sized enterprises. In
other cases, adjudicative processes may be more apt for correcting possible
abuses of power by online businesses.
Adjudicative procedures may also be useful methods for resolving online
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consumer disputes. Online arbitration has advantages: it is custom-built for
the dispute at hand, it is conclusive and it may replace the jurisdiction of
the courts. Online arbitration may be non-binding or appealable. The success
of the UDRP providers derives from three aspects: (i) it deals only with
blatant disputes, which are abusive registrations made in bad faith in order to
take advantage of the reputation of existing trademarks; (ii) its referral is
included through a mandatory contractual clause; and (iii) it has incorporated
a self-enforcement mechanism. Online judicial processes are particularly
appropriate for dealing with disputes where parties cannot reach consensus
through any other ODR method, when a large disparity of bargaining power
exists between the parties and when it is necessary to review decisions eman-
ating from private ODR service providers.
Most online B2C disputes may be dealt with through a tiered system: the
first step may be a company’s internal customer service; the second step,
consensual ODR: ie assisted negotiation, automated negotiation and online
mediation; the third step, online arbitration; and the final step, an online
judicial process. The final step should be reached by only a very small
percentage of disputes. Multi-step dispute resolution processes should be
considered as a matter of public policy and within the concept of proper
access to justice. The law should therefore emphasise the parties’ obligation to
use consensual processes during the initial stage of their dispute in order to
promote less formal, less costly and more efficient dispute resolution methods.
Future dynamics and recommendations for ODR
This book cannot reach final conclusions in the ODR field, a field which is
constantly evolving. Instead, I will attempt to predict how ODR might
develop in the EU over the next few years (let us say 10 to 15 years). There will
be an increase in institutionalised ODR processes, such as the Spanish online
arbitration systems, the Money Claim Online in England and Online Small
Claim procedure in Ireland. The ESCP could become the first judicial pro-
cedure incorporating ODR technology to deal with cross-border claims within
the EU. The ESCP, however, may not be the best scheme to deal with low value
claims, since parties without legal representation may find difficulties in filing
claims appropriately and bringing sufficient evidence forward. This is a chal-
lenge that judges and arbitrators will face that could potentially limit the
effectiveness of the redress of consumer complaints by adjudicative processes.
In the following years the resolution of disputes will be first attempted by
consensual processes, regardless of the amounts of money involved. The ESCP,
for instance, will incorporate in-house civil servants acting as online mediators
to filter those disputes which may be ripe for compromise. When consensual
processes were not attempted, the courts will start to consider systematically
whether these disputes should be mediated. Hence, mediation will become
part of the litigation system. Accordingly, legal professionals will advise on
the appropriateness of each dispute resolution method.
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The future of ODR is undeniable. According to Katsh, ODR might not
have taken over the world the first time around, but technology has reached
the point where it simply does not make sense not to use the internet to handle
disputes.4 There is a constant increase in the use of ADR, transnational
e-commerce and online social networking. Evans et al observe that:
Many young people today keep in touch with one another through e-mail
or instant messaging, rather than by telephone communications. It seems
likely, therefore, that digital online communications systems will soon
revolutionize the way people resolve their conflicts [. . .] The principal
users of these futuristic ODR systems will likely be new generations
of computer-literate youths. Operating beyond the constraints of either
territorial or technical limits, these advanced ODR users could cross
territorial, language, and cultural barriers.5
ODR might not always provide a perfect solution to resolve all B2C disputes
but it could certainly deliver a satisfactory resolution to many disputes,
including those that arise out of the B2C sphere or even outside the com-
mercial and online realm, such as citizen to government (C2G) disputes.
The need for ODR increases when parties face certain circumstances; for
instance, where parties have limited economic resources, where there is a vast
geographic distance between the parties or where there is urgency in the
resolution of disputes. It is also an ideal process for isolated B2C transactions
where parties prefer less formal legal proceedings and are content to avoid
face-to-face interactions.
This book suggests that the time is right to expand and regulate those
ODR providers who are ready to provide fair and effective services. I believe
that the ODR of the future will cater for specific disputes, will mainly be
publicly operated and monitored, it will be compulsory, largely automated
and it will be able to provide many of the functions of a human neutral party.
Such a system would have to be supported by artificial intelligence. To date,
a high level of automation has only been achieved with low comprehension
that can only deliver information, eg SquareTrade assisted negotiation, or
manage one single issue, eg CyberSettle blind bidding. Although ODR
systems with a higher content of artificial intelligence already exist, eg
SmartSettle, they have been proven not to be consumer-friendly as yet.
Clearly, with the appropriate regulation it is merely a question of time before
ODR services are improved, becoming the mainstream method for resolving
online B2C disputes.
Notes
1 Sir Brian Neill QC (former Lord Justice of Appeal and past President of the
Civil Mediation Council) 5th International Forum on ODR, University of
Liverpool (19–20 April 2007).
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2 An early version of some of the ideas of this conclusion have been published in
Cortés (2010).
3 Phillips LCJ (2008b) 5.49, 14.5.
4 Katsh & Wing (2006) 26.
5 Evans, Wettman, Shadoff & Birdwell (2006) 427.
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Appendix
Proposal for a Regulation establishing
an Accreditation Scheme for Online
Dispute Resolution Services
The following text is a blueprint that encapsulates some of the best practices
while taking an EU perspective for the regulation and accreditation of online
dispute resolution (ODR) service providers. It was suggested in Chapter 5
that, before this proposal is implemented, a green paper should be first issued
with the objective of consulting the views of all stakeholders. The consult-
ation shall enquire about the need for Community action in the accreditation
of ODR service providers.
Article 1
Objective
The purpose of the Regulation is to accredit fair and efficient ODR service
providers in order to promote the use of ODR for the resolution of all types
of disputes, but in particular for the resolution of cross-border business
to consumer (B2C) disputes arising out of e-commerce in the internal
market. The accreditation of ODR service providers shall require that




a) ODR service providers for the purpose of this Regulation shall be those
whose processes take place mainly online with the use of ad hoc informa-
tion and communication technology (ICT) tools.
b) Accredited ODR service providers shall be those ODR service providers
who comply with this Regulation and that have been accredited by the
EC Commission and the European Consumer Centre Network (ECC-Net).
These providers shall display, if they decide to do so, a pan-European logo
named EU-Confidence.
c) For an accredited ODR the process shall be considered as the entire
course of the ODR proceeding, which shall be an online process from
the start to the end promoting, prior to the adjudicative resolution, a
consensual agreement. This is without prejudice to the use off-line com-
munications exceptionally whenever this is deemed necessary by the
ODR service provider or the neutral third party.
d) For an ODR platform the website interface hosting the process shall be
considered as that of an accredited ODR service provider.
Article 3
Attentiveness
Disputes shall be dealt within a reasonable time period reflecting the needs of
e-commerce. Hereby, disputes shall be resolved as expeditiously as possible,
and in any event disputes shall be resolved within two months after the
commencement of the ODR process, unless all parties and the ODR service




The language of the procedure shall be the same language of the transaction
that originated the dispute. Parties may agree to a different language as long
as this is accepted by the neutral third party and the accredited ODR service
provider. Accredited service providers may however have a limited number of
working languages. When their services are thus offered to an online business
that makes transactions in more languages than those offered by the accredited
ODR service provider, the trustmark logo must be accompanied by the
expression of ‘limited coverage’.
Article 5
Submission to the online process
a) If a consumer informs a business that is adhered to an accredited ODR
provider that he or she rejects the remedy proposed by the company’s
internal customer complaints service and wishes to submit the dispute to
the accredited ODR service provider, the business must co-operate fully
in the proceedings and comply with the result, even when the decision
may be appealable by the consumer.




Consumers and businesses shall be able to initiate claims in online processes
managed by accredited ODR service providers. But businesses shall not be
able to lodge claims against consumers, only against other businesses.
Article 7
Appeals
a) Parties may appeal a decision from the accredited ODR service provider,
except in B2C disputes where only consumer-claimants shall be permit-
ted to appeal. The appeal shall be made to the competent court according
to the Brussels (I) Regulation and the applicable law shall be that stated
in accordance to the Rome (I) Regulation.1 When the appeal is 5000 or
below and has cross-border elements, ie when one of the parties is located
in a different Member State, the claim shall be processed according to the
European Small Claims Procedure (ESCP).2
b) The ESCP is hereby amended, first, by increasing the economic limit from
2000 up to 5000 and, secondly, by removing the right of the claimant
to request the legal costs for engaging in litigation when the award is not
more favourable than the decision delivered by the accredited ODR
service provider.
c) The European Commission will develop a pan-European website inter-
face that will be used by all the national courts when resolving online
appeals. The new interface shall allow litigants to participate in a fully
online process obviating the need for travelling.
Article 8
Binding nature of the ODR process
Businesses shall not compel consumers to agree to the use of binding ODR
processes prior to the materialisation of a dispute, except when the business
has referred all unresolved complaints to an accredited ODR service provider.
In the latter event, pre-dispute agreements shall be upheld if they were
clearly disclosed before the transaction was completed. The final decision of
the accredited ODR service provider shall be binding on both parties, except
when one party appeals the decision.
Article 9
Selection of neutral third parties and technology
Accredited ODR service providers must be capable of selecting the appropriate
neutral third party and adequate ICT tools for the resolution of each
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individual dispute, taking into account the scope and knowledge of the par-
ties. The procedure of how neutral third parties are selected shall be transpar-
ent and shall be fully disclosed to the disputants.
Article 10
Costs
The costs of ODR services shall be kept as low as possible, particularly for
consumers who must be able to access these services free of charge or at a low
cost. In any event the cost of acceding to an accredited ODR service provider
should be proportionate to the dispute and lower for both parties than an
offline process. Accredited ODR service providers should be partly funded,




a) Dispute resolution professionals shall have sufficient skills and training
to fulfil their function, but they will not need to be licensed legal practi-
tioners. However, accredited ODR service providers must take measures
to ensure legal experts are available for consultation when specialised
knowledge on the interpretation and application of laws and regulations
is required in the process of providing ODR services.
b) Neutral third parties shall be independent, without any type of personal or
professional relationship with any of the parties. Accordingly, accredited
ODR service providers shall incorporate procedures for recusing pro-
viders and neutral third parties who are interested parties to a dispute or
have any other causes which may harm the fair use of accredited ODR.
c) The neutral third party, whenever this is feasible, shall not be linked
to successful case settlement or to a recommendation or decision in
favour of any particular party. When dealing with repeated players
accredited ODR service providers shall provide a mechanism to grant
greater levels of transparency and impartiality, which may, for instance,
allow an additional opportunity to recuse neutral third parties by non-
repeated-players.
d) Information about the credentials and experience of neutral third parties
shall be made available to the parties. This information shall include the




Consensual processes and representation
Accredited ODR bodies shall play an active role in encouraging the use of
consensual methods for resolving disputes, thus reducing the need for legal
representation. However, consensual processes should not be imposed against
the will of the parties. Parties shall always retain their right to be represented
or assisted by a third party at all stages of the procedure. Notwithstanding,




a) The technology used by accredited ODR shall strive to keep user inter-
faces as simple and intuitive as possible. The European Commission and
the ECC-Net shall provide some guidelines and criteria for ensuring
accessibility.
b) Parties shall be able to download and print all the information contained
in the ODR platform, including information related to their individual
cases.
c) The ODR platform should be available to all parties in order to check




a) Accredited ODR service providers shall make available to the parties
an appropriate and secure method for giving notifications. Without
prejudice to the use other techniques that ensure the authenticity of
the communications and the identity of the parties, the use of the elec-
tronic signature shall guarantee the communications and the identity of
all parties.
b) Notifications shall be sent to the electronic destination chosen by the
parties. They shall be considered to have legal effect the day after the party
had accessed the notification. Nonetheless, if one party had not accessed
the notification 10 days after the notification was sent, then the party
shall be considered notified.





The place where the ODR process occurs is where the physical ODR platform
[or secretariat] is located. Hence, accredited ODR service providers shall
disclose the physical location of their platforms, including the postal address
and contact information, such as e-mail addresses of the ODR service pro-
viders and telephone numbers.
Article 16
Privacy and confidentiality
a) All the information contained and distributed shall observe all the data
protection law and the confidentiality requirements established by
European law.
b) The ODR platform shall maintain a high level of security, such as Secure
Sockets Layer and cryptographic protocols, hence providing authentica-
tion procedures for access to cases files and other data.
Article 17
User information
The following information shall be clearly displayed by all accredited ODR
service providers:
a) the identities and affiliations of the ODR service providers, their managers
and interveners;
b) a description of the type of dispute which may be referred to as well as any
existing restriction regarding territorial coverage and the effect of the
decision;
c) whether the process is meant to be exclusively online, or both offline
and online, and what it entails. Online processes shall disclose the
system requirements (hardware and software) for using the ODR
platform;
d) requirements that consumers must meet, such as the previous attempt
to obtain redress through the business internal complaint system;
e) an explanation about what is a neutral mediator, arbitrator, neutral third
party and other terms to which parties may be unfamiliar;
f ) information about the credentials and experience of neutral third parties;
g) clear and unambiguous information about the processes involved and
how users can best manage their cases;
h) information on time limitations and the suspension of prescription
periods when applicable;
i) indication of fees and costs to be borne by the parties;
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j) where mediation and arbitration are offered, simple and clear information
for parties about the differences between the services shall be available;
k) rules that serve as the basis for the decision, including legal provisions,
considerations of equity and code of conduct;
l) the legal force of the decision taken, that is, whether and when an
accredited ODR service provider would issue binding or non-binding
outcomes;
m) whether the decisions are made publicly available;
n) when online arbitration is used, parties shall be informed how the arbitral
award is delivered and how parties can enforce it;
o) parties are entitled to be informed of the decisions, its legal status, and




a) Consumers shall be informed in clear and understandable language,
before agreeing to a suggested settlement that they have the choice to
agree or disagree with the suggested settlement.
b) Any decision or agreed settlement should be recorded on a durable
medium.
Article 19
Suspension of legal proceedings
Where a lawsuit is pending between the parties to a civil dispute which may
be settled by an accredited ODR service provider, the court in charge of the
case, upon request of one of the parties, may decide that the legal proceeding
shall be suspended for a period of not more than four months.
Article 20
Submission of business reports
a) Accredited ODR service providers shall prepare and submit to the ECC-
Net a business report, inventory list, balance sheet and expenditure
statements for each business year within three months after the end of the
business year.
b) The Business Report shall consist of information about the number and
type of disputes being handled by the accredited ODR service provider,
including the type of claims, any systematic problem arising from com-
plaints, the number of disputes resulting in settlement or agreement




a) The EU-Confidence logo shall be given to all ODR service providers
who are considered by the Commission and the ECC-Net to comply
consistently with the present Regulation.
b) All online businesses that adhere to an accredited ODR body shall be
permitted also to display the same logo as long as these businesses provide
an internal complaint-handling system which is credible, works efficiently
and is subject to independent monitoring or auditing by the ECC-Net.
Article 22
Liability
Accredited ODR providers shall be liable for damages caused to any person
who relies on the trustmark as to the accuracy of the information therein
represented; unless the ECC-Net recognises that the accredited ODR pro-
vider had not acted negligently. The European Commission and the ECC-Net




Accredited ODR service providers shall have a feedback system where users
will post their satisfaction levels. Even though accredited ODR providers
may decide on the publication of their feedback ratings, these shall form part
of the annual report submitted to the ECC-Net.
Article 24
Inspection
If the ECC-Net considers that there is an accredited ODR body that does
not comply with the Regulation, the ECC-Net shall remove the accreditation
from the ODR service provider.
Notes
1 Regulation 593/2008 of the Parliament and the Council of 17 June 2008 on the
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I) OJ L177 art 6; Regulation
44/2001 of 22 December on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters [2000] OJ L12 art 15.
2 Regulation (EC) 861/2007 of 11 July 2007 establishing a European Small Claims
Procedure [2007] OJ L199/1.
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